From Freetown, Sierra Leone.
Volume 3b: Chapter 2: External Actors and their Impact on the Conflict
CHAPTER TWO
External Actors and their Impact on the Conflict
Introduction
1. Non-interference of one state in the internal affairs of another
state is a core principle of international relations. In reality,
however, there has hardly been an intra-state conflict in the world
that has not seen the involvement of external actors. These external
actors typically provide military, political or moral support to one or
a variety of competing factions, or they attempt to arbitrate and
implement resolutions to the conflict.
2. There are many reasons
and motivations behind the participation of external actors in
intra-state conflicts. These parties may be lured into a conflict by a
shared ideology with one of the factions, or by ethnic, religious or
other identity sentiments. Furthermore, the strategic importance of the
conflict-affected state, geo-political interests or economic
considerations could also be taken into account before intervening in
intra-state conflicts. The involvement of external actors could also
result from compliance with obligations under international protocols
or membership of regional or international institutions, like the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United
Nations (UN). The conflict in Sierra Leone was not a war imposed from
outside: it was an internal armed conflict in which certain external
actors became involved.
3. As part of its mandate to unearth the
antecedents, causes and nature of Sierra Leone’s conflict, the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC” or “the Commission”) recognised
the importance of investigating the role of external actors. There were
two main parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone - the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) and the Government of Sierra Leone. It should be
accepted at the outset that each of these parties underwent numerous
changes of character in the course of the conflict and formed alliances
with other factions that were neither predictable nor enduring.
Nevertheless, all the other factions that took part in the conflict can
be loosely placed under one of these two parties, including the various
external actors who offered their support in the course of the war.
4.
For the purposes of analysis, the Commission has divided the Sierra
Leone conflict into three phases. This chapter begins by examining the
involvement of external actors in the pre-conflict years and the first
phase of conventional “target” warfare from 1991 to late 1993. It then
tracks these external actors, along with others who joined the
conflict, throughout the second phase, from late 1993 up to March 1997,
and the third phase, from 1997 to 2002.
External Actors in the Pre-Conflict Period up to 1991 and in Phase I of the Conflict: March 1991-1993
Libya: preparing revolutionaries in pursuit of ideology
5.
The involvement of external actors in Sierra Leone’s conflict can be
traced to the 1970s when attempts were made by different groups of
Sierra Leoneans to undo Siaka Steven’s decade-old hegemonic grip on the
country. These efforts included the nation-wide student demonstrations
of 1977, which largely failed in the face of a violent clampdown by
state security forces. Since the demonstrations did not yield a regime
change, the students resorted to political sensitisation on college
campuses and among youths in greater Freetown. Initially the
sensitisation took the form of study groups. On the Fourah Bay College
(FBC) campus of the University of Sierra Leone, a number of study
groups sprang up. Prominent among these was the Green Book Study Group.
6.
The Green Book contains the political philosophy of the Libyan
President, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, which is known as the Third
Universal Theory. It advocates the creation of a Jamahiriya - a
peoples’ state. Ghaddafi claimed that the Third Universal Theory is
instrumental to the emancipation of the human race. The spread of
Ghaddafi’s political philosophy became a key foreign policy objective
of the Libyan state. Even before he began supporting revolutionary
movements in different parts of the world, Ghaddafi offered diplomatic
relations and foreign aid in furtherance of his aim of spreading his
political philosophy. Libya gave financial assistance to Sierra Leonean
Muslims in the late 1970s in order to perform the annual hajj
pilgrimage to Mecca. The Libyan government also provided funds to
assist the Sierra Leone government to host the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU) summit in 1980.
7. As part of a wide range of
foreign policy tools to influence events outside Libya, Ghaddafi
provided a safe haven and weapons training for individuals who wished
to instigate revolutionary struggle in their own countries. These were
people who had been branded as terrorists, dissidents and insurgents by
their own governments but who (in many cases) were engaged in
resistance to overthrow dictatorial and colonial regimes. Ghaddafi also
created front organisations for their operations in neighbouring states.
8.
A number of formal bodies were responsible for the execution of Libya’s
foreign policy. These included the Foreign Liaison Secretariat, the
Secretariat for External Security, the Divisions of General and
Military Intelligence, the Libyan Special Security Forces, and the
Secretariat of Justice.
9. As part of Libya’s foreign policy
strategy, Libyan Peoples’ Bureaus and Revolutionary Committees /
Councils facilitated the setting up of revolutionary movements in a
number of countries. In 1985, a renewed drive was undertaken to extend
Libya’s influence in the third world.
10. Members of the Green
Book Study Group at FBC had established contacts with Libyan
authorities in the early 1980s. In 1985 three lecturers and 41 students
were expelled from FBC following allegedly riotous conduct by students
after a convocation ceremony, on and off the campus in Freetown. Alie
Kabbah, the student union leader, along with some of the other students
who were expelled, travelled to Ghana towards the end of 1985. The
Commission received a variety of accounts of the steps that occurred
next and the following descriptions can reflect only the experiences
and perspectives of those cited.
11. The then President of
Ghana, Flight Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings, and his government had an
avowed revolutionary posture. He was perceived as a proponent of
pan-Africanism. The majority of the radical students who were expelled
from FBC were members of the Pan-African Union organisation (PANAFU).
Upon arrival in Accra, some of the students were received by the Chief
of the Libyan Peoples’ Bureau in Ghana. Some of the students gained
admission into the University of Ghana at Legon to complete their
studies. The Libyan government paid their fees and their up-keep on
scholarships. While in Ghana, the student radicals were invited to
attend seminars and conferences in Libya. Their trips were funded by
the Revolutionary Council of Libya.
12. Alie Kabbah and his
colleagues in Ghana subsequently worked out a programme with the Libyan
authorities to train Sierra Leonean revolutionaries to overthrow the
All Peoples’ Party (APC) regime. About 25 Sierra Leoneans participated
in such training in Libya between 1987 and 1989. In 1986 some of the
students in Ghana travelled to Conakry to meet with members of PANAFU
from Sierra Leone. It was resolved thereafter that four members of
PANAFU would be sent from Sierra Leone for training in Libya. They
travelled to Ghana where they stayed with Alie Kabbah and his
colleagues in their hostel for a week before proceeding to Libya. They
were joined by three others who had been based in Ghana. All of these
Sierra Leonean dissidents travelled to Libya without proper travel
documents. This suggests that the Ghanaian authorities were aware of
their presence and movement. The government however declined to comment
on the issue on an invitation by the Commission.
13. The
training in Libya was mainly premised on ideology. It commenced in
around August 1987 and ended in January 1988. Sierra Leoneans who
subsequently travelled to Libya received not only ideological training,
but also military training. In 1988, another group of Sierra Leoneans
was sent to Libya for training.
Liberia: assembling the RUF war machine and launching war
14.
Liberians were undergoing military training during 1988 to begin a
revolution of their own against President Samuel K. Doe. In the course
of the training in Libya, a disagreement arose among the Sierra Leonean
revolutionaries regarding the timing and manner of the proposed
revolution in Sierra Leone. Contrary to what the Libyans and some
Sierra Leonean radicals wanted, the group of student revolutionaries
wanted a well-structured revolution that would be restricted to Sierra
Leone. The student-led group became known as the Alie Kabbah group. The
Alie Kabbah group wanted more time to plan such a revolution. The
Libyans wanted the Sierra Leonean revolutionaries to join the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), in their revolution against Doe and
then move on to Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor, who was leading the
Liberians, was quick to take advantage of the split in the ranks of the
Sierra Leoneans by aligning with Foday Sankoh , a former corporal in
the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), who emerged as
the leader of the more militant faction. Sankoh had no prior prominence
within the Sierra Leonean revolutionary movement, but was willing to go
with Taylor’s NPFL to Liberia.
15. After the training of the
NPFL forces concluded in Libya in 1989, Charles Taylor travelled to
Sierra Leone and requested President Joseph Saidu Momoh to allow him to
use Sierra Leone as a launch pad for his revolution into Liberia. The
request was not granted because of the Mano River Union (MRU) Protocol
that disallowed the interference of one MRU Member State in the affairs
of another. Not only was Taylor’s request turned down, he was also
arrested and incarcerated at the Sierra Leone maximum security prison
at Pademba Road. Nevertheless, it was alleged by President Kabbah that
the APC Government received money from Taylor to look favourably on his
request to use Sierra Leone as a launching pad for war in Liberia.
16.
In 1990, the Economic Community of West Africa States Ceasefire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) undertook ‘Operation Liberty’ in an effort to
quell the crisis in Liberia. Sierra Leone was used as a forward base
and as a launch pad for subsequent ECOMOG operations in Liberia.
ECOMOG’s success in preventing the NPFL from taking over Monrovia in
1990 was regarded by Taylor as a calculated move to prevent his
ascension as President of Liberia. Taylor saw Sierra Leone as a major
player in the success of ECOMOG’s operations in Liberia. In early 1991
Taylor, in an interview with the BBC, vented his disappointment with
Sierra Leone and vowed that the country would “taste the bitterness of
war”. Taylor had captured territories in Liberia, which he made
available for the further training of RUF fighters. On Sankoh’s
request, the NPFL began turning over Sierra Leoneans captured in
Liberia for training. Taylor also provided trainers from among his NPFL
commandos. The recruits who received training from Taylor’s men in NPFL
territories in Liberia became known as the RUF “vanguards”.
17.
The RUF launched its insurgency without any independent direction or
means, due to the sizeable presence of Taylor’s men among them. As
explained in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the
Conflict, NPFL fighters outnumbered their RUF counterparts by four to
one. In addition, as pointed out by one Sierra Leone researcher, “those
Liberian NPFL fighters never took orders from Sankoh, but from Taylor
or NPFL commanders”. Taylor and his men were in control of operations
at the initial stage; indeed, it has even been suggested that the
presence of Sierra Leoneans was merely designed to lend an indigenous
flavour to the incursions. It is perhaps best to relay the experience
of local people on the ground at this time through excerpts from TRC
statements in which Liberian or NPFL fighters are mentioned:
“…
On 23 March 1991, there was a cross border attack on Bomaru town, Upper
Bambara Chiefdom… The elders resolved to send a fact finding mission to
ascertain what happened…I led a team of seven men to Bomaru. On our
arrival, we were shocked and dismayed about the killings of up to 13
civilians. We went to the point where Major Foday was killed. I met his
body hanging through the roof and blood flowing freely on the ground.
Among the 13 civilians killed were 7 men, 4 women and 2 children. They
had bullet holes all over their bodies. We were informed that the
conflict was…between the Sierra Leone Army stationed at Bomaru and
rebels of the NPFL of Liberia….
… Early in April, 1991, the
Liberians launched the attack on a full scale… days later, the rebels
attacked the chiefdom headquarter town of Pendembu. They entered the
town firing and bombing from all angles… later they called the trapped
residents to assemble at the town barray… The commander, speaking
through an interpreter in Liberian pidgin English, explained the
mission and their aim of taking on the APC Government. He announced his
organisation as Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone… he was
Colonel Sherita, a chartered mercenary for the mission…”
[and]
“…On
the day my father was killed, he was at home discussing with his
friends when the rebels attacked shooting indiscriminately with no
specific target. These rebels were from Liberia….”
Burkina Faso: an early backer of the RUF’s war efforts
18.
Statements taken by the Commission show that fighters from Burkina
Faso, known as Burkinabes, were involved in the early stages of the
conflict. Burkinabes were fighting on the side of RUF. Sierra Leone
military personnel found Burkina Faso identification cards on some
members of the rebel fighters who were killed at battle front:
“It
happened at Ngolawahun, Sorogbema in Pujehun district in May 1991 where
Mr. Moseray was asked to hand over his cigarette to the Burkinabes who
were part of the RUF. The rebels captured and killed him for refusing
to give them his cigarette.”
“It was in 1991 and I was staying
with my aunt as a ward. When the RUF - Burkinabes - first entered
Pujehun. I was at the stream with my companions. We were laundering
clothes. We were caught and sexually abused by those rebels. I was
eight years then and about three to four of them had sex with me. I was
deflowered...”
19. Although there were no suggestions that
Burkina Faso was involved at state level, the relationship between
Taylor and Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso is noteworthy. The two were
close friends. Campaore had introduced Taylor to Thomas Sankara and
Ghaddafi in a bid to establish contacts for the rebellion in Liberia.
In 1991, six Burkinabes, led by Captain Ndola Wasando, were captured by
Sierra Leone Army personnel in Kailahun.
20. The speed with
which the RUF attacked other towns and villages after the attack on
Bomaru on 23 March 1991 was greatly assisted by the involvement of
Liberian NPFL fighters and the Burkinabes. The Liberians and Burkinabes
were trained in guerrilla warfare and had prior experience in the war
in Liberia. The Liberians and Burkinabes fighters devised the crude
strategies around enlisting new fighters, including recruiting child
combatants. Their intimidatory practices included forcing children to
kill their parents in the full view of onlookers from community. The
rationale was that those children, forever haunted by their actions,
would then stay with the rebels. The Liberians and Burkinabes also
committed atrocities ranging from systematic rape to cannibalism.
21.
The initial response of the APC Government of President Joseph Saidu
Momoh to the attack on Bomaru was to dismiss it as an act of banditry.
However, when Pujehun District and other parts of the country came
under attack, it was clear that a strong army was needed to curb the
invasion of the RUF. The strength of the military in 1991 was about
3,500 (three thousand five hundred) men. The military had an almost
empty armoury. It was under these circumstances that the RSLMF
requested military assistance from the Republic of Guinea.
Guinea: the first state to provide combat support for the Government of Sierra Leone
22. The bilateral defence pact between Sierra Leone and
Guinea to provide defence assistance in times of crisis dates back to
1971. In 1971, Guinean soldiers were in Sierra Leone to help the
government of President Siaka Stevens quell an attempted coup. In 1982
upon the request of the Guinean Armed Forces, the RSLMF sent a medical
team to help Guineans in the face of a natural disaster.
23.
Guinean Armed Forces personnel arrived in Sierra Leone three weeks
after the attack on Bomaru and went straight to the battle front at
Daru where: “the intervention of the Guinean forces at that time saved
the lives of men and officers of the RSLMF who were at Daru barracks
which had been surrounded by the rebel forces”. The Guinean Armed
Forces supplied much-needed arms and ammunition to the RSLMF up to 1993.
ULIMO: united with the Government in opposition to RUF / NPFL
24. Since the initial invaders of Sierra Leone were
predominantly Liberians, the personnel of the RSLMF had reasons to be
suspicious of anyone who had a Liberian accent. Liberians living in
refugee camps in Eastern Sierra Leone were not spared such suspicion
and in some cases they were targeted by personnel of the RSLMF. Some
Liberians were killed in the process. The situation in the Liberian
refugee camps became deplorable. This resulted in a meeting between
Momoh and General Kapeh, who was a former Liberian ambassador to Sierra
Leone under President Doe. At that meeting, Kapeh expressed his
government’s willingness to help the Sierra Leone government prosecute
the war. Doe’s government saw the war as an NPFL invasion. As a result
of that meeting, Dar Youlou was asked by Kapeh to organise Liberians in
the refugee camps and other parts of Sierra Leone into a fighting group
to fight along side the RSLMF. Dar Youlou (alias D-Wah) named the group
‘Liberian United Defence Force’ (LUDF). The name LUDF was rejected and
changed to United Liberation Movement (ULIMO). According to a senior
officer of the group, the name LUDF was changed because they were not
in Liberia and they were not fighting for the Liberian people, but for
Sierra Leoneans.
25. ULIMO mainly recruited Mandingos and
Krahns. Mandingos and Krahns were supporters of the Doe regime and
therefore the main targets of the NPFL fighting forces:
“….At
one time in Monrovia, my father called me and told me that the names
Koroma and Kanneh were the names the Liberians didn’t want to hear. If
you were in Liberia and you carried any of those names, you would be
killed. My father was a twin; Koroma was his name. When we crossed the
river, they killed my father and took away all his belongings….’’
26.
Some former soldiers of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), who fled
from the war in Liberia, were also in the ULIMO group and these
soldiers were given guns and uniforms. One of the training camps of
ULIMO was in an oil palm farm near Kpetema village along the Kenema and
Zimmi highway in the East of Sierra Leone. Major James Yayah Kanu, who
was the Brigade Commander in Kenema, was charged with the
responsibility of overseeing the ULIMO training. After the training,
ULIMO forces were put under his command. The Liberian Roosevelt Johnson
was named the field commander of ULIMO.
27. ULIMO was to
set up a joint task force with the RSLAF at the war front to launch
offensives against RUF positions and recapture RUF-controlled
territories. However, from the outset ULIMO commanders were intent on
establishing a corridor into Liberia to resume the war against Taylor’s
NPFL. A former ULIMO fighter told the Commission that the organisation
also wanted to save the Liberians in refugee camps in Sierra Leone from
the abuses of personnel of the RSLAF.
28. Internal ethnic
divisions soon began to compromise the cohesion of the ULIMO force. In
particular, fighters began to align themselves according to their
allegiances to either the Mandingo or the Krahn ethnic groups, the two
dominant tribes in the organisation. Ethnic Krahn fighters remained
close to Roosevelt Johnson and formed a loyalist group called ULIMO-J.
Meanwhile Mandingo financiers in Kenema and some Guinean officials
rallied around rival commander Alhaji Kromah to create the splinter
group ULIMO-K. In 1993 ULIMO fighters from both sets crossed into
Liberia to fight against Taylor’s NPFL. The weapons supplied for the
war against the RUF were instead used by ULIMO to carry out its own
fight against Taylor and the NPFL in Liberia.
29. ULIMO troops
under the command of Charles Collins , who went to protect the diamond
fields in Tongo in 1991, executed hundreds of civilians accused of
being members or collaborators of the RUF. Most of the executions were
carried out on a hill between Lalihun and Giehun. This hill became
known as ‘Rebel Hill’, a nickname that is still used by the locals
today. Although ULIMO succeeded in retaking some areas, including
Pujehun, the RUF invasion of the country persisted. Greater military
strength was required to protect Sierra Leone from the incursions.
Nigeria: intervening to assist the Government of Sierra Leone
30.
At the request of the Sierra Leone government, Nigeria sent a small
force in late 1991 and they guarded RSLMF bases and installations.
Apart from formal requests or protocols for military assistance,
officials of both Nigeria and Sierra Leone pointed to socio-cultural
ties between the two countries as good reason for Nigerian support.
Socio-cultural ties between Sierra Leone and Nigeria have their genesis
in the end of slavery and the establishment of Freetown as a haven for
freed slaves. Slaves from Nigeria bound for the New World, freed by
British naval boats, were resettled in Freetown. These ex-slaves from
the Americas and Britain became known as the Krios, with a cultural
identity that drew much from Nigerian heritage. President Olusegun
Obasanjo talked about this ‘blood relationship’ between Nigerians and
Sierra Leoneans as the foundation and justification for Nigeria’s
military and diplomatic intervention in Sierra Leone.
31.
The desire to give a regional outlook to ECOMOG in Liberia also
accounted for Nigeria’s deployment of troops in Sierra Leone. Nigeria
also supplied direct support to Sierra Leone’s own military efforts. It
sent soldiers to Sierra Leone to protect military installations and
other strategic facilities so as to enable Sierra Leone send a
contingent of troops to the ECOMOG mission in Liberia.
32. In
April 1992 junior officers of the RSLMF moved to Freetown from the war
front and overthrew the government of Momoh. They established the
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and promised to expel the
rebels from Sierra Leone. In pursuit of this promise the NPRC embarked
on mass recruitment into the army and thousands of youths who had
little or no formal education found themselves in the army.
33.
The NPRC continued the diplomatic and military relations between
Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and a “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA) was
signed with the Nigerian government, which led to the deployment of the
Nigerian Armed Forces Training Group (NATAG). NATAG had a specific
mandate to provide training to the Sierra Leone military. In spite of
such support the fortunes of the Sierra Leone army at the war front did
not change for the better and by the end of 1993 the RUF had taken much
of the Southern and Eastern parts of the country.
Phase II of the Conflict: 1994-1997
Government of Sierra Leone searches for solutions through diplomacy and non-state private armies
34.
By the beginning of 1994 disciplinary problems, due to factional
fighting in ULIMO’s ranks, began to take their toll on the
organisation’s prosecution of the war in Sierra Leone. There was a
dispute between Kapeh and Youlou, commanders of ULIMO. Colonel Tom
Nyuma , NPRC secretary of state for the Eastern province, called a
meeting to settle the dispute. Youlou took the opportunity to express
his anger and dislike for Kapeh. Following that, he ordered Mandingo
fighters of ULIMO to kill Kapeh. Kapeh tried to escape, but was killed.
Following this incident, in June and July 1994, all ULIMO personnel
operating in Sierra Leone were disarmed by the SLA contingent at
Waterloo and taken to the Allen Town camp in Mayami.
35. By the
end of the year, the RUF had brought the war to the outskirts of the
capital city, Freetown, when it captured Newton. The NPRC chairman,
Captain Valentine Strasser , promising amnesty, asked the RUF to cease
hostilities. The RUF turned down the request and continued hostilities.
The maiden intervention of the United Nations (UN)
36.
In November 1994 the NPRC Chairman, Valentine Strasser, wrote a letter
to the UN Secretary General asking the UN to facilitate negotiations
between his government and the RUF. The UN Security Council responded
by sending an exploratory mission to Sierra Leone on 15 December 1994
and the team travelled across the country. Following the report of the
Mission, Mr. Berhanu Dinka of Ethiopia was appointed Special Envoy to
Sierra Leone two months later. The role of the UN Special Envoy
included facilitating negotiations between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the RUF and returning Sierra Leone to civilian rule. However,
the presence of the UN Special Envoy in Sierra Leone did not stop the
terror campaign of the RUF.
37. It was in these circumstances
that Strasser’s government hired the services of the Ghurkhas Security
Group (GSG) in 1995. The GSG was a privately owned British company
formed in 1989 and specialised in recruiting former British army
Ghurkhas officers and soldiers for security services. GSG was
sub-contracted to the Sierra Leone mission by J&S Franklin Limited,
a British manufacturer of non-lethal military equipment and a weapons
sales agent.
38. The GSG was to train the presidential guards
and the RSLMF in counter insurgency techniques and safeguard Camp
Charlie - a military base at Mile 91. The GSG arrived in Sierra Leone
in February 1995 with 58 Ghurkhas and three European managers. The NPRC
had acquired two Russian Mi-24 helicopter gunships, manned by
Belarusian mercenary pilots, and engaged in attacks on a number of RUF
bases. The GSG refused to conduct offensive operations against the RUF,
arguing that it did not form part of their contract. On 24 February
1995 the GSG commander, Mackenzie, and other personnel were killed in
an ambush by the RUF and two months later the GSG withdrew from Sierra
Leone. In their short stay, the Ghurkhas achieved nothing. The abrupt
withdrawal of the GSG, at a time when the RUF had intensified its
operations in areas close to the capital city, not only created a
precarious security situation, but caused much embarrassment for the
NPRC government which had promised to pursue the rebels by land, sea
and air.
39. The NPRC government asked a former AFL soldier,
Brigadier-General David Bropleh, to re-organise the disarmed ULIMO
fighters so that they could fight on the side of government. The NPRC
government and ULIMO authorities agreed, among other things, to drop
the name ULIMO and the fighters were to be constituted as part of the
Sierra Leone Army as a new unit called the Special Task Force. Members
of the Special Task Force would serve under the laws and army rules of
Sierra Leone. The recruited Liberians were issued with Sierra Leone
military identity cards.
40. On 5 May 1995 the first batch of
Special Task Force personnel was re-armed and sent with Sierra Leone
Army personnel to fight at the Waterloo front against the RUF. On 10
June 1995 a second batch was re-armed and also sent to the war front in
the Bo District area. The Special Task Force went on to score
significant successes at its various war front deployments. In spite of
the successes, there were many areas that remained under the control
RUF.
The enlistment of Executive Outcomes
41.
The NPRC government secured the services of Executive Outcomes, a South
African private security firm. Executive Outcomes was introduced to
Strasser by Michael Grunberg and Anthony Buckingham of the mining
company, Branch Energy. The contract required Executive Outcomes to
provide between 150 and 200 soldiers, fully equipped with helicopter
support. Executive Outcomes was to help repel the RUF from the Freetown
area, secure government control of the diamond areas in Kono, help
stabilise the whole country and retrain the army and the Kamajor
militia. The company was to provide logistical support, sophisticated
communications equipment and transportation for the army.
42.
Executive Outcomes was set up in 1989 and was run by Luther Eeben
Barlow, previously a Lieutenant Colonel in the South African military
intelligence unit and a senior member of the Civilian Cooperation
Bureau (CCB). Executive Outcomes, in its early days, developed a
flourishing business relationship with the diamond-mining sector. In
1993 Executive Outcomes carried out its first significant military
operation in Angola for the Angolan government against UNITA.
43.
Between 1993 and 1995, Executive Outcomes changed its strategy and its
company profile. It expanded and became a fully-fledged private army.
British operations were established under Executive Outcomes (UK)
Limited and registered in London in September 1993. Barlow registered
Executive Outcomes as a private company in South Africa in 1994. Its
men were mostly ex-commandos who had worked for the former apartheid
government of South Africa.
44. Executive Outcomes was to
be paid two million US dollars ($2,000,000) a month by the Sierra Leone
government. Executive Outcomes financed its own activities at the
beginning, hoping to be reimbursed by the government of Sierra Leone
when control over the diamond mining areas was regained. Executive
Outcomes encountered financial problems between 1996 and 1997 because
of non-payment for its activities in Sierra Leone. In all, the company
was only paid about a third of its total fees for the eighteen months
it was in Sierra Leone. Part of these funds allegedly came from an IMF
loan to the government. Executive Outcomes was also partly paid in the
form of diamond concessions offered to Branch Energy, a diamond mining
company with close links to Executive Outcomes.
45. Executive
Outcomes, with its reconnaissance capabilities, air power, and
guerrilla warfare experience was able to beat back the RUF to Kailahun
and the Liberian border. It retook Kono and destroyed Camp Zogoda, the
RUF jungle base that acted as its headquarters. All of these military
and strategic gains were accomplished in only a few months.
RUF seeks foreign assistance in the face of defeat
46.
The RUF was thrown into disarray but it was not annihilated. In order
to continue its campaign in Sierra Leone, the RUF fell back on external
support. Libya, which had provided training for Sankoh and other Sierra
Leoneans, continued to give support to the RUF. In a letter to Brother
Mohamed Talibi, the Ambassador of the Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya in
Accra, Ghana, dated 26 June 1996, Sankoh wrote:
“I want to thank
you and the other brothers at home again for the half million United
States Dollars (500,000USD) which I received through you for the
purchase of needed materials to pursue the military mission”.
47.
In the same letter, Sankoh went on to make a further request for $(US)
1 million to “purchase twice the listed materials for effective and
smooth operation’’.
48. By the end of 1995 the NPRC clearly had
the upper hand in the war as the RUF had been pushed through Kailahun
District into Liberia. At this time, the people of Sierra Leone were
anxious for a return to democratic rule.
Elections and diplomatic initiatives to end the war
49.
In February and March 1996, multi-party elections brought the Ahmad
Tejan Kabbah-led Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) to power. External
involvement in Sierra Leone’s war remained insignificant, mainly taking
the form of international diplomacy and the occasional condemnation of
human rights violations and abuses taking place in the country.
Britain and the West: strategic contributions towards stability
50.
Britain provided financial support for the elections of February and
March 1996 with a contribution of some £17 million. The EU, the
Commonwealth, the US and the UN also provided funds and technical
support. The emerging opportunity for stability in Sierra Leone saw
other countries bolstering diplomatic initiatives to end the war.
Libya: bridging the gap to Peace Talks in 1996
51.
The Commission heard that Colonel Ghaddafi admitted supporting the RUF
when he was confronted on the issue by Julius Maada Bio, the second
Chairman of the NPRC, in 1996. Moreover Ghaddafi provided Bio with
vital information and direction as to how to get the RUF to the table
for peace talks. Ghaddafi’s counsel led – directly or indirectly – to
the first peace talks between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
RUF, which took place in Abidjan in 1996. Libya, which sent delegates
to the peace talks, promised the withdrawal of its support to the RUF.
The opening of those discussions was partly facilitated by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN to Sierra Leone, Mr.
Berhanu Dinka. Following the general elections of February and March
1996, the talks that had begun between the RUF and the NPRC Government
of Sierra Leone under Bio were taken up by the newly elected SLPP
Government of President Kabbah.
Côte d’Ivoire: a host and a catalyst for Peace Talks
52.
Konan Bedie, the President of Côte d’Ivoire and his foreign minister,
Amara Essé, were also instrumental in bringing the SLPP government and
Foday Sankoh together in Abidjan. Essé went to the bush to persuade
Sankoh to attend the peace talks. The Abidjan talks resulted in the
signing of a Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. The main elements of the
agreement included the total and immediate end of hostilities,
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all combatants, the
withdrawal from the country of all mercenaries and amnesty for RUF
fighters.
53. Sierra Leoneans were generally uncomfortable
with the Abidjan Accord. They were displeased, for example, with the
fact that Côte d’Ivoire had allowed the RUF to establish an office in
Abidjan. This gesture was not without precedent, however. Côte d’Ivoire
also permitted UNITA, which was waging war against the Angolan
government, to set up an office in Abidjan.
The RUF regroups and poses a renewed threat
54.
According to Kabbah, the RUF’s signing of the Abidjan Accord was a
deception. A few days after the signing of the Accord, the government
intercepted a message sent by Sankoh to his field commander, Sam
Bockarie (alias Mosquito), in which Sankoh told Sam Bockarie that he
signed the Accord to relieve international pressure on the RUF. In the
same message, Sankoh was said to have ordered his men to resume
hostilities on an even bigger scale. A month before the Abidjan Accord,
Sankoh wrote a letter to Talibi indicating that he had earlier received
US $29,000 through a certain Daniel Kallon. Sankoh said in the letter
that he would use the period after the signing of the Abidjan Peace
Agreement to “transact (my) business in getting (our) fighting
materials freely and easily’’. He further requested US $700,000 to help
purchase fighting materials.
55. Kabbah, demonstrating
commitment to the negotiated settlement of the war, terminated the
contract of Executive Outcomes in accordance with the Abidjan Accord.
The RUF had insisted on the early implementation of the clause that
provided for the withdrawal of all mercenaries. This was to
dramatically weaken the government’s military position. Sankoh had
refused to sign the document authorising the deployment of UN monitors.
Although the Executive Outcomes contract was terminated several of the
company’s personnel stayed on in Sierra Leone and took up other
security-related assignments.
56. After his election, Kabbah
made requests to the international community for assistance in the
areas of intelligence-gathering and training. The response of the
international community was negligible. Kabbah’s request to the US
government to assist his government with weapons, when it became clear
that the Abidjan Accord was not holding, was turned down. Another
request for assistance in training soldiers at Benguema to the US and
British governments, resulted in these countries sending five soldiers,
two Americans and three British. The highest-ranking soldier was a
sergeant. After a brief spell, the five trainers left without informing
the Commander-in-Chief of the RSLMF.
Phase III of the Conflict: 1997 – 2002
The coup of 25 May 1997
57.
In the early months of 1997 there was an alleged coup plot against the
Government of Kabbah. The government requested Nigerian assistance to
investigate the coup plot, which resulted in Johnny Paul Koroma and
other junior military officers being charged with treason. The trials
were taking place when soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army and a handful
of civilians staged a coup on 25 May 1997. Following the coup, Kabbah
and his cabinet fled to Guinea and the plotters established themselves
as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).
Greater international community involvement to end the coup
58.
The coup took place in an optimistic post-Cold War decade that had seen
the collapse of undemocratic one-party and military regimes across the
world. The coup was received with shock by world leaders as a setback
for the growth of democracy in Africa. It was swiftly condemned.
ECOWAS, OAU and the Commonwealth enter the fray
59.
On 4 June 1997, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its annual
meeting in Harare, only one week after the coup, called on Africa and
the world not to recognise the military junta in Sierra Leone. At the
same meeting the OAU appealed to ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra
Leone to restore constitutional order. The OAU stressed the “imperative
need to implement the Abidjan Peace Agreement” which, “continued to
serve as a viable framework for peace, stability and reconciliation in
Sierra Leone”.
60. Consequently, in June 1997, ECOWAS heads of
governments put forward three objectives on the Sierra Leone conflict.
The objectives were: 1) to ensure the early restoration of the
legitimate government of Kabbah; 2) the return of peace and security to
Sierra Leone; and 3) the resolution of the issues of refugees and
displaced persons. The OAU aimed to establish dialogue and negotiations
with the AFRC junta. Failing persuasion it aimed to impose economic
sanctions AFRC. The use of force to remove the junta from power was
also considered. A committee of four was established to implement the
action plan. The committee comprised the foreign ministers of Côte
d’Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria. The foreign minister of Liberia
was later added to the committee, making it a Committee of Five.
61.
The Committee first sought and received the support of the UN Security
Council for its initiatives in Sierra Leone. From 17 to 18 July 1997
the Committee met with representatives of the AFRC in Abidjan. The
Committee and junta representatives agreed that the issues relating to
the crisis in Sierra Leone should be peacefully resolved and a
cease-fire was agreed upon. It was also agreed that the junta would be
allowed to prepare to return the country to constitutional order. From
29 to 30 July 1997 the parties met again in Abidjan. While the meeting
was in progress, the AFRC announced in Freetown that they would remain
in power until 2001. This brought the renewed Abidjan negotiations to
an abrupt end.
62. ECOWAS heads of government at the twentieth
ordinary summit, in Abuja from 28 to 29 August 1997, proposed the
imposition of economic and other sanctions on the junta. These
sanctions covered weapons, petroleum and petroleum products, a travel
ban on members of the AFRC and members of their families and an embargo
on humanitarian aid. Recognising Article 53 of the UN Charter, which
provides that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the
Security Council”, the proposals were tabled before the UN Security
Council for approval. The UN Security Council Resolution 1132 of 8
October 1997 endorsed the sanctions but declined to endorse the use of
force to remove the junta from power or an embargo on humanitarian aid.
Under Article 7 of the ECOWAS decision, ECOMOG was mandated to “employ
all necessary means to enforce the implementation of this decision”.
Prior to the endorsement of sanctions and embargo, but after the coup
of 25 May 1997, the UN Secretary-General appointed Mr. Francis Okelo of
Uganda as the new Special Envoy to Sierra Leone.
63. The
sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and the UN were broadly welcomed by Sierra
Leoneans opposed to the AFRC. However, the measures took a heavy toll
on the civilian population. The fact that ECOMOG targeted humanitarian
aid in enforcing the sanctions partly contributed to the suffering of
civilians. On 7 November 1997 the World Food Programme, warned that the
health of thousands was at stake because humanitarian assistance had
not been allowed to cross into Sierra Leone from Guinea. On 11 November
1997 the ECOMOG Field Commander, General Victor Malu , announced that
clearance would be given for food aid to be brought into Sierra Leone
“within days”, but such clearance was not given until the end of the
year. ECOMOG was also accused of sinking boats carrying food shipments
as they entered the port of Freetown.
64. In spite of the
worsening humanitarian situation, ECOMOG and the international
community believed that the sanctions were vital to the success of the
intervention. This was also the view held by most Sierra Leoneans.
Peter Penfold , the former UK High Commissioner to Sierra Leone,
remarked that “the people of Sierra Leone were resolved to undergo
anything in exchange for democracy.”
65. Testimonies to the
Commission suggest that the sanctions and embargo greatly contributed
to the junta’s willingness to meet with the ECOWAS Committee of Five on
23 October 1997, in Conakry, Guinea for a fresh round of Peace Talks.
66.
At the Conakry meeting of October 1997, the representatives of the
junta and the ECOWAS Committee of Five agreed that the junta would hand
over power to President Kabbah on 22 May 1998, but that the sanctions
and embargo provided for in UN Security Council Resolution 1132 were to
be maintained. Provisions were made for the immediate cessation of
hostilities and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of
all combatants. Disarmament and demobilisation of combatants was to
commence on 1 December and end on 31 December 1997. Humanitarian
assistance, which would be monitored by ECOMOG and UN military observer
operations, would recommence on 14 November 1997. All those involved in
the coup were granted immunity from prosecution. This agreement came to
be known as the Conakry Peace Plan. In a communiqué issued by the
Committee, it was recognised that Sankoh was expected to return to
Sierra Leone in order to support the peace process.
67. In
November 1997, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, invited
President Kabbah to attend the Commonwealth summit in Edinburgh as his
personal guest. President Kabbah was given the opportunity to put
across the problem of Sierra Leone to the summit. The summit condemned
the military dictatorship in Nigeria and its abysmal human rights
credentials, but noted “the positive contribution the country was
making through ECOWAS in support of democratic government in the
region’’. The summit also condemned the military junta in Sierra Leone
and called for the reinstatement of Kabbah’s government. It suspended
Sierra Leone from participating in the councils of the Commonwealth and
Peter Penfold, British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, went with
Kabbah and his cabinet to Guinea to demonstrate the determination of
the British government to support democracy in Sierra Leone. The
British government also provided £250,000 to Kabbah and his cabinet
while they were in exile in Guinea. These funds were used to run the
government-in-exile. The British government also funded the setting up
of Radio 98.1 FM. The radio station was an effective propaganda machine
used by the government against the military junta.
68. The
Conakry Peace Plan seemed like a viable framework for peace in Sierra
Leone. In a press release issued on 5 November 1997, Kabbah stated that
he found the peace plan acceptable and that the Conakry Peace Plan
contained a number of positive elements, which would lead to the
resolution of the crisis in Sierra Leone. Kabbah pledged that his
government would do everything possible to co-operate with ECOWAS and
its monitoring group, ECOMOG.
69. In spite of the acceptance of
the Conakry Peace Plan by all the parties to the conflict, each gave it
a different interpretation. Questions in relation to disarmament, the
Army, the release of Sankoh, and Nigeria’s dominance in ECOMOG became
the subject of several unproductive meetings between the junta and
ECOMOG.
70. At its seventh meeting in Abuja on December 1997
the ECOWAS Committee of Five maintained that the Conakry Peace Plan
remained the best framework for the restoration of peace and
constitutional order in Sierra Leone. The reality was that the Conakry
Peace Plan was rapidly collapsing.
71. The international
community was not enamoured with the Nigerian ruler, Sani Abacha, who
while leading a dictatorship back home presented himself
internationally as a fighter for democracy in Sierra Leone. In its
desire to distance itself from Sani Abacha, the international community
declined to provide much-needed support for the Nigerian-led ECOMOG.
Sandline International: Kabbah brings in a non-state private army
72.
The period following the 1997 coup saw the biggest diplomatic
engagement on Sierra Leone since the start of the conflict in 1991.
However, it became clear that force would be needed to remove the
junta. Kabbah and his government sought the services of a non-state,
profit-making military outfit. Kabbah contracted the British private
military company, Sandline International. It has been alleged that it
was the British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, who
introduced Sandline to the President. In an interview with the
Commission, Penfold denied this version of events but acknowledged that
Kabbah did consult him on the terms of the Sandline contract. Kabbah’s
contact with Sandline was actually initiated in mid-1997 by Rupert
Bowen, a former diplomat and intelligence operative. Bowen was
Sandline’s representative in the West African Region and a friend of
Penfold. By the middle of July 1997, Tim Spicer, the head of Sandline
International, had flown to West Africa to meet with Kabbah and ECOMOG.
73.
Sandline was contracted in the sum of US$1.5 million a month to provide
training, arms and equipment support to the pro-government forces.
Sandline International was also allegedly asked to plan, execute and
co-ordinate an assault on Freetown. Sandline’s operations in Sierra
Leone were reportedly financed by a Vancouver-based Indian national,
Rakesh Saxena.
74. Sandline was registered in the Bahamas and
had its headquarters in Chelsea, sharing its premises with Branch
Energy and Heritage Oil. It also had offices in the USA headed by
Bernie McCabe, a former officer in the US Army Special Forces.
75.
The operations of Sandline International in Sierra Leone had no
independent structure. Sandline depended on ECOMOG, which co-ordinated
the activities of the pro-Kabbah forces within and outside of Sierra
Leone. Sandline may have been forced to operate covertly because of a
UN arms embargo on the Government of Sierra Leone and the AFRC junta at
the time.
76. By the end of 1997, the Conakry Peace Plan was
in tatters. The Kamajors, a pro-government civil defence militia, had
launched “Operation Black December’’, attacking several junta
positions. The Kamajors succeeded in taking most of the major roads in
the east and south of the country. By the beginning of 1998, skirmishes
between the junta and ECOMOG personnel on the ground in Sierra Leone
increased. As the security situation deteriorated, humanitarian
assistance ceased. Rhetoric from the exiled Government, ECOMOG and the
junta moved increasingly away from peace and back to war.
77. On
5 February 1998, the AFRC launched an attack on an ECOMOG patrol team.
ECOMOG forces launched a full-scale attack and forcefully removed the
military junta from power. On 10 March 1998, President Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah was reinstated.
78. ECOWAS deserves credit for its role
in the Sierra Leone. Nigeria’s role should be highlighted. It provided
the bulk of the military resources deployed in Sierra Leone in the name
of ECOWAS / ECOMOG. Many ECOWAS Member States, like Guinea Bissau, Cape
Verde, Niger and Benin, lacked the resources to do much beyond voting
on resolutions at ECOWAS meetings. While there has been no suggestion
that Ghana did anything to fuel the war, Ghana’s contribution to the
search for peace was not significant. Countries such as Burkina Faso
and Liberia were covert backers of the rebels.
Liberia, Libya and Burkina Faso: the network of RUF backers coalesces around the AFRC
79.
Although the ECOMOG military intervention succeeded in removing the
RUF/AFRC coalition from power and reinstating Kabbah’s government, it
did not have the endorsement of the UN Security Council. On 16 March
1998, the UN Security Council, issued Resolution 1156 welcoming the
return of Kabbah to power, followed by Resolution 1171 in June,
prohibiting the sale of arms and related material to non-governmental
forces in Sierra Leone. The Resolution included a travel ban on all
members of the overthrown junta and their families.
80. When
ECOMOG attacked Freetown, the junta forces and their RUF allies did not
put up any resistance. They escaped through the Freetown peninsula to
the northern part of the country and to the RUF stronghold in Kailahun
in the east. This meant that the RUF and the AFRC did not lose
significant manpower or equipment. Some nine months later the alliance
was able to capture half of the country and occupy most areas of the
capital for two weeks.
81. The war in Sierra Leone persisted
during the third phase largely because the RUF controlled the
diamond-producing areas. Taylor became the conduit for the sale of the
diamonds on the international market. In return the RUF received arms
and ammunitions through Taylor.
82. Liberia’s involvement in the
conflict was part of a wider network of outside support for the RUF,
which also involved Burkina Faso and Libya. However, there is no
evidence before the Commission that Libya and Burkina Faso shared
Liberia’s interest in the diamond resources of Sierra Leone. Although
Libya had promised to withdraw its support for the RUF there are
suggestions that following the coup of 1997, Libyan support for the RUF
and its allies continued. Arms and ammunitions were flown from Libya
via Burkina Faso and Liberia to the RUF. In a statement given to the
Sierra Leone Police, Yair Gal (aka Yair Galklein), an Israeli
“businessman”, testified that while travelling from Burkina Faso to
Monrovia in December 1998, he witnessed the loading of rifles into an
Air Burkina plane. The plane flew into Monrovia. Upon arrival the
rifles were loaded into a Jeep, and driven to the border with Sierra
Leone.
83. In December 1998 two Ukrainian planes loaded
with arms and ammunition from Libya flew into Monrovia at midnight. The
arms and ammunitions were then loaded into four trailer trucks
belonging to Simon Rosenbloom, another Israeli. Three of the trucks
went to Lofa country from where the arms and ammunitions were
transported to the RUF base in Kono. In his testimony to the Commission
at the public hearings held in Makeni, Bombali District on 29 May 2003,
Reverend Father Mario Guerra testified that, while he was in captivity,
two hundred rebel soldiers – albeit mostly affiliated to the AFRC –
received a large number of rifles of identical make. This was in
contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1171, which prohibited
the sale of arms and other related materials to non-government forces
in Sierra Leone.
84. Although Liberia, Burkina Faso and Libya
constituted a network of support for the RUF, they did not share the
same motivations. Ideology accounted for Libya’s involvement in the
Sierra Leone conflict. Libya wanted a revolutionary regime in Sierra
Leone but the RUF lacked the necessary organisational cohesion and
revolutionary discipline. Many commentators have described Sierra
Leone’s civil war as one of the most brutish and deadliest wars in
recent times. The RUF has been credited as one of the primary violators
of human rights in Sierra Leone. As the civil war unfolded these facts
could not have been unknown to Libya. The regime in Burkina Faso
claimed to be revolutionary. It would seem that the strong relations
between Burkina Faso and Libya resulted in Burkina Faso’s involvement
in the Sierra Leone conflict as an ‘errand boy’ for Libya. Individual
Burkinabes also benefited from the arms and diamonds trade.
Misuse of the Red Cross emblem
85.
Humanitarian aid was another dimension of the involvement of external
actors in the conflict. International organisations were pivotal in
meeting the medical, food and shelter needs of people directly affected
by the war.
86. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) was a leading agency in humanitarian intervention in the
country. Under the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, the
ICRC is mandated to bring neutral and impartial assistance and
protection to victims of war, regardless of their race, religion,
origin or sex. In carrying out its work the ICRC maintains contact with
all parties to a conflict. The Red Cross emblem, depicting neutrality
and impartiality, is relied upon for the protection and safety of ICRC
staff, facilities and equipment. Sierra Leone is a party to the Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocols.
87. In 1992 the
ICRC established a permanent structure in Freetown as a sub delegation
managed from Abidjan. In 1995 the Government of Sierra Leone authorised
delegates of the ICRC to assess the humanitarian situation in Kailahun
District, which was under RUF control at the time. In February 1996 the
ICRC established an assistance programme for civilians in RUF
territories in Kailahun District and in the course of the conflict, the
ICRC extended its assistance to victims of the war all over the country.
88.
In the events leading up to the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown,
there were reports of a helicopter bearing ICRC insignia flying above
Sierra Leone for non-humanitarian purposes. The helicopter with the Red
Cross emblem was reported to be delivering arms, ammunition and other
supplies to the RUF:
“A helicopter was coming from Liberia to
supply arms in Sierra Leone. I saw one of those helicopters. The
helicopter was covered with ICRC flag so that people will not know….”
[and]
“There
were helicopters operating out of Liberia coming in to the rebels. We
have fairly solid proof that the Red Cross helicopter was supplying
weapons to the rebels. Now, if it was on behalf of the Red Cross or
whether it was being used by individuals for Red Cross, or they
chartered it, I am not too sure…”
89. Neil Ellis, a government
helicopter pilot, informed the Commission that the government had
received repeated warnings about the use of ICRC-marked helicopters to
fly arms supplies to the RUF. On one occasion, he was instructed to
tail the ICRC helicopter and to shoot it down if it deviated from its
flight path. In that instance, the helicopter kept to its flight path
to Mabang in the Moyamba District.
90. In an interview with
Radio Democracy 98.1 FM on 9 December 1998, the Minister of
Information, Dr. Julius Spencer, noted that the government was
investigating allegations that the ICRC helicopter had been delivering
materials to the RUF. On 13 January 1999, the government asked the ICRC
to leave the country. The ICRC was allowed to return in May 1999 and
resumed operations but was restricted to government-controlled areas.
91.
The ICRC supplied the Commission with a detailed letter in which it
pointed out that its helicopters had flown over Sierra Leone for
several years during the conflict period. The organisation provided
model names and even code numbers for each of its helicopters, as well
as specific years in which they operated. Based on this assessment, the
ICRC contended that the specific allegations about its involvement in
arms trafficking during late 1998 could not have been true.
92.
After this initial response from the ICRC, the Commission was obliged
to invite ICRC officials for an interview because they had mixed up
certain dates in their submission. The officials furnished the
Commission with further explanations, which satisfied the Commission
that the helicopter in question was not an official ICRC helicopter.
Moreover, the ICRC had logbooks and pilot verification procedures that
prevented helicopters chartered by the ICRC and bearing its emblem
being used without its knowledge and approval.
92. The balance
of probabilities, supported by perpetrator testimony, indicates that
ICRC emblems were misappropriated and used on “alien” helicopters by
one or more of the fighting factions. The misuse of humanitarian
emblems can seriously compromise the activities of humanitarian
organisations. Such misconduct is strictly prohibited under
International Humanitarian Law by virtue of an express provision in the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. The Commission calls
upon peacekeeping forces and law enforcement authorities in conflict
zones to be aware that those trafficking in arms may deploy vehicles or
planes marked with the emblems of humanitarian organisations such as
the ICRC. Extra vigilance and spot checks are required to stop this
pernicious practice.
Charles Taylor’s personal influence on the RUF
93.
In the aftermath of the invasion of Freetown, on Thursday 25 February
1999, former ECOMOG Field Commander, General Timothy Shelpidi accused
Charles Taylor of Liberia and Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso of
planning to destabilise the entire sub-region. As long as Taylor was in
power in neighbouring Liberia, he said, the crisis in Sierra Leone was
never going to come to an end.
94. The Liberian Government
repeatedly denied accusations that it was supporting the RUF. It did
admit, somewhat reluctantly, that there were Liberians fighting on the
side of the RUF, but claimed that they were doing so without the
support or backing of the Liberian Government. In a letter to the
Secretary-General of the UN, dated 23 February 1999, President Charles
Taylor wrote:
“Liberians have been used as mercenaries in Sierra
Leone for a long time by all governments of Sierra Leone. They have
always been there, about 3,000 of them. But they are there on their
own.”
95. Charles Taylor’s and his Government’s denials of
support for the RUF appear nonsensical in the face of overwhelming
testimonies and evidence given to the Commission, not least by the
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police. In
a letter from the Office of the President of Liberia addressed to the
Leader of the RUF on 3 November 1998, Taylor expressed continued
support for the RUF organisation and its aim of taking over the
Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone.
96. Taylor’s
influence over the RUF was demonstrated on a number of occasions.
Taylor personally intervened to persuade the RUF to accept the terms of
the Lomé Peace Agreement. In May 2000, when the RUF took over 500 UN
peacekeepers hostage, Taylor was instrumental in negotiating their
release. An ECOWAS delegation met Taylor on 19 June 2000 and asked him
to help secure the hostages’ release. The Secretary-General of the UN,
Kofi Annan, the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the
Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo made a request on 21 June 2000
for Taylor to intervene in the hostage crisis in Sierra Leone. He
responded:
“I have said to them that I will do everything within my own strength to help release the hostages in whatever way I can.”
97.
The Liberian Minister of Information, Joe Mulbah , told the BBC on 29
June 2000 that the hostages would be released “over the weekend”.
Before Mulbah’s announcement, 139 Zambian peacekeepers held hostage by
the RUF, were moved to Foya across the Liberian border and handed over
to the Liberian authorities by Issa Sesay on 15 June 2000. On the day
the announcement was made by the Liberian Minister of Information, 21
Indians were transported to Foya by Issa Sesay, who again handed the
hostages over to the Liberian authorities.
98. It was not until
November 2002, that Taylor openly admitted his involvement in the
Sierra Leone conflict. Taylor maintained that:
“In the Sierra
Leone crisis, for example, Liberia was not the only country involved.
The other countries got off the hook because other major countries
protected them. We had good reason for our association with the RUF
(Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone) at that particular period,
purely for national security concerns.“
An enhanced role for the United Nations
99.
In July 1998, the UN Security Council established the UN Observer
Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). UNOMSIL had an initial strength of
seventy military observers, fifteen medical staff and five civilians.
Mr. Francis Okelo, the Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, was named the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Chief of
Mission. Brigadier Subhash C. Joshi, from India, was the Chief Military
observer. UNOMSIL’s mandate under Security Council Resolution 1181 was
to monitor the security situation and to advise on the disarmament and
demobilisation of combatants. UNOMSIL never achieved full strength and
is mostly remembered for its lack of impact.
100. It was no
surprise that hostilities continued in spite of UNOMSIL’s presence. By
December 1998, the RUF/AFRC controlled a large portion of the country’s
territory. In January 1999, the mobs of thugs associated with the AFRC
invaded Freetown inflicting widespread destruction and casualties. In
the wake of these attacks, SRSG Okelo helped to initiate negotiations
between the Government and the RUF/AFRC. On 18 May 1999, Kabbah and
Sankoh entered into talks in the Togolese capital, Lomé. The United
States, through its Embassy in Freetown, also assisted to bring the
parties together in Lomé. On 7 July 1999, the Government of Sierra
Leone and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Agreement. The Lomé Agreement,
among other things, made provision for a blanket amnesty for members of
the warring factions; the establishment of a neutral United Nations
group to monitor a cease-fire; and the creation of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.
101. While recognising that the
amnesty provisions in Lomé were “difficult to reconcile with the goal
of ending the culture of impunity”, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan, hailed the Lomé Agreement as “a great step forward for Sierra
Leone”. Annan further intimated that amnesty may not apply to
international crimes and instructed the UN SRSG to enter a handwritten
reservation explicitly stating that the UN did not regard the amnesty
provisions as applying to international crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law.
102. Although Lomé was heralded
as the beginning of the end to the conflict in Sierra Leone, attacks on
civilians recommenced almost as soon as Sankoh returned to Freetown. On
23 March 1999, the UN Secretary-General had recommended to the Security
Council that it should authorise the deployment of a substantially
larger peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone. On 22 October 1999, the UN
Security Council authorised the establishment of the United Nation’s
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The military and civilian components
of UNOMSIL were transferred directly to UNAMSIL and the UNOMSIL mandate
was terminated. The Secretary-General appointed Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji, a
Nigerian diplomat at the UN, as his new Special Representative and
Chief of Mission. UNAMSIL’s brief included overseeing the
implementation of the Lomé Agreement, establishing a security presence
at key locations throughout the country and monitoring adherence to the
cease-fire. In February 2000 the number of peacekeepers was increased
to 11,100.
103. The hostage-taking incident seriously tainted
the image of the peacekeepers and undermined the confidence of the
people of Sierra Leone in the UN. However the UN did not give up on
Sierra Leone. Annan declared that ‘the situation in Sierra Leone
remained tense and volatile under conditions that resemble civil war’.
On 19 May 2000, two days after the arrest of Sankoh, the UN Security
Council authorised an increase in the strength of the peacekeeping
force to 13,000 military personnel.
104. In June 2000 the Sierra
Leone Government requested the UN Security Council to establish a
tribunal in Sierra Leone to prosecute those in the RUF who had breached
the cease-fire “in order to bring and maintain peace and security in
Sierra Leone and the West African sub-region.” In July 2000, the Sierra
Leone Government approved and sent a draft resolution to the UN
formally requesting the Secretary-General to set up a criminal
tribunal. The Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution on 14
August 2000 and endorsed the Government’s request with the
understanding that ‘the amnesty provisions of the Lomé Agreement did
not apply to international crimes.’
105. One crucial element
that aided the consolidation of the peace was the intervention of the
British military. In the aftermath of the UN hostage crisis, Britain
raised its security profile in Sierra Leone considerably. It sent more
soldiers to the country and seconded a military adviser to the
government. When the RUF threatened the Freetown International Airport
at Lungi, British soldiers halted their offensive. British forces also
dislodged a band of former AFRC soldiers known as the West Side Boys,
who were threatening the security of the city. These combat actions and
Britain’s military presence around the country may have convinced the
RUF to opt for peace.
106. The Government and the RUF agreed to
a renewed cease-fire on 10 November 2000. The cease-fire hardly held.
The RUF continued sporadic attacks around the country. On 30 March
2001, the UN Security Council authorised the expansion of UNAMSIL to
17,500 military personnel. UNAMSIL became the world’s largest
peacekeeping mission and peacekeepers were located all over the
country. This helped to facilitate the return of refugees and
internally displaced persons to their communities of origin.
107.
In June 2001 the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR)
programme was established. The peacekeepers provided security at the
disarmament centres and for officials of the DDR programme.
108.
On 18 January 2002, President Kabbah declared that the war was over at
a symbolic ceremony at Lungi Airport. Among those in attendance were
numerous external actors, preparing themselves for participation in
Sierra Leone’s fresh efforts to achieve sustainable peace and
development.
© 2002 - 2007, Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission
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