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The Final Report of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone
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Volume 3B
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Volume 3b: Chapter 2: External Actors and their Impact on the Conflict
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CHAPTER TWO
External Actors and their Impact on the Conflict
Introduction
1.
Non-interference of one state in the internal affairs of another state is a core principle of international relations. In reality, however, there has hardly been an intra-state conflict in the world that has not seen the involvement of external actors. These external actors typically provide military, political or moral support to one or a variety of competing factions, or they attempt to arbitrate and implement resolutions to the conflict.
2.
There are many reasons and motivations behind the participation of external actors in intra-state conflicts. These parties may be lured into a conflict by a shared ideology with one of the factions, or by ethnic, religious or other identity sentiments. Furthermore, the strategic importance of the conflict-affected state, geo-political interests or economic considerations could also be taken into account before intervening in intra-state conflicts. The involvement of external actors could also result from compliance with obligations under international protocols or membership of regional or international institutions, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations (UN). The conflict in Sierra Leone was not a war imposed from outside: it was an internal armed conflict in which certain external actors became involved.
3.
As part of its mandate to unearth the antecedents, causes and nature of Sierra Leone’s conflict, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC” or “the Commission”) recognised the importance of investigating the role of external actors. There were two main parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone - the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Government of Sierra Leone. It should be accepted at the outset that each of these parties underwent numerous changes of character in the course of the conflict and formed alliances with other factions that were neither predictable nor enduring. Nevertheless, all the other factions that took part in the conflict can be loosely placed under one of these two parties, including the various external actors who offered their support in the course of the war.
4.
For the purposes of analysis, the Commission has divided the Sierra Leone conflict into three phases. This chapter begins by examining the involvement of external actors in the pre-conflict years and the first phase of conventional “target” warfare from 1991 to late 1993. It then tracks these external actors, along with others who joined the conflict, throughout the second phase, from late 1993 up to March 1997, and the third phase, from 1997 to 2002.
External Actors in the Pre-Conflict Period up to 1991 and in Phase I of the Conflict: March 1991-1993
Libya: preparing revolutionaries in pursuit of ideology
5.
The involvement of external actors in Sierra Leone’s conflict can be traced to the 1970s when attempts were made by different groups of Sierra Leoneans to undo Siaka Steven’s decade-old hegemonic grip on the country. These efforts included the nation-wide student demonstrations of 1977, which largely failed in the face of a violent clampdown by state security forces. Since the demonstrations did not yield a regime change, the students resorted to political sensitisation on college campuses and among youths in greater Freetown. Initially the sensitisation took the form of study groups. On the Fourah Bay College (FBC) campus of the University of Sierra Leone, a number of study groups sprang up. Prominent among these was the Green Book Study Group.
6.
The Green Book contains the political philosophy of the Libyan President, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, which is known as the Third Universal Theory. It advocates the creation of a Jamahiriya - a peoples’ state. Ghaddafi claimed that the Third Universal Theory is instrumental to the emancipation of the human race. The spread of Ghaddafi’s political philosophy became a key foreign policy objective of the Libyan state. Even before he began supporting revolutionary movements in different parts of the world, Ghaddafi offered diplomatic relations and foreign aid in furtherance of his aim of spreading his political philosophy. Libya gave financial assistance to Sierra Leonean Muslims in the late 1970s in order to perform the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. The Libyan government also provided funds to assist the Sierra Leone government to host the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in 1980.
7.
As part of a wide range of foreign policy tools to influence events outside Libya, Ghaddafi provided a safe haven and weapons training for individuals who wished to instigate revolutionary struggle in their own countries. These were people who had been branded as terrorists, dissidents and insurgents by their own governments but who (in many cases) were engaged in resistance to overthrow dictatorial and colonial regimes. Ghaddafi also created front organisations for their operations in neighbouring states.
8.
A number of formal bodies were responsible for the execution of Libya’s foreign policy. These included the Foreign Liaison Secretariat, the Secretariat for External Security, the Divisions of General and Military Intelligence, the Libyan Special Security Forces, and the Secretariat of Justice.
9.
As part of Libya’s foreign policy strategy, Libyan Peoples’ Bureaus and Revolutionary Committees / Councils facilitated the setting up of revolutionary movements in a number of countries. In 1985, a renewed drive was undertaken to extend Libya’s influence in the third world.
10.
Members of the Green Book Study Group at FBC had established contacts with Libyan authorities in the early 1980s. In 1985 three lecturers and 41 students were expelled from FBC following allegedly riotous conduct by students after a convocation ceremony, on and off the campus in Freetown. Alie Kabbah, the student union leader, along with some of the other students who were expelled, travelled to Ghana towards the end of 1985. The Commission received a variety of accounts of the steps that occurred next and the following descriptions can reflect only the experiences and perspectives of those cited.
11.
The then President of Ghana, Flight Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings, and his government had an avowed revolutionary posture. He was perceived as a proponent of pan-Africanism. The majority of the radical students who were expelled from FBC were members of the Pan-African Union organisation (PANAFU). Upon arrival in Accra, some of the students were received by the Chief of the Libyan Peoples’ Bureau in Ghana. Some of the students gained admission into the University of Ghana at Legon to complete their studies. The Libyan government paid their fees and their up-keep on scholarships. While in Ghana, the student radicals were invited to attend seminars and conferences in Libya. Their trips were funded by the Revolutionary Council of Libya.
12.
Alie Kabbah and his colleagues in Ghana subsequently worked out a programme with the Libyan authorities to train Sierra Leonean revolutionaries to overthrow the All Peoples’ Party (APC) regime. About 25 Sierra Leoneans participated in such training in Libya between 1987 and 1989. In 1986 some of the students in Ghana travelled to Conakry to meet with members of PANAFU from Sierra Leone. It was resolved thereafter that four members of PANAFU would be sent from Sierra Leone for training in Libya. They travelled to Ghana where they stayed with Alie Kabbah and his colleagues in their hostel for a week before proceeding to Libya. They were joined by three others who had been based in Ghana. All of these Sierra Leonean dissidents travelled to Libya without proper travel documents. This suggests that the Ghanaian authorities were aware of their presence and movement. The government however declined to comment on the issue on an invitation by the Commission.
13.
The training in Libya was mainly premised on ideology. It commenced in around August 1987 and ended in January 1988. Sierra Leoneans who subsequently travelled to Libya received not only ideological training, but also military training. In 1988, another group of Sierra Leoneans was sent to Libya for training.
Liberia: assembling the RUF war machine and launching war
14.
Liberians were undergoing military training during 1988 to begin a revolution of their own against President Samuel K. Doe. In the course of the training in Libya, a disagreement arose among the Sierra Leonean revolutionaries regarding the timing and manner of the proposed revolution in Sierra Leone. Contrary to what the Libyans and some Sierra Leonean radicals wanted, the group of student revolutionaries wanted a well-structured revolution that would be restricted to Sierra Leone. The student-led group became known as the Alie Kabbah group. The Alie Kabbah group wanted more time to plan such a revolution. The Libyans wanted the Sierra Leonean revolutionaries to join the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), in their revolution against Doe and then move on to Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor, who was leading the Liberians, was quick to take advantage of the split in the ranks of the Sierra Leoneans by aligning with Foday Sankoh , a former corporal in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), who emerged as the leader of the more militant faction. Sankoh had no prior prominence within the Sierra Leonean revolutionary movement, but was willing to go with Taylor’s NPFL to Liberia.
15.
After the training of the NPFL forces concluded in Libya in 1989, Charles Taylor travelled to Sierra Leone and requested President Joseph Saidu Momoh to allow him to use Sierra Leone as a launch pad for his revolution into Liberia. The request was not granted because of the Mano River Union (MRU) Protocol that disallowed the interference of one MRU Member State in the affairs of another. Not only was Taylor’s request turned down, he was also arrested and incarcerated at the Sierra Leone maximum security prison at Pademba Road. Nevertheless, it was alleged by President Kabbah that the APC Government received money from Taylor to look favourably on his request to use Sierra Leone as a launching pad for war in Liberia.
16.
In 1990, the Economic Community of West Africa States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) undertook ‘Operation Liberty’ in an effort to quell the crisis in Liberia. Sierra Leone was used as a forward base and as a launch pad for subsequent ECOMOG operations in Liberia. ECOMOG’s success in preventing the NPFL from taking over Monrovia in 1990 was regarded by Taylor as a calculated move to prevent his ascension as President of Liberia. Taylor saw Sierra Leone as a major player in the success of ECOMOG’s operations in Liberia. In early 1991 Taylor, in an interview with the BBC, vented his disappointment with Sierra Leone and vowed that the country would “taste the bitterness of war”. Taylor had captured territories in Liberia, whi
