| From Freetown, Sierra Leone. Volume 3B CHAPTER ONE
Mineral Resources, their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country Introduction 1. The management of state resources is central to the quality of governance in any country. This is particularly the case in Sierra Leone, a country whose economy depends essentially on revenues from its mineral resources. The Commission deemed it important to examine how mineral resources were used by successive governments and how they may have contributed to the war. Furthermore, the Commission set out to explore the extent to which the combatant groups exploited mineral resources to sustain themselves and replenish their war-making supplies. 2. Despite its huge mineral resources, Sierra Leone has remained one of the poorest countries in the world. Extensive alluvial and kimberlitic diamond deposits, as well as bauxite, rutile and gold, are found in the east and the south of the country. Gold, iron and more recently bauxite have been discovered in the north. Iron ore at Marampa was a major foreign-exchange earner until mining there was closed down in the mid-1990s. In the past, these resources have benefited a small elite group of Sierra Leoneans as well as Lebanese, Senegalese, Gambian, Guinean and Nigerian traders and a sprinkling of other groups from the sub-Saharan region. 3. The most important mineral resource in Sierra Leone is diamonds. This chapter will focus predominantly on diamonds and refer to other minerals where appropriate. 4. Throughout the world, diamonds are objects of desire and admiration. In Sierra Leone, diamonds were indirect causes and fuelling elements of the war. The misuse of diamond resources in an essentially single-product economy like Sierra Leone’s has created huge disparities in socio-economic conditions. While the elite and their business associates in the diamond industry have lived in grandeur, the poor have invariably been left to rue the misappropriation of the collective wealth. 5. As a national resource, diamonds have been controlled and exploited largely by a non-Sierra Leonean community, the Lebanese, who have formed and maintained new centres of economic power in the country. 6. In the context of the Sierra Leone conflict, diamonds were highly coveted because they yielded tremendous revenues, which would enable the armed factions to procure additional weapons and ammunition. Possession of weapons conferred power upon the armed parties, as they could capture large areas of territory, which could in turn be exploited for economic purposes. The desire to expand “control areas” into parts of the country ripe for economic exploitation gradually became the main motivating factor for all the armed groups and many local commanders, thus triggering further conflict. 7. There is a widely held belief in the western world that the conflict in Sierra Leone was initiated and perpetuated because of diamonds, the country’s most important mineral resource. According to this version, the RUF, backed by Charles Taylor and the NPFL, initiated an armed rebellion in Sierra Leone to gain control of its diamond resources. In the years following the initial attack, it is alleged, the proceeds from an illicit diamond trade enabled the RUF to finance its war effort through the purchase of weapons abroad. 8. On the basis of its research and investigations, the Commission views this version of the conflict as simplistic. It fails to capture numerous complexities, the reasons for the decay of the state in Sierra Leone and the role minerals played prior to and during the conflict. It also does not reflect what unfolded on the ground in Sierra Leone. There were multiple causes of the conflict and reasons for the involvement of Liberian and other foreign actors. Although it is true that the RUF partly financed its war effort through diamond trafficking, diamonds did not yield significant revenues for the movement before 1997. 9. Using primary data gleaned from interviews, statements and hearings, along with secondary materials from reports issued by NGOs and international bodies such as the United Nations, the Commission will address the following issues in this chapter:
10. The Commission has divided the Sierra Leone conflict into three phases. This chapter begins by examining the pre-conflict years with a view to setting the context for the conflict. Thereafter, the three phases are analysed as follows: first, the period of conventional “target” warfare from 1991 to late 1993; second, the guerrilla warfare phase from late 1993 up to March 1997; and finally the period from 1997 to 2002, encompassing the alliance between the AFRC and the RUF, the Lomé Peace Agreement, the resumption of hostilities and the eventual conclusion of the conflict. The Political Economy of Mineral Resources 11. To understand the failure of the state in Sierra Leone and the role that minerals played in the conflict, we need to consider the nature of the state that emerged in 1961. At independence, there was euphoria that the new indigenous leadership would extend development and services to the people exponentially. In Sierra Leone, as in many other parts of Africa, the first few years following colonialism actually witnessed economic growth. Two key factors reversed this trend and set the country on a very different trajectory from the forward path desired by the people. 12. The first factor was the management of the economy. The popular expectation in the years before independence in many countries was captured by the Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah in his refrain: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things will be added unto you”. The assumption was that political independence would free latent energies in the nation. The new state would churn out a host of policies to create and empower an indigenous entrepreneurial class, which was expected to be the engine of growth and development. In reality, however, the beneficiaries of these new policies turned out to be the political elite rather than the common people. Unfortunately for Sierra Leone, the indigenous elite preferred rent seeking rather than active economic participation and quickly ceded control of important economic activities to Lebanese and Syrian businessmen. Furthermore, the dominant economic management theories of the time favoured state intervention and centralised management of the economy. Leading members of the ruling elite sought to privatise state resources, thus depriving the nation of the benefits of its most valuable assets. Such “predatory domination” has been defined as the “conversion of political power and position into economic wealth for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many.” 13. Huge economic and development resources were placed in the hands of the new leaders. As the inheritors of power, the political elite acquired the tastes and behaviour of the departing colonialists. Such undisciplined control over resources opened the way for burgeoning corruption. Sierra Leoneans began to question the role and mission of the emergent political elite. 14. In 1978 a one-party state was imposed upon the people of Sierra Leone. This move by the ruling All Peoples’ Congress (APC) followed the co-optation of civil society leaders into government and the crushing of dissent. Political power became a means to economic wealth, with personal rewards so high that politicians would resort to extreme measures to win and maintain power. The state became the primary avenue for private enrichment. Gradually, power became de-institutionalised and personalised, resulting in dysfunctional public institutions and random violence. It was in the interests of the political elite to promote disorder, as it provided further opportunities to misappropriate the economic resources of the state. As a direct result, public institutions could no longer provide vital services to the people. 15. The political elite had preferential access to the machinery of the state. Politicians, senior civil servants and military officers exercised a great deal of power over access to foreign and domestic capital and markets, which they used to accumulate large fortunes and to consolidate their control of the economy. Exploitation occurred through a burgeoning de facto market in government contracts, licences and offices. The productive and regulatory capacities of the state became severely eroded and compromised. This led to the “informalisation” of the state. The state was misappropriated for the private benefit of the political elite, just as it had been in colonial times. 16. This brief background helps us to understand why diamond smuggling has been a perennial, seemingly uncontrollable problem in Sierra Leone. Key members of the elite and successive governments have promoted and continue to benefit from diamond smuggling. Efforts to contain smuggling during the APC rule were a façade. Smuggling was indeed promoted by the Office of the President. Today, so high are the personal and political stakes involved in the fight against diamond smuggling that every individual effort to achieve accountability will be fiercely contested and require sustained application. The Diamond Industry before the Conflict The colonial period
17. A variety of minerals, including gold, iron and diamonds, were discovered in Sierra Leone in the 1930s; rutile, or titanium ore, was discovered in the 1960s. Diamonds were discovered in the Kenema and Kono Districts. The colonial government, through the Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST), established the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) in 1934. CAST was a corporation controlled by the Selection Trust Group of London, with a portion of the shares held by De Beers. The SLST was granted exclusive mining and prospecting rights throughout the country for 99 years. In 1933, an iron-ore mine was opened at Marampa in Port Loko District and was generating almost 30% of the colony's export revenue by 1938. 18. The mining sector became the major source of export for the country. In 1930, minerals accounted for a mere 0.5% of total exports and even in 1951, agriculture still accounted for 66.8%. However, by 1961, minerals had come to account for 87% of exports (79% of which were diamonds). These shifts rendered the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in the international market. Moreover, since minerals were only extracted in Sierra Leone but transformed abroad, the revenues from the value-added services that multiplied the price of the products were not being returned to the country. The profits of the industry went mostly to non-Sierra Leonean diamond industry interests involved at other levels of the transaction. 19. Beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, the colonial government adopted the strategy of relying on local chiefs to exercise control over the expanding diamond industry. However, the central government in Freetown had little control over the chiefs’ actions and therefore could not curb nascent illicit mining: “As
the state’s chosen administrative and, increasingly, political
intermediaries, chiefs also voiced a popular dissatisfaction with state
attacks on illicit mining. The harder Freetown pushed reform, the
greater the risk of upsetting the accommodations that enabled Freetown
to rule the hinterland in the first place.”
20. These “accommodations” with local chiefs widened the loss of state control over the diamond industry in the years leading up to the conflict. Government officials, as well as the chiefs, benefited from these unofficial deals: “Informal accommodations between officials and chiefs and a tolerance of limited illicit mining maintained social order.”
21. The diamond rush in the 1950s created security problems. The number of new miners was so great that control became difficult. Thousands of people started illicit mining on the SLST lease, many of them abandoning the rice fields for the diamond mines. This resulted in a significant drop in rice production. In the early 1950s, Sierra Leone was self-sufficient in rice production whereas in 1963, the country had to import 21,000 tons of rice to feed its population. 22. In 1955, illegal miners attacked the SLST security forces and a police station in Kono. In 1955 and 1956, popular dissatisfaction with what was perceived as excessive control by Chiefs and the state led to several riots in Kono District. Indeed, “most Kono residents believed that SLST’s monopoly on diamond mining bestowed benefits upon Europeans and chiefs” only. 23. The SLST and De Beers began hiring private security companies to police the mining areas. They hired the Diamond Protection Force, a private British security company managed by Sir Percy Sillitoe, to guard the border areas against smuggling and the diamond areas against illicit mining. This was the first instance of the hiring of mercenaries in Sierra Leone, but many others would follow, especially during the conflict. SLST also had planes fly over mining areas to monitor illicit mining. 24. In 1955, the colonial government terminated the SLST - De Beers monopoly and introduced the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS), under which Sierra Leonean miners could buy licences. Previously, Sierra Leonean nationals had not been allowed to own mining concessions. Parts of the SLST Yengema concession that were unsuitable for large-scale mining were leased to local, small-scale miners, who were required to sell all their diamonds to SLST. By allowing Sierra Leonean miners to operate mines, the colonial government sought to curtail smuggling and restore security to the SLST lease area. The colonial government also established the Mining Area Development Administration (MADA), a state development expenditure programme incorporating local authorities into the decision-making process. 25. This new system gave more power to the local chiefs to grant leases to mine diamonds. The chiefs began assigning plots and collecting surface rents. One Kono businessman complained that the unofficial payments (or bribes) to chiefs to obtain a licence rose 500% under the new ADMS. 26. The other effect of ADMS was to create a “supporter” artisanal system in which wealthy Lebanese businessmen would “look after” African miners, providing funding for licences and mining equipment and protecting miners against SLST security forces. In exchange, miners would sell their diamonds to the Lebanese. Most dealers engaged in both licit and illicit buying of diamonds, paying low prices to illegal miners and selling at higher prices to the SLST. 27. Despite the ADMS, smuggling did not stop. Rather, it increased dramatically. Due to its borderless nature, artisanal mining could not be effectively controlled and policed. Table 1, below, shows that in the three years following the introduction of ADMS, smuggling increased over the three years preceding its introduction.
Source for Table 1: Mitchell, P.K. and Swindell K.; “Recent Changes in Sierra Leone Mineral Industry”, in The Bulletin: The Journal of the Sierra Leone Geographical Association, Volumes 9 and 10. 28. As shown in Table 2, below, ADMS became a significant contributor to the total production of diamonds, accounting for a minimum of 50% of annual production. From 1980 on, while the value increased, the total number of carats recorded began to decline. Zack-Williams has argued that this fall was the result not of mine depletion but of the informalisation of mining by a decaying state. Most production was by illicit dealers who smuggled their products out of the country. The state was losing money, but the political elite was getting wealthier.
Source for Table 2: Mitchell, P.K. and Swindell K.; “Recent Changes in Sierra Leone Mineral Industry”, in The Bulletin: The Journal of the Sierra Leone Geographical Association, Vol. 9 and 10. From SLST to the NMDC
29. When Siaka Stevens came into power in 1968, he used populist rhetoric to gain support, claiming that small miners should have the opportunity to benefit from the diamond industry. The government encouraged licensing of small-scale mining, proclaiming it as the small man’s chance for success. However, the government’s unofficial encouragement of smuggling resulted in the theft of several shipments of diamonds belonging to the SLST. For instance, on 3 November 1969, the SLST’s monthly production, worth US$3.4 million, was stolen, allegedly on the orders of Stevens and Jamil Said Mohamed, a prosperous and influential Lebanese businessman with close links to Stevens. 30. The transformation of the diamond industry into an informal economy was complete with the “nationalisation” of the SLST and its replacement by the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) in 1970. In 1973, the government created the Cooperative Contract Mining (CCM) scheme, which allowed private mining operations within the NDMC lease. This initiative was presented as a concession to local miners. The main reason for this opening was the decrease in foreign revenues resulting from the government’s inability to curb illicit mining and smuggling, as well as the decrease in production arising from old equipment. CCM therefore did not really benefit the local miners. Rather, it strengthened Siaka Stevens’ underground economy. 31. Siaka Stevens had directed the state-controlled NDMC “to make land available for the people to mine”. In reality, this was a division of the diamond fields among the APC elite and their allies, including the chiefs in the diamond-producing areas and government officials, many of whom owned plots in other people’s names. The then Minister of Finance, Tommy Taylor-Morgan, was quoted as warning that the country was losing more than US$160 million of diamond income annually to smuggling. 32. Through the years, Siaka Stevens had allied himself with a group of powerful Lebanese merchants who controlled some of the official and much of the unofficial diamond trade. The NDMC had a 51% share of the SLST lease, while Jamil Said Mohamed alone controlled some 12% through his company, the Precious Mineral Mining Company (PMMC). Jamil Said Mohamed was very influential and controlled a large part of the industry, including the mining of other minerals, with the approval of Siaka Stevens. Corruption and smuggling reached such a level that official diamond production dropped significantly. 33. The CCM was designed to arrest the dramatic drop in NDMC production. In 1973, 94% of the legal non-alluvial diamond output was produced by NDMC. In 1980, the percentage had dropped to 29%. This was coupled with the general decline in overall official production. In 1974, the government created the Government Diamond Office (GDO) to value diamonds and ensure the repatriation of profits from diamond sales abroad into the Bank of Sierra Leone. Although GDO was supposed to be a neutral institution, it was headed by Stevens and Jamil Said Mohamed, who tended to allow favoured people to repatriate only a portion of their profits. They also used GDO to undervalue diamonds, keeping the difference for themselves or for members of the elite close to the government. 34. The government cut its export tax on diamonds from 7.5% to 2.5% in 1977, ostensibly to reduce smuggling. However, in practice, the tax cut increased the share of diamond resources that went into the pockets of the political elite. By the end of the 1970s, NDMC was in decline. In 1983, SLST sold its remaining shares to Jamil Said Mohamed’s PMMC. 35. Overall, Stevens established a system through which he controlled the diamond industry using a network of partners and without having to engage the government apparatus. The survival of this system was ensured internally by the use of elite-accommodation practices, such as offering favoured treatment to APC sympathisers and local chiefs. Stevens and his clients relied on paramilitary forces such as the Internal Security Unit (ISU) to maintain social order through physical repression of opponents and illicit miners. This transfer of ownership from formal state institutions to informal networks personally controlled by Stevens helped intensify smuggling, depriving the national treasury of potential tax revenues. 36. The popular perception that the state was favouring elites and giving away the diamond resources led to riots in Kono in 1984 and 1985, in which miners attacked the property of the state and of politicians. The establishment of the GGDO
37. President Momoh came to power in 1985 and created the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO) to remedy the shortage of foreign exchange. This attempt was part of a series of reforms aimed at re-establishing Sierra Leone’s borrowing capacity with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 38. GGDO was originally supposed to buy and sell gold, and to stockpile diamonds to be used as collateral to raise external loans, but these functions were never carried out. Although GGDO never bought diamonds, it advertised diamonds internationally and facilitated export deals. 39. Sierra Leone’s diamonds were fuelling the Middle East conflict. Prominent Lebanese dealers were some of the main financiers of the Islamic movements in the Middle East. To undermine this control, the Israeli government got involved in the diamond industry at a time when President Momoh was in desperate need of foreign exchange and support to prop up his failing economy. Momoh invited an Israeli firm called LIAT Construction and Finance Company to manage the diamond industry, thereby undermining Jamil Said Mohamed’s control. The Israeli company was accused of trafficking in drugs and arms, using the Sierra Leonean diamond industry as cover, and its director, Shaptai Kalmanovitch, was arrested for fraud in London in 1987. Under the control of the Israelis, however, diamond exports rose 280% between 1985 and 1986. Another Israeli company, N.R. SCIPA Group, replaced LIAT after Kalmanovitch’s arrest. The company was allegedly dealing in both legal and illegal diamonds. The ever-growing demands of Momoh’s cronies resulted in further drastic reductions in government revenues and popular dissatisfaction led to riots again in 1988 and 1989 in Kono District. Diamond smuggling
40. The rise in diamond smuggling during the Stevens and Momoh eras is explained by the rent seeking instincts of the political elite, which were furthered by the peculiar organisation of the international diamond industry. Inadequate monitoring of the origin of diamonds is one of the major problems in the industry. The Belgian Diamond High Council (HRD), on whose trading floors a large proportion of the international diamond trade takes place, records the origin of diamonds as the country from which they were last exported. Such recording tells nothing about where the diamonds were actually mined. For instance, a diamond can be smuggled from Sierra Leone into Liberia, then shipped to London, and be recorded as being of British origin, even if Britain does not produce diamonds. 41. Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 1, below and overleaf, show the discrepancy between the diamond production in some West African countries and diamond imports into Belgium. Throughout the conflict period, the HRD imported two or three times as many diamonds from Sierra Leone as the government of Sierra Leone officially exported. These numbers suggest significant smuggling. In 1999, official exports were worth US$1.2 million, compared with a conservative industry estimate of US$70 million in real commercial value.
Sources for Table 3: Smilie, et al., The Heart of the Matter, Partnership Africa Canada Ottawa, January 2000: Data for Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire for the years 1994 to 1998 from: Ronald F. Balazik, ‘Gemstones’, 1998 Annual Review (United States Geological Survey, August 1999) at page EE 17. Remaining data for the same countries is from various mineral industry reports from 1990 to 1994 published by the United States Geological Survey. Sierra Leone data is drawn from the Government of Sierra Leone, Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), Freetown, Sierra Leone, 1999.
Sources for Table 4: Smilie, et al., The Heart of the Matter, Partnership Africa Canada Ottawa, January 2000: Diamond High Council, 1998 Annual Report, Antwerp 1999, at page 1, and additional information supplied directly by HRD.
Source for Figure 1: Progress Report, Diamond High Council, 2003 42. The figures for Liberia, represented graphically in Figure 1, are even more interesting. While Liberia has never produced more than 150,000 carats per year, HRD records show that 12.3 million carats were imported from Liberia in 1996. In fact, the import figures for Liberian diamonds are in the million-carat range for every year from 1990 to 1998, except 1991. Between 1995 and 1999, Belgium imported 33.6 million carats from Liberia. The HRD therefore concluded that “imports recorded from Liberia bear no relationship to local production capacity”. 43. The diamonds found in Sierra Leone are mainly gemstones, while those mined in Liberia are mostly industrial diamonds. Gemstones are clear and colourless stones used in jewellery, while industrial diamonds are imperfect stones used in drills and other tools. It is therefore fairly easy for experts to differentiate between diamonds of Sierra Leonean origin and those of Liberian origin. 44. Diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone into Liberia and neighbouring countries was not invented by the RUF or Charles Taylor. It started as least as early as the 1950s. After the tightening of control over the industry by the Sierra Leonean state in the 1960s and 1970s, Liberian diamond exports decreased considerably. Such controls enabled key officials of the Sierra Leonean government to become real players in the industry and channel trade in diamonds to Lebanese and other friends within the country, who then exported them to Belgium and parts of the Middle East. 45. It is also important to note the figures for Belgian imports from Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Ghana. Although it has not been demonstrated that the RUF and Charles Taylor were responsible for smuggling diamonds through these countries, the figures show that in all probability their government officials colluded in the smuggling of diamonds out of Sierra Leone. Consequently it is likely that officials of the Sierra Leonean state have been doing business in diamonds with people in Liberia, including Charles Taylor, while he supported the pillage and plunder of Sierra Leone. 46. Côte d’Ivoire has virtually no diamond-production capacities, yet between 600,000 and 2.2 million carats were exported to Belgium each year between 1990 and 1998. The 2.2 million carats officially exported from Côte d’Ivoire in 1996 is equal to the entire volume produced in Côte d’Ivoire during the 30 years between 1948 and 1978. This comparison suggests the massive smuggling of diamonds into Côte d’Ivoire during the 1990s. 47. The import and export figures for Guinea also raise suspicion of smuggling. The UN Panel of Experts has indicated that diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone into Guinea and the use of Guinea as the country of origin for exported diamonds are the two factors that explain these figures. 48. A further discrepancy exists in the figures for The Gambia. Imports of Gambian rough diamonds into Belgium averaged US$100 million per year between 1996 and 1999. 49. The Commission’s research demonstrates that the RUF could not have earned all the money attributed to it in official reports from conflict diamonds alone. Except for a brief period in 1992 when the RUF occupied Koidu, the headquarters of the diamond-rich Kono District, it did not have access to the major diamond-producing areas of the country until 1995, when it occupied Koidu again for four months before being driven out by Executive Outcomes. RUF’s diamond pickings in those areas could not have constituted the colossal amounts reflected in the literature. Figure 1 shows that, except in 1986, Belgian imports of diamonds from Liberia have always outstripped those from Sierra Leone. Yet Liberia is not reputed to have substantial diamond deposits and does not have gemstone-quality diamonds. The conclusion to be drawn from the above tables and Figure 1 is that diamond smuggling within the axis of Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire has been going on for more than 30 years, with Liberia being the principal conduit. This would suggest that those involved in diamond smuggling had developed networks and contacts in Liberia, which facilitated their smuggling and export of diamonds from within the region. Even in 1990, before the war in Sierra Leone started, Liberia exported more than 5 million carats of diamonds. 50. During the conflict, particularly between 1992 and 1997, control over Kono District seesawed between the RUF and government forces. Diamond exploitation and smuggling carried on unabated. Testimony to the Commission indicated that dealers continued to do business with whoever had control of the territory. Even the manager of Branch Energy in Kono tried to arrange a secure corridor to facilitate the continuation of his business. It served the interests of both the RUF and members of the political elite to continue to use the same sources for laundering their diamond loot. Individuals laundering the proceeds from diamonds had direct connections to Charles Taylor, the alleged mastermind of diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone. Control of the routes provided opportunities for rent seeking for both the RUF and the NPFL; it probably also yielded substantial revenues in “passage tax”. An alarmed international community quickly outlawed business in what has come to be known as “blood diamonds”. 51. The corruption in the Liberian diamond industry made “diamond laundering” extremely easy. Transactions and payments were made in U.S. dollars. This made Liberia a haven for diamond dealers. The UN Panel of Experts found the existence of several shelf companies whose given addresses in Monrovia turned out to be non-existent. These companies were used to legalise the diamonds exported. President Taylor controlled the trade through his Inspector General of Mines, who reported directly to him.
52. Charles Taylor benefited enormously from the diamonds that passed through Liberia. His control was institutionalised when he became President of Liberia in 1997. The RUF also profited substantially from fines and charges it levied against diamond miners in the territories it controlled. The revenues from these activities were used to procure arms, ammunition and supplies for continuing the war against the Sierra Leonean state. 53. On 5 July 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1306, imposing an embargo on the trade of diamonds from Sierra Leone. The UN Panel of Experts was created at the same time to monitor violations of the embargo and investigate diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone and its effect on the conflict. The Panel conducted several interviews with senior officials in different countries, including the then Liberian President Charles Taylor and senior officials in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Its report was published in December 2000 and provided great insights into the relationship between diamond smuggling and arms trafficking. Other minerals
54. Other mineral resources are present in Sierra Leone, especially gold, bauxite and rutile. Although these minerals represent potentially important financial resources for the state, government focus so far has been on diamonds. 55. Mining of such minerals requires deep digging and therefore heavy machinery and substantial capital investment. The same is true of kimberlitic diamonds, found deep below the surface of the earth. Illegal mining of these minerals is difficult and therefore easily monitored by the government. On the other hand, the mining of alluvial gold and diamonds is easy and requires no investment in major equipment. It is therefore very difficult to control and regulate. The role of non-Sierra Leonean communities
“The
problem with us Sierra Leoneans is that we discriminate against
ourselves. Any time an outsider comes in, we immediately give him
everything.”
56. This quote essentially reflects the behaviour of the Sierra Leone political elite who exploited every opportunity for personal benefit, through networks and partnerships with non-Sierra Leonean businesses. 57. The Lebanese did not come to Sierra Leone for the diamonds; they were in the country long before diamonds were discovered. Beginning in the 1940s, however, members of the Lebanese community got involved in all aspects of the Sierra Leonean diamond industry, from funding licence holders to exporting diamonds. By paying higher informal taxes to the miners, they have assumed dominance over the industry. 58. Bank loans have been far more accessible to non-Sierra Leonean communities than to Sierra Leonean nationals. Because of their wealth, members of these communities are widely perceived as being more capable of repaying loans. The result of such lending practices has been that non-Sierra Leoneans have taken advantage of opportunities for investment and business development, amassing tremendous resources from the diamond business and other industries. These captains of industry have allied themselves with the political elite as a means of protection. They have benefited enormously from doing business in Sierra Leone but they have returned little to the country in the form of investments. Most profits are sent to other countries. 59. Since the Lebanese possessed capital, they rapidly took control of the diamond industry, as well as much of the business sector in general. By 1966, 73% of all shops in the country belonged to Lebanese nationals. 60. In 1959, the government required joint ventures between the SLST and Sierra Leonean nationals to exploit aspects of the SLST lease. In 1961, a constitutional decree denied citizenship to anyone of non-African parentage, which meant that the Lebanese and members of other resident communities who had been in Sierra Leone for generations could not automatically obtain citizenship. 61. The combination of the new policy of indigenous participation in mining and the citizenship decree had two consequences. First, it consolidated the dependence of Sierra Leoneans - who did not possess the necessary capital - upon wealthier individuals, mainly the Lebanese, thus deepening the “supporter” system that had begun in the 1950s. Second, since the right to acquire a mining licence was now restricted to citizens of African descent, many Lebanese invested through the local chiefs, using the chiefs’ names to get licences and sharing the profits. 62. This situation persisted for many years, creating a system in which Lebanese dealers associated with government officials and local chiefs dominated the diamond industry. These dealers supported the mine operators (also referred to as “diggers”) who in turn hired labourers to dig the diamond plots. According to the 1963 census, there were 2,500 licensed and unlicensed diggers, most of them linked financially to Lebanese dealers. The diggers employed 25,000 to 30,000 labourers. These links increased over the years, and in 1982, 80% of all Sierra Leonean nationals applying for a dealer licence listed the same address in Sefadu, which was connected to Jamil Said Mohamed. 63. Directly or indirectly, the Lebanese are still dominant at every level of the process. At the extraction level, they create a “supporter system” and provide the mining tools and the money for the licence. The arrangement usually includes the sharing of profits on every diamond found. The Lebanese are also extensively involved at the dealer and exporter levels. 64. The Marakas (Gambian and Senegalese nationals) have also been involved at the dealing level since the 1950s. Unlike the Lebanese, they do not own shops; instead they conduct their transactions on the streets of Kono towns, especially Koidu. The Marakas are generally held in higher esteem than the Lebanese by Sierra Leoneans involved in the diamond industry. The Marakas have invested some of their profits in community development. 65. Leading Lebanese dealers were close associates of government leaders. Jamil Said Mohamed, for example, was a business associate of Siaka Stevens. His company was granted a licence to take over the NDMC. When he ran it aground, he sold it back to the government. When the government could no longer pay civil servants’ wages, Jamil Said Mohamed “lent” money to the government to do so. The perception deepened that the Lebanese were and still remain the greatest beneficiaries of the diamond business. 66. Diamond smuggling is facilitated by the possession of a “dealer licence”. A holder of a dealer licence is required to declare a certain minimum amount of transactions every year to the GGDO. Once this benchmark is attained, the dealer may legally deal in diamonds in his possession as he pleases. Although dealers cannot export diamonds officially without an export licence, they can deal in diamonds inside the country without declaring such sales to the GGDO. A popular hotel on Aberdeen Road in Freetown has been identified to the Commission as the rendezvous point for foreign speculators and merchants eager to buy diamonds. 67. Ordinarily dealers are supposed to buy diamonds from licensed miners only, but there is minimal oversight of the dealership level of the industry. Since the dealers are the prime promoters of the supporter system, they have hundreds of miners, not all of whom are licensed, on their support lists. Once a diamond is received at a dealer’s office, it can be certified as having been produced by any of the supported miners and can be “officially” sold to the dealer. One of the foremost diamond dealers in the country told the Commission during a closed hearing in Freetown that he wouldn’t insist on licences from miners before buying diamonds from them, because “I can legalise any diamond and then sell it”. 68. There is a perception among Sierra Leoneans that the Lebanese keep all the profits from the diamond trade within the Lebanese community and invest only in their own businesses or export the profits to Lebanon. Many Lebanese, despite their long years in the country, have not integrated into Sierra Leonean society and are resented by Sierra Leoneans for their failure to do so. 69. Non-Sierra Leonean communities perceived by the RUF/AFRC as being wealthy were specifically targeted for attacks during the conflict. In the diamond industry, the Lebanese, Maraka and Fullah communities are involved in dealing and exporting. Their houses were often searched and their diamonds and money seized in surprise attacks. One victim, a wealthy diamond exporter of Lebanese origin with business interests in Kono and Freetown was attacked several times. During one of the attacks on his house in Koidu, his family was only rescued by the intervention of Executive Outcomes. 70. The Ukrainian and Russian communities were involved in the conflict mainly as mercenaries, training men and flying supplies to whoever paid them, including the RUF and the government forces. According to statements and interviews obtained by the Commission, they were also involved in diamond smuggling and arms trafficking, using helicopters to transport weapons and gems. 71. Links have been alleged between Sierra Leonean diamonds and international terrorist organisations. The Washington Post published an article claiming that Charles Taylor had facilitated a diamond deal for Al Qaeda. Taylor was allegedly paid US$1 million, and the diamonds originated in Sierra Leone. The Commission found no evidence to substantiate such allegations. Mineral Resources and the Conflict Period 72. The lack of total state control over the diamond industry and other mineral resources had major repercussions for the conduct of the war in Sierra Leone. 73. Mining companies often contract with private security firms to provide protection in conflict areas where collapsing states are unable to provide security. In Sierra Leone, diamond-, rutile- and gold-mining companies entered into arrangements with private security firms, such as Executive Outcomes, Sandline International, Lifeguard Security and ArmSec International (SL). Some of these firms, notably Executive Outcomes and Sandline, have also provided security services to the government. Phase I of the Conflict: March 1991-1993 74. Phase I encompasses the start of the war in March 1991, the NPRC coup in 1992 and the RUF’s efforts to regroup from the brink of defeat in 1993. Although this is a pivotal period in the history of the conflict, few significant events occurred in the diamond industry. The RUF started its military operations in 1991, but did not gain any significant control over any diamond area before 1992, when it first captured Kono. This period was characterised by the decline of NDMC and the retreat of GGDO from the diamond trade. 75. The NDMC shut its operations in Yengema in October 1992, its operations in Tongo Field in March 1993 and went into liquidation in October 1993. The demise of the NDMC left the government weakened by the loss of legal diamond revenues. 76. Throughout the conflict, the fighting factions used the tactic of diamond seizure to gain revenues quickly. Diamonds were looted or seized from individual miners and dealers and sold. 77. From 1991 to 1993, Kailahun District and parts of Pujehun District were under RUF control. In Kailahun, only two towns, Jojoima and Kotoma, were mining areas. Diamond mining was organised by the RUF in those towns on a very small scale and produced a modest quantity of diamonds. These were handed over to a mining commander, who would record them and hand them either to Foday Sankoh or to NPFL fighters, who would take them to Liberia. 78. The RUF captured Kono for a brief period in 1992 and was in control of Koidu and the surrounding communities for four months between October 1992 and February 1993. However, some Chiefdoms in Kono District - Nimikoro, Nimiyama and Sewafe - were under RUF control during almost all of the conflict. The RUF mined diamonds on a small scale, seized mining equipment and abducted miners to operate it. One former RUF commander witnessed the presence of Foday Sankoh, Issa Sesay, Sam Bockarie and Patrick Lamin in the Koidu area in late 1992 to oversee RUF mining activities. 79. The RUF attacked a diamond mine in February 1993 in Baakaar, Dama Chiefdom, in Kenema District, but was forced from the area by the NPRC regime. Throughout the war, insufficient control on the ground prevented the RUF from organising large-scale mining in Pujehun District, where the Zimmi diamond mines were located. 80. The situation worsened for the RUF from 1993 onwards. Military authorities told the BBC on 15 November 1993, that the Sierra Leone Army had recaptured Koindu after 13 months under RUF control. They also proclaimed the recapture of nine other towns in Kailahun and seven towns in Pujehun. By the end of 1993, the RUF had been largely pushed out of Sierra Leone into Liberia. 81. Army soldiers also engaged in diamond smuggling in Bo and Pujehun Districts from the beginning of the conflict. A miner was attacked by SLA soldiers in Sumbuya, Bo District, in 1991 and tortured because he refused to hand over the diamonds he had mined. A soldier assaulted him and raped his wife: “I
was beaten by them severely until I was at the point of death. The
reason was because I was a miner and they said I have never given
diamonds. One of them raped my wife.”
82. This victim also witnessed the soldiers seizing diamonds from other miners. In the same year, in Gisiwulo village, Pujehun District, SLA soldiers forced villagers to guide them through the swamps where diamonds were found. Those who refused were tied up and left in the sun until they became co-operative: “The SLA soldiers used to gather the towns’ people
and ask that we show them the swamps where big diamonds could be found.
If we failed to cooperate, they would tie us up and bake us in the sun.
One morning, Lieutenant Mallah ordered his men to tie me up because I
was the town chief and I had refused to show them the swamps. I was
held hostage for one whole day and night.”
83. In the town of Bo, in 1993, during a riot, a diamond digger was attacked and killed by an SLA soldier who had requested money from him. His employer witnessed the killing: “Hassan was stabbed and shot all over his body. I stood there for some time watching him, then his brothers came and joined me.”
84. The perceived wealth of diamond workers made them targets of armed factions throughout the conflict. Vigilantes and civil militias 85. From the first efforts at assembling civil militia forces in the south and east of the country, the collective resources of the host chiefdoms were typically gathered together to feed, fund or otherwise assist whatever force was present there. In chiefdoms with diamond and other mineral deposits, the young men were required to donate their finds to the community effort. In Pujehun District, where the RUF had allied itself with an amorphous body of militiamen known as the “Action Group”, villagers in the Soro Gbema and Kpanga Krim chiefdoms provided fighters with shelter and the proceeds of their agriculture and industries. This practice was reflective of the warm reception initially given to the RUF in the south. However, after the middle of 1991, there is evidence that locals ceased to contribute voluntarily and that the RUF then resorted to looting the resources they required, including diamonds and other minerals that people had in their possession. Phase II of the Conflict: 1994-1997 86. Phase II of the conflict was characterised by a shift in the fighting strategy of the RUF to guerrilla warfare tactics. This change was effective: the RUF was able to gain significant territory and secure control over Kono for several months in 1995 and strike a decisive advance towards Freetown. In the same year, the attacks on the SIEROMCO and Sierra Rutile Limited mines by the RUF had tremendous implications for the national economy and led to the destruction of the surrounding communities and the internationalisation of the conflict. The insecurity created by the attacks, coupled with the effectiveness of the RUF on the ground, led the government to hire the private security firm, Ghurkhas Security Guards. 87. The NPRC regime, in search of more revenue, opened the mining industry to “junior” diamond-mining companies. The term “junior” refers to “small prospecting and mining companies which work on the edge of the industry, discovering diamond fields, generating funds on international stock markets, sometimes selling diamonds directly but more often than not eventually selling out to larger companies”. Such companies take risks to discover new resources and establish themselves in the world market. 88. These junior companies were associated with private security firms not just in Sierra Leone but throughout Africa. In conflict zones, such companies could not rely on the war-torn country to protect their mining operations. Therefore, to safeguard their profits, they turned to other means of security. The junior companies that entered Sierra Leone during the conflict period included those in the list overleaf. Rex Mining Company 89. Rex Mining Company NV acquired concessions in Tongo Field and Zimmi in March 1994. The leases were renewed by the government in August 1999 but were revoked in mid-October 2003 when the company failed to pay outstanding licence fees amounting to US$282,000. The company claimed in 1999 to have close contacts with both government officials and the RUF. That claim was denied by Foday Sankoh. When the government’s helicopter gunship was shot down in 1998, Rex’s managing director and president provided the government with spare parts from Russia worth US$3.8 million. AmCan 90. AmCan came to Sierra Leone in 1993, and procured concessions for exploration in Kono District. Sierra Gold Limited, a subsidiary of AmCan, holds a 30-square-mile gold mine in Tonkolili District. In 1996, AmCan purchased ArmSec International (SL), a private security company. It is not clear what role ArmSec played in the conflict, but it was used by AmCan to provide security for its mining concessions. As of 1999, David Quee was AmCan’s lawyer and representative in Freetown as well as Chairman of the GGDO. Despite this apparent conflict of interests, the Ministry of Mineral Resources did not intervene. Branch Energy, Diamond Works and Executive Outcomes 91. Branch Energy first entered Sierra Leone in 1995 and obtained a concession from the NPRC regime for mining kimberlitic diamonds in the Kono District. The lease was originally for 25 years and could be renewed. The contract was ratified by the Parliament in 1996. However, Branch Energy, which in 1996 became a subsidiary of Diamond Works, a mining company registered in Canada, decided to end its activities and evacuate its personnel after the May 1997 coup that led to the establishment of the AFRC. 92. The Commission travelled to Kono to visit the Branch Energy concession and conducted interviews with its employees. The company lost US$15 million of its initial 1995 investment, because its equipment was looted or burnt. Jan Joubert, the company’s country manager since 1995, arranged the evacuation of personnel after the May 1997 coup. After negotiations with the AFRC in Kono, the employees and other foreigners were finally evacuated by helicopter in August. However, Joubert stayed behind and managed to set up meetings between the military, the AFRC/RUF and the Kamajors. The ultimate aim was to achieve a secure climate in Koidu and in Kono District in general that would be safe enough to permit the resumption of the company’s operations. Joubert succeeded initially in creating a forum for discussion with the AFRC but finally had to leave the country in September 1997 following the breakdown of negotiations. 93. Executive Outcomes (EO) was part of a bigger group, called Plaza 107, which included Sandline International, Lifeguard Security and other security firms, as well as some mining companies such as Branch Energy. From its inception, EO had been providing security for diamond companies in conflict zones. It had performed such services for Anglo American, De Beers and Branch Energy in its diamond operations in Angola. 94. The ostensible links between Branch Energy, EO and Sandline International in Sierra Leone are denied by Branch Energy and Diamond Works. After the end of Executive Outcomes’ operations in Sierra Leone, Eeben Barlow, the former director of Executive Outcomes, became a shareholder in Diamond Works. 95. Executive Outcomes was allegedly introduced to the government by Branch Energy through Tony Buckingham. Its mandate was to repel the RUF and retake the diamond-mining areas in Kono District. EO was paid by the NPRC partly in cash and partly in mining concessions granted to Branch Energy. According to Captain Valentine Strasser, former Head of State and Chairman of the NPRC, Ghurkhas Security Services was also paid in diamond concessions. One month after Executive Outcomes pushed the RUF out of the diamond areas, Branch Energy secured its 25-year lease in Kono District. Reginald Glover, then Minister of Mineral Resources, claimed that he was ordered by the Head of State to give diamond concessions to Branch Energy. 96. Branch Energy, Diamond Works and Executive Outcomes became important players in the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. Using contacts in government and acquiring protection from the RUF, they continued to engage in diamond exploitation. The RUF, diamond smuggling and arms trafficking “We
have signed the Peace Accord on 29 November 1996, just so as to relieve
our movement of the enormous pressure from the international community
while I will use this opportunity to transact my business in getting
our fighting materials freely and easily.”
Foday Sankoh, Leader of the RUF, 4 December 1996
97. Before 1995, the RUF conducted diamond mining on a sporadic and unorganised basis. However, the Commission received multiple reports of civilians being forced to mine for the RUF dating back to 1994. In a letter allegedly sent to Mohamed Talibi of the Libyan Arab Bureau in Ghana, Sankoh stated in June 1996 that he had been able “to organise serious mining operations in precious minerals which [he] believes will help [them] generate the needed foreign exchange for [their] mission”. 98. In 1995, the RUF took control of the Koidu area and held it for about four months until being driven out by Executive Outcomes. Witnesses recall several instances in which RUF fighters seized diamonds from civilians in Kono District, often beating or torturing them if they refused to hand the diamonds over. In Kelfala Chiefdom, Pujehun, in 1995, a miner was seriously beaten by RUF fighters when he refused to hand over his diamonds: “One rebel came with a mask and asked me
to produce the diamonds. I told him I had nothing like diamonds in my
possession. Failing to produce the said diamonds, I was severely beaten
with a stick. He further threatened to kill me. I begged him not to
kill me as I am a poor boy working for people. But he seemed not to
care and continued beating me until the first stick was broken. He used
a second stick until it was finished.”
99. A former RUF commander reported on RUF diamond-seizure tactics during the period when the RUF was in control of the Koidu area. Seizures were conducted during raids on towns and mining sites and also on individual miners and dealers. Diamond seizures were also conducted in Pujehun District, often resulting in the death of civilians: “At Kpetewoma Lugbu
in August 1995, we were in a hiding place mining when the rebels got to
us. They surrounded us and got everybody to the mining site. We were
asked to give them the diamonds we had. Because there was delay in
giving them the diamonds, four miners were killed and others lined up
to follow them. They took all we had in the huts plus our food.”
100. The tactic of diamond seizure was also used in Tongo Field throughout the war, but large-scale mining was not organised in that area during the period between 1994 and 1997. 101. The RUF used diamonds to buy weapons and supplies. As illustrated by the Foday Sankoh quote above, it appears that the RUF signed the Abidjan Peace Accord only to gain time and re-establish its control on the ground. Indeed, by the time of the Abidjan signing in 1996, the RUF had suffered a major military setback and lost control of the diamond-mining areas. 102. The RUF diamonds were smuggled mainly to Liberia and Guinea, over footpaths through the borders. The diamonds were carried by RUF commanders across the border to Foya-Kama and Voinjama, and then on to Monrovia. The profits from diamond sales were used to purchase weapons, ammunition, food and equipment. Several reports and testimonies indicate that the weapons came mainly from Eastern Europe by air, were trans-shipped in Burkina Faso and Libya, then imported into Liberia, usually by air as well, in violation of the UN arms embargo on Liberia. The weapons were then transported into Sierra Leonean territory mainly by road in load trucks. The material included ammunition, RPGs, grenades and AK-47s. 103. The estimates of RUF revenues from diamond smuggling vary from US$25 million to US$125 million per year. De Beers’ estimate for 1999 is US$70 million. The estimates refer to the optimal value of the production capacity of the land under the RUF’s control and not to the actual RUF revenues, which are extremely difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, these estimates seem very high and, if accurate, suggest a very important role for diamonds in fuelling the conflict. The fact that there is no evidence that supplies matching these levels of profits reached the RUF fighters on the ground, suggest that the estimates were overstated. 104. Two possible explanations can be offered for the discrepancy between alleged RUF receipts in diamond sales and the supplies to the fighters. The first is that corruption within the ranks of the RUF was high and individual commanders were keeping some of the profits. Another possible explanation is that Liberian officials and other business partners in Liberia, who received the diamonds from RUF commanders, retained a high level of the profits for themselves. 105. On several occasions, senior commanders in various factions attempted to keep diamonds for themselves. Former Head of State Johnny Paul Koroma, after the removal of the AFRC from power, tried to keep some diamonds to pay for his escape from the country. He was placed under house arrest by senior RUF officers (including Issa Sesay and Mike Lamin) until he returned the diamonds. He handed over diamonds reportedly worth US$15,000. 106. On another occasion, Issa Sesay was given 14 diamonds by Sam Bockarie to take to Monrovia to a business associate of President Taylor’s. The objective was to exchange the diamonds for military equipment. Issa Sesay went to Monrovia with the diamonds, but claimed to have “lost” them in a tea shop. He later explained to the RUF command structure what had happened, and a fight with Sam Bockarie and Mike Lamin ensued. Issa Sesay has been accused of dealing diamonds for his own benefit and covering up the deals: “Issa was in
charge as the overall commander; if he had a diamond of about 10 to
fifteen carats, he would take it to somebody who he knows has money,
and he would say: ‘Go and sell that diamond; go to such and such
person.’ That person would buy the diamond and later on Issa would come
around with his vehicle and his boys and say: ‘What about that diamond
you bought? Bring it, I want it.’ The person would then be forced to
produce that diamond and pay for it again.”
107. The People’s Army of Sierra Leone, a combination of the RUF and AFRC forces, had a mining unit complete with Mining Commanders. The unit suffered from internal power struggles with commanders stealing diamonds from one another. One investigation obtained by the TRC, conducted by the People’s Army Joint Security Board, followed the “loss” of 82 pieces of diamonds. The investigation concluded that “the administrative set-up within the Mining Unit was very poor” and recommended the daily weighing of diamonds in the presence of all the mining commanders, the issuance of receipts signed by witnesses and an increase in security within the Mining Unit. 108. The TRC received testimony about the involvement in diamond dealing of high-ranking government and military officers in Liberia, including former President Charles Taylor. One former RUF combatant claimed to have witnessed an exchange of diamonds and weapons between Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor in 1994 at the Kangari Hills base. Although his account was uncorroborated, this combatant’s testimony does accord with widely-held suspicions in the international community. 109. In the aftermath of the overthrow of the AFRC/RUF regime by ECOMOG in February 1998 and the subsequent withdrawal of the RUF to its stronghold of Kailahun District, diamond transactions were allegedly conducted with the “leader of Liberia” and “the brother in Burkina” in exchange for arms and ammunitions. According to a conversational excerpt attributed to Mike Lamin: “Although he [Sam Bockarie] had already made some
contacts with them, he needed some of the gem stones to give to the
leader in Monrovia to facilitate these contacts. Before this, of
course, we were aware that some transactions were going on as on
several occasions he made visits to Monrovia through the help of one
Benjamin Legon, a Liberian security personnel; in collaboration with
the Adjutant General. The Adjutant General knows about some diamonds
given to Benjamin Legon for onward handing over to the Leader in
Liberia.”
110. There is some evidence of diamonds for weapons and supplies deals between the RUF and some Guinean individuals and military officers. There is however no proof of the involvement of the government or any high-ranking military personnel. It is alleged, in one instance, that the RUF bought a BM-21 multiple rocket launcher from the Guinean Armed Forces just after the invasion of Freetown in January 1999. 111. Allegations of corruption were made against Foday Sankoh when he became Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Mineral Resources, following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999. These allegations concern deals apparently made with the Integrated Group of Companies and BECA Company, the latter having signed a contract for exploitation of diamond and gold resources directly with the RUFP and not with the Government of Sierra Leone. The place of diamonds in the overall strategy of the RUF
112. Some of the RUF’s weaponry was acquired through purchases made abroad, paid with diamonds and other sources of revenue. However, this does not suggest that diamonds-for-arms exchanges was the only way, or even the primary way, in which the RUF acquired weapons; nor does it mean that diamonds were the only commodities used in such exchanges. 113. The Commission has received several testimonies from civilians forced to produce marketable agricultural produce for the RUF. All these events were reported from Kailahun District, which borders Liberia. In July 1998, the RUF came to an understanding with the authorities of Lofa County in Liberia for cross-border trade allowing the RUF to transport produce for sale in Liberia. 114. Villagers were forced to harvest cocoa and coffee and hand those products over to RUF commanders. Abu Yaku Gaima was the Paramount Chief for Dia chiefdom, Kailahun District, in 1993, when the RUF invaded the chiefdom: “Peter
Vandy and Mohamed Ukulay (alias Mannawa), who was the RUF Brigade
Commander, came to Baiwala and requested for 100 bags of cocoa to be
produced in 5 days, as they urgently needed it to buy arms. He ordered
me to register all civilians all over the chiefdom and that everybody
should join efforts.”
115. Villagers were then forced to carry these items across the border to be exchanged for weapons, suffering many violations in the process, such as beatings and killings. The abductees would then be brought back to carry more items: “I was subjected to forced labour to carry double bags with either cocoa or coffee to Liberia and back to Sierra Leone. This was done many times”; or left behind upon reaching the destination: “When they entered
into our hiding place and captured us, we had to carry one double bag
loaded with either cocoa or coffee. But if they did not get the
required amount, they would lock us in our houses until they get the
quantity they wanted, after which they would open the door and ask us
to carry these loads to Foyia in Liberia. When you reached your
destination, they would abandon you and go for their business”.
116. From these testimonies, the focus appears to have been on the acquisition of coffee and cocoa, because they had a reasonably high market value. 117. Several witnesses speculated that the RUF acquired weapons mainly through the seizure of SLA equipment after taking over SLA bases. These testimonies are supported by evidence of the types of weapons and logistics that were used by the RUF: mainly SLA standard issue firearms rather than sophisticated weaponry imported from abroad. RUF weapons included small arms rather than mounted heavy artillery pieces. RUF vehicles were typically stolen vehicles rather than newly purchased trucks. Other minerals and natural resources
118. On 19 January 1995 the RUF attacked two important mines in Moyamba and Bonthe Districts. One was a bauxite mine owned by SIEROMCO, a subsidiary of Swiss Aluminium Company of Zurich. The second mine was owned by Sierra Rutile Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Nord Resources of the United States. Sierra Rutile was then the largest producer of rutile, or titanium ore, in the world with a 25% share of the global market. SRL employed 2,000 people and produced 150,000 tons of rutile per year. The company was the largest private employer in Sierra Leone before the attack. The two mines accounted for 63% of export earnings in 1994 (with 48.7% for SRL and 14.5% for SIEROMCO), which represented US$13 million of revenues for the government. The impact on the economy of these attacks was therefore disastrous. 119. Most of the employees of SIEROMCO and Sierra Rutile were evacuated, but the RUF took several foreigners hostage. The attack at Rutile was led by Mohammed Tarawallie, who was the RUF Battle Group Commander at the time. He was acting under the instructions of Foday Sankoh and is said to have communicated with him by telephone from the Sierra Rutile office. 120. One civilian witness told the Commission that many soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Tom Nyuma, Provincial Secretary of State under the NPRC, were brought in as reinforcements the day before the attack at Mokanji and Rutile in two helicopters. According to this account, the directors of Sierra Rutile Limited wanted to evacuate the employees, but were assured by Tom Nyuma that the area was secure and the advance of the RUF had been countered: “Tom
Nyuma assured them of security since the soldiers were fully deployed;
this same confidence he gave to the civilians. [The next day] we heard
the information that the RUF had reached Kaibama. The township was full
of panic as everyone wanted to leave but the soldiers deployed gave us
confidence that nothing would happen.”
121. When Mokanji was attacked, the mother of this witness, Ibrahim Jusu, was shot dead by the RUF, along with other civilians. The employees of SIEROMCO were kidnapped. Witnesses before the Commission, including Ibrahim Jusu, accused Tom Nyuma in strong terms of collusion with the RUF. 122. A number of reasons have been advanced to the Commission for the attacks at Sierra Rutile and SIEROMCO. One reason was that the attacks were aimed procuring equipment and stealing cash from the Sierra Rutile office, allegedly amounting to “thousands of dollars”. Another objective was to cut off the government’s revenue by disrupting production activities at the companies. A further reason was that the attacks were part of the RUF’s terror tactics in order to create a general climate of insecurity among the population. 123. Two victims of the attacks claimed that the attacks were carried out by a combination of RUF and SLA fighters, acting together in the looting of civilian properties and the burning of houses: “The RUF rebels
who were controlling the Sierra Rutile Company used the route from
Sierra Rutile through our village, Moselolo. They opened fire on us and
all of us abandoned the village. They set fire to 27 houses and some
people were captured, all of our belongings were looted and some burnt
down. The RUF rebels and SLA combined themselves to attack us.”
124. The attacks and the subsequent hostage taking were certainly part of a strategy to gain international notice. The RUF simultaneously demanded the cessation of British military help to the NPRC regime. The hostage taking was widely reported in the Western press, as European nationals were among the abductees. The negotiations for the release of the hostages also resulted in the Sierra Leonean conflict receiving international attention some four years after it had started. The hostage taking sent a message to international aid workers that the country was not safe and that they should pull out. 125. The attacks on the two companies resulted in the disruption of community life in the areas close to the mines. The Commission has received testimony from villagers of Moyamba and Bonthe Districts describing the violations committed against them by the RUF as including looting of property, abduction, including of young children, summary executions and the burning of houses. These violations resulted in extensive displacement of civilians, as they fled to neighbouring villages and to the bush, trying to escape the attacks. Young girls were abducted and turned into “bush wives”: “We were captured on Wednesday 25 May
1995 and taken to Kpetema where we stayed for about a month. An RUF
rebel who apprehended me forcefully took me for his wife. I was 15
years of age by then.”
126. A female witness was captured by the RUF with her two sisters on January 19th 1995 at Rutile:
“One
night, Edward Kaitibi (my RUF abductor) asked me to have sex with him
but at that time I had no knowledge of sex. He forced me that night in
the bush after which I saw blood all over me. It went on for about 30
minutes [...] I ended up with pregnancy.”
127. The towns of Rutile and Mokanji were specifically targeted, being closer to the mines. The Commission collected testimony regarding the looting and burning of the villages of Mata Gelema, Moselolo, Victoria, Nyandehun and Mokeleh during the months following the attacks at the mines. Civilians were displaced from these villages, sometimes for several months. The RUF conducted sporadic attacks, making it difficult for the population to return to the villages. 128. The attack at the Sierra Rutile plant itself was described by an employee as “tense, fearful and bloody”. The same employee witnessed the killing of many people, including his supervisor. After the attacks, several Rutile abductees were forced to become members of the RUF. The first contacts to secure their release were made with the help of the ICRC and the head office of SIEROMCO in Freetown. Fred Marrafono, a British citizen, was hired as a consultant by SIEROMCO to negotiate with the RUF. The contacts were made by telephone with RUF officers and the hostages were finally released. 129. As a result of the worsening security situation and the fear of losing control over the Moyamba area, the NPRC regime called in the Ghurkha Security Services. The arrival of the Ghurkhas opened the way for the involvement of private security firms in the conflict as mercenary forces for the government. Executive Outcomes and Sandline International soon followed the Ghurkhas. From that point on, various governments were to rely on the services of private security companies to provide security in mining areas, fight the RUF and provide logistical support to the Army and the Civil Defence Forces. 130. SIEROMCO resumed its activities after the crisis, but output declined drastically and production was finally ceased altogether. More recently Sierra Rutile Limited has begun initial steps towards resuming production. The plan for the renewal of operations was presented to the public at Mokanji in August 2003 and activities were about to resume at the time of writing in 2004. The project is expected to create 900 jobs at its inception, 90% of which will be for Sierra Leonean nationals. 131. One witness testified to the Commission about combat training he received in 1997 from a security company called Cape International. Cape International is owned by Fred Marrafono, the British citizen who conducted the negotiations for the release of the hostages taken by the RUF at Rutile in 1995. The witness was trained, along with 33 others, in providing security for a gold mining company named Golden Prospect Mining Company. The original aim of the training was to provide security for the company’s assets and personnel from attacks. The witness and his fellow trainees subsequently fought with the Tamaboros, the Northern Region-based group that was part of the Civil Defence Forces. Mineral resources and civil militias 132. By the end of 1995, a growing consensus existed among chiefs particularly in the South and East that the army could no longer be trusted to provide effective defence for the civilian population. In their place, most chiefdoms were seeking to install a form of civil or community defence force, consisting of “sons of the soil”, bolstered by the chiefdom police. As part of their undertaking to support and supply such a force, the chiefs in areas endowed with natural resources would put forward “offerings” of those resources. The Commission has heard evidence of diamonds being given directly to the CDF mined from the diamondiferous banks of the Sewa River, Bo District; from the lucrative alluvial diamond mines around Tongo Field, Kenema District; and from the smaller mining fields North of Zimmi, Pujehun District. In addition, chiefdoms that possessed mineral resources other than diamonds contributed towards the war effort. Gold, for example, was donated by chiefs in the Mongheri township in Valunia Chiefdom, Bo District. 133. In order to institute an efficient system of supply of items such as diamonds and gold, chiefs had to assemble a labour force from among their own people. In this regard, while the majority of those engaged in mining or auxiliary tasks appear to have worked on a voluntary basis, the Commission received testimony from aggrieved persons who claimed that they were forced into labour or otherwise disadvantaged by their participation. One such claim suggested that in the chiefdom they were “regimented” into performing different types of labour and heavily punished if they refused the “orders” of their chiefs. 134. It is not clear what happened to the valuable minerals in question once the local chiefs collected them. The intended purpose was to convert them into their equivalent value in food, logistics such as vehicles or fuel, or arms and ammunition for the local civil militia (mostly Kamajors). However, while the testimonies from those who mined seem to indicate a relatively high value of minerals extracted, testimony from the “foot soldiers” of the CDF seem to suggest a paucity of provisions in every respect. 135. This disparity suggests that there was a high degree of embezzlement among those in control of such resources in the CDF. A Commission of Inquiry into allegations of corruption in the CDF in Bo District resulted in the resignation of the CDF Regional Co-ordinator for the South, Alhaji Daramy-Rogers in 1999. When questioned on this issue, Alhaji Daramy-Rogers testified that claims of embezzlement against him were fabricated. In his submission to the Commission, a coordinator of a CDF support group based in the United States recalled a telephone conversation in which Chief Hinga Norman requested the President to permit the take over of the diamond mines at Zimmi for exploitation by the CDF in order to boost the war effort. The President turned down the request because this would amount to the “mortgaging the nation’s resources”, to which Chief Norman replied “that they were already mortgaged.” 136. Despite the President’s demurrer, the CDF engaged in substantial mining of diamonds and other minerals in areas under its control. The Commission was unable to establish definitively how the mined resources were taken out of the country, or who the buyers were. The Commission has however heard testimony that Chief Norman made trips to Monrovia to procure arms and ammunition for the CDF. Monrovia had become the regional hub for international diamond dealing. The dealers there are known to have purchased diamonds from all available sources, which can safely be said to have included the RUF, AFRC, CDF, NPFL and a variety of private operators. Phase III of the Conflict: 1997 - 2002 137. The coup of 25 May 1997 marked a veritable turning point in the conflict. The AFRC junta invited the RUF to join it in a governing coalition. At this time the RUF and AFRC retained combined control over most of the diamond mining areas. From 1997 the RUF engaged in extensive mining and smuggling. This expansion of activity resulted in a significant increase in both the quantity and the quality of weapons and ammunition distributed to RUF fighters on the ground. 138. Between 1998 and 2002, RUF revenues from diamonds came in three main ways: organised mining, continued seizure from civilians in diamondiferous areas and “washing” of already mined gravel by abducted civilians. Mining ceased when the RUF and AFRC retreated into the bush in the face of the ECOMOG intervention of February 1998. However, the RUF regrouped and was able to launch its largest ever assault on Kono District in December 1998. Prior to December 1998, the RUF had not had sufficient control over the most lucrative areas of Kono to organise large-scale mining operations. Upon capturing Koidu Town and its environs, though, the RUF and some elements of the AFRC were able to carry out large-scale mining across Kono District, as well as in parts of Kenema District, such as Tongo Field. Mining activity continued from late 1998 to 2002 and was especially concentrated from 2000 up to the 2002 elections. The best areas for mining were pointed out to the combatants by abducted civilians. The RUF relied on abducted miners for its mining operations, as most RUF commanders had no mining expertise. 139. Combatants even resorted to mysticism in their search for diamonds. The Commission received a report of a human sacrifice organised by AFRC soldiers in Tongo Field in July 1997. The sacrifice was aimed at providing mystical support to the search for diamonds: “The
soldiers arranged to perform a ceremony so that they can get more
diamonds, but this ceremony must be performed on a human being. My
husband was seriously tortured with a stick by the AFRC soldiers until
he became hopeless. They finally beat him until he died.”
140. Towards the end of the war, some citizens of the diamond-producing areas resisted the mining of diamonds in their communities. There was a rebellion by the Kono people in the Koidu area in December 1998. The rebellion, led by the Movement of Concerned Kono Youth (MOCKY), was aimed at stopping the mining activities that were benefiting the RUF. A battle ensued between the civilians and the RUF forces with substantial casualties on both sides. 141. When Foday Sankoh was released from detention in Nigeria in 1999, he visited Kono and ordered the commanders on the ground to expand mining operations. Mining Units were created with one Mining Commander for each area. Mining Commanders registered all miners and ordered security forces to monitor all mining and ensure that the diamonds were not stolen. According to one former RUF commander, any diamond found was handed over to the Mining Commander, then on to the Brigade Commander, the Battlefield Inspector and finally the Battle Group Commander, who in turn would pass it on directly to the “Leader” (Foday Sankoh). The Battle Group Commander at the time was Sam Bockarie. RUF personnel had to deliver the diamonds to him in Buedu on foot, using the footpath between Koidu and Buedu. There was one Overall Mining Commander for Kono and one for Tongo Field. 142. The people engaged in acquiring valuable resources for the RUF, including its miners and Mining Commanders, were strictly monitored. According to the same former RUF commander: “There was one idea
in the RUF: diamonds and foreign currencies were highly, highly needed.
So whenever you captured these things, you should report them - no
matter what quantities there were.”
143. There were several attempts by local RUF commanders and civilian miners to retain some of the diamonds and keep the profits for their own benefit. The Commission has received evidence of several investigations carried out by the RUF and by the People’s Army into private appropriations of diamonds. The diamonds were labelled “state property”. Sometimes, there were not even formal investigations. The accused were tortured on the spot. According to another RUF commander: “When you are caught, then if you are
lucky, they will say that they should investigate you. If you are
unlucky, they will conduct their own jungle investigation, which means
that they will torture you until you are dead.”
144. During one investigation in January 2001, three civilians were arrested for allegedly stealing diamonds. The third accused, Fatmata Conteh, was tortured and beaten to death. 145. There are accounts of the RUF/AFRC forces attacking civilians for the purpose of diamond extortion. A miner was attacked in Kono in 1997 by the AFRC troops who stole his mining equipment. Another witness claimed that he was arrested and tortured by the RUF in Tongo Field in July 2000 when he refused to hand over the diamond he found: “During my arrest, I was seriously tortured, almost to death, for that diamond. The rebels burst my head and they made a deep cut in my fore head.” 146. The RUF destroyed many houses and buildings in Kono District to use the lands for mining. In addition to the physical harm inflicted on civilians, was the displacement of the civilian population. The most striking example is Kono District. It was targeted throughout the war, by the RUF and by other armed factions, and many civilians have yet to return to the district after having escaped the attacks. 147. According to one account, Kamajors were carrying out illicit mining in Dodo Chiefdom, Kenema District, in 2000. There are also reports of Kamajors seizing diamonds from civilians, in Normiyama, Kono District, in 1999. The latter incident resulted in the witness being beaten, shot and detained, while six diamonds were taken from him. ECOMOG
148. Allegations of diamond smuggling were made against the Nigerian troops of ECOMOG. According to some accounts, high-ranking ECOMOG officials were involved in trading diamonds. Other accounts state that individual commanders were involved but the leadership was aware and did nothing to stop them. The Commission has been unable to obtain sufficiently authoritative information to make decisive findings in this regard. The Current Status of the Diamond Industry in Sierra Leone 149. The Ministry of Mineral Resources regained access to Kono District and control of the Tongo Field area in March 2002. Mining began immediately and this has resulted in an increase in the level of legal diamond exports since 1999, as demonstrated by the figures in Table 5, below.
Source for Table 5: Gberie, L. West Africa: Rocks in a Hard Place - The Political Economy of Diamonds and Regional Destabilisation, Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, May 2003. 150. The Government of Sierra Leone’s target for 2003 was US$ 60 million of diamond export value. As of 19 May 2003, the GGDO reported to the Commission that it had recorded an export value of US$ 27.6 million. 151. Although the level of smuggling seems difficult to assess, the expected level of exports from Sierra Leone has been estimated at between US$ 70 million to US$ 300 million per year. This estimate indicates that high levels of exports are still unaccounted for and suggests that smuggling continues on a large scale. Valuable profits remain unavailable to help rebuild the economy or to provide resources for the communities. Kimberlite diamond mining
152. Branch Energy / Diamond Works came back to Sierra Leone in 2003 and resumed its activities. It started rebuilding its installations at the beginning of the year and began operations in November 2003. The Kono concession (Koidu Property, four square kilometres) has estimated reserves of 6.3 million carats, with a potential to generate US$ 2.5 million in monthly revenues. The company hopes to repay its investment during the first two years of operation and generate substantive profits over the following two years. 153. Acquisition of diamond licences is by agreement with the chiefdom authorities and the central government. All land in the provinces is community owned. Companies and individuals cannot buy land. They can only rent it for a given period of time. The local authorities have the prerogative to decide who is issued a lease. 154. The chiefdom authorities may, for example, require that the company reinvest a part of its profits in community development, hire a percentage of its employees from the local people and conduct environmental assessments before starting operations. Branch Energy agreed to hire most of its labour force from the local community, and reinvest part of its profits into community projects. In June 2003, hundreds of youths demonstrated in Koidu to request the company to keep to this commitment. The situation was resolved by a series of meetings between community leaders and the management of the company. 155. The government will issue a licence after negotiations have been concluded with the community. At the time of writing, Branch Energy is currently paying an annual rent of US$200,000 for its Koidu Property, an annual lease rent of US$25 per acre, an annual surface rent of US$10 per acre and a 5% royalty on diamond sales and 4% royalty on precious metal sales. According to the Sierra Leone Mining Code, the government has the prerogative to negotiate special mining agreements with private companies to provide incentives for foreign investment. These special agreements can include tax cuts and royalty payments.
Alluvial diamond mining
156. The government has never succeeded in establishing complete control over the alluvial mining of diamonds. Corruption of the state apparatus and the close relationships between diamond magnates and politicians has always undermined government control. Current regulations on alluvial mining are imposed by the national government and the chiefdom authorities. Since all land in the diamond producing areas is community owned, the plots are leased. The licence fee to government is set at Le 200,000, which is around US$60. Le 120,000 is payable to the local Chief as surface rent. Only Sierra Leonean nationals are permitted to buy mining licences. 157. All alluvial diamond-mining licences are renewable every year and a miner is allowed to hold up to five licences. All applicants approved by the chiefdom authorities are granted licences by the government. Concerns relate to the manner in which selections are made and whether ruling families are favoured. The unregulated nature of the mining allows for corruption and abuse. Interviewees have alleged that the best parcels of land are allocated to privileged people in government and their associates. The procedure for the granting of licences by the chiefdom authorities needs to be revisited. 158. According to the district office of the Ministry of Mineral Resources in Kono, one thousand licences were issued in 2003. Many Sierra Leoneans who do not possess the necessary capital to pay for the licence were “sponsored” by either wealthy Sierra Leoneans, Lebanese or Guinean dealers who control the mining operations through the intermediary of Sierra Leonean nationals. These supporters provide tools and food to miners, the cost of which is subsequently deducted from any diamonds that the miners sell to the supporters. Alternatively the supporter receives all the diamonds mined and sells them with the miner receiving a portion of the sales. Since all diamonds found are sold to the supporter, the supporter is able to fix prices and control market conditions unilaterally. 159. The monitoring system established by the government is composed of local offices in the diamond mining areas with Mines Monitoring Officers travelling to the chiefdoms to control illicit mining (plot owners who operate without licence) and illicit buying (dealers who do not possess licences and/or who buy from unlicensed miners). There are few Mines Monitoring Officers and their pay is low (less than US$ 100 a month). Low remuneration encourages corruption, as Mines Monitoring Officers are tempted to supplement their low incomes with bribes. 160. The Mines Monitoring Officers lack the necessary resources, such as vehicles, to patrol the mining areas. In November 2003, alluvial diamond resources were identified in at least six of the 14 chiefdoms in the Kono District: Nimiyama, Nimikoro, Gbense, Tonkoro, Kamara and Fiama Chiefdoms. There were less than 30 Mines Monitoring Officers to cover the whole area. This area represents half of Kono District. One government official interviewed by the Commission assessed the need for about 60 officers in the district. 161. UNAMSIL and the Ministry of Mineral Resources started a joint project in Kono District in July 2003 with the aim of improving monitoring on the ground. Military Observers conducted an aerial survey together with representatives of the Ministry to identify the areas where diamonds are mined. 485 mining sites were identified. This data was subsequently compared with the licence registry to identify illegal sites. UNAMSIL MILOBS personnel then accompanied Mines Monitoring Officers in land patrols to visit the illegal sites and impose reprisals. The Ministry hopes to extend this monitoring project to other alluvial mining areas outside of Kono District. 162. A dealer licence costs US$ 3,000. Illicit buyers offer slightly higher prices to miners because they don’t pay licence fees and taxes. The higher prices are an incentive to miners to sell to illicit buyers. The border areas have many bush paths that are not policed at all. UNAMSIL has recruited a border control specialist to advise the government on border policing issues. One solution proposed by the Government Mining Engineer in Kono District is to encourage the licensed dealers to buy diamonds from illegal miners. The diamonds enter the system at the dealer level and will be exported legally, under government control. This proposal cannot be a solution because the dealers are also reselling the diamonds locally. The government therefore does not earn any revenues at any stage of the dealing process unless the diamond is exported. 163. Mines Monitoring Officers have no authority to arrest illegal miners. They must report the cases to the police, who often lack the necessary means to act on the spot. The police are not always able or willing to proceed with arrests and illegal miners. The diamonds that are actually confiscated from unlicensed miners are sold at an auction. Forty percent of the selling price goes to the person who confiscated the diamond (Mines Monitoring Officer) and 60% to the government treasury. This clause has been given legal status by the Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act, 2003. 164. In the Mines and Minerals Decree of 1994, the punishment for offenders of the licence system is not more than one year’s imprisonment or a fine not ex |
