| From Freetown, Sierra Leone. Volume 2 CHAPTER TWO
Findings
Introduction1. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (“the Act”) enjoined the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“the TRC” or “the Commission”) to make findings in relation to the causes, nature and extent of violations and abuses during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. In particular, the Commission was mandated to deliberate on the question of whether such violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual. The Act required investigation into the roles of internal and external factions in the conflict. 2. This chapter summarises the main findings of the Commission. The detailed findings of the Commission are to be found in the different chapters of the report. The main findings are preceded by primary findings. The primary findings are the central or most important findings made by the Commission. 3. In the course of its proceedings, the Commission amassed a large amount of evidence and information from public and closed hearings, interviews, investigations and research. Based upon the totality of this information, the Commission has made findings concerning the roles played in the conflict by governments, groups, factions and individuals. 4. At the end of each section addressing the role played by a particular government, faction or group, the names and positions of persons found to have been its key office holders are listed. In circumstances where a finding related to the actions of the government, faction or group in question, those office-holders were by implication held responsible. 5. In certain circumstances, findings were also made in respect of individuals. These circumstances included:
6. The Commission made findings in respect of groups and individuals after careful deliberation. Following months of research and investigation, staff members placed their research conclusions before the Commissioners in a series of workshops. These conclusions were interrogated and debated by the Commissioners. 7. The standard of proof employed was not that used by criminal courts of law, namely proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commission did not make findings on questions of innocence or guilt. It made factual findings in relation to responsibility and accountability. The standard of proof utilised by the Commission was therefore more akin to the preponderance or balance of probabilities. 8. The Commission, by necessity, devoted its energies to building the totality of the story of the conflict. Although specific cases were investigated, these were events that either served to illustrate the greater story or incidents that, in themselves, defined the nature and course of the conflict. 9. The Findings chapter is perhaps more properly described as a summation of the main conclusions that emerged from the process of establishing the “factual or forensic truth” of the conflict. At times this summation accords with some of the “personal or narrative truths”, namely the truth as understood or related by individual participants, victims and witnesses. The findings also, at times, accord with the “social truth” or that truth that is generally accepted by large segments of the population. 10. At other times, the conclusions to be found in the Findings chapter depart fundamentally from the different narrative truths and formerly accepted social or popular truths. In so doing, the findings of the Commission have debunked certain popular “truths” and may contribute to the creation of a new social truth of the Sierra Leone conflict. 11. The Findings chapter commences with the Primary Findings of the Commission. The chapter then sets out the conclusions and findings of the Commission in relation to the following topics and themes:
a. Causes of the Conflict
b. Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict c. Perpetrator Responsibility d. Military and Political History of the Conflict
i. Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
ii. Sierra Leone Army (SLA) iii. National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) iv. Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) v. Sierra Leone People’s Party Government (SLPP) vi. Civil Defence Forces (CDF)
e. External Actors
i. Libya
ii. Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) iii. United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) iv. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) v. United Kingdom vi. Executive Outcomes vii. United Nations and the International Community
f. The Judiciary, the Rule of Law and the Promotion of Human Rights
g. Youth h. Children i. Women j. Mineral Resources k. TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone PRIMARY FINDINGS 12. The Commission finds that the conflict and the post-independence period preceding it represent the most shameful years of Sierra Leone’s history. These periods reflect an extraordinary failure of leadership on the part of all those involved in government, public life and civil society. 13. The Commission finds that the central cause of the war was endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced most people to a state of poverty. 14. Successive political elites plundered the nation’s assets, including its mineral riches, at the expense of the national good. 15. Government accountability was non-existent. Institutions meant to uphold human rights, such as the courts and civil society, were thoroughly co-opted by the executive. 16. This context provided ripe breeding grounds for opportunists who unleashed a wave of violence and mayhem that was to sweep through the country. 17. Many Sierra Leoneans, particularly the youth, lost all sense of hope in the future. Youths became easy prey for unscrupulous forces who exploited their disenchantment to wreak vengeance against the ruling elite. 18. The Commission holds the political elite of successive regimes in the post-independence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict. 19. The Commission finds that the seeds of discontent of the late 1980s and early 1990s can be traced to the colonial strategies of divide and rule and the subversion of traditional systems by the colonial power and successive governments. 20. War in Sierra Leone was waged largely by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans. All factions specifically targeted civilians. 21. The Sierra Leone civil war was characterised by indiscriminate violence. It broke long-standing rules, defiled cherished traditions, sullied human respect and tore apart the very fabric of society. 22. While the majority of victims were adult males, perpetrators singled out women and children for some of the most brutal violations of human rights recorded in any conflict. 23. Children aged between ten and 14 years were especially targeted for forced recruitment. Girls between the ages of ten and 14 were targeted for rape and for abuse as sexual slaves. 24. Women and girls were raped, forced into sexual slavery, tortured and suffered cruel and inhumane acts. 25. Forced displacements, abductions, arbitrary detentions and killings were the most common violations. 26. The Commission holds all the armed groups involved in the conflict responsible for systematically plundering and looting Sierra Leone. 27. The Commission finds the leadership of the RUF, the AFRC, the SLA and the CDF to be responsible for either authorising or instigating human rights violations against civilians; alternatively for failing to stop such practices or to speak out against them; and for failing to acknowledge the atrocities committed by their followers or members. 28. The Commission holds the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the RUF responsible for planning and executing military operations against the state of Sierra Leone. In particular, the Commission finds that the leaders of these organisations, Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh, played pivotal roles in bringing bloody conflict to Sierra Leone. 29. The Commission found the RUF to have been responsible for the largest number of human rights violations in the conflict. 30. The AFRC committed the second highest rate of violations. 31. The SLA and the CDF were attributed, respectively, with the third and fourth highest institutional counts of violations. 32. The Commission finds that the governments in power at the time of the outbreak of violence in 1991 and during the conflict period neglected to take adequate steps to protect the nation from the aggressive actions of foreign and rebel forces. 33. The Commission finds that the SLPP Government must bear responsibility for the excesses committed by the CDF. The Government failed to stop and address the Commission of human rights violations against civilians and initiates even when knowledge of such violations was brought to its attention. 34. The Commission finds that successive governments abused the death penalty to eliminate political opponents. The Commission finds the continued existence of the death penalty on the statute books of Sierra Leone to be an affront to a civilised society based on respect for human life. 35. The Commission finds that successive regimes in Sierra Leone misused emergency powers to suppress political dissent. The persistent use of so-called “Safe Custody” detention is unlawful and represents gross contempt for the rule of law by the present Government of Sierra Leone. 36. The Commission finds that contrary to popular belief, the exploitation of diamonds did not cause the conflict in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, different fighting factions did target diamondiferous areas for the purposes of gathering mineral wealth to support their war efforts. 37. The Commission finds that many of the causes of the conflict that prompted thousands of young people to join the war have still not been adequately addressed. High among these factors are elitist politics, rampant corruption, nepotism, and bad governance in general. They are potential causes of conflict, if they remain unaddressed. 38. The Commission holds that the right to the truth is inalienable. This right should be upheld in terms of national and international law. It is the reaching of the wider truth through broad-based participation that permits a nation to examine itself honestly and to take effective measures to prevent a repetition of the past. FINDINGS ON THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 39. The causes of the Sierra Leone conflict were many and diverse. Some historical antecedents to the conflict can be traced back to the colonial period, while others are found by examining the post-independence years, in particular, the years preceding the outbreak of violence in 1991. 40. Key themes highlighted by the Commission were the pervasive corruption and the dire failings in governance that characterised all the regimes of the pre conflict years. These factors produced the conditions that made Sierra Leone ripe for violent conflict. 41. This section also sets out findings in relation to those developments that constituted the immediate antecedents to the start of conflict. Primary findings 42. Prior to 1991, successive regimes became increasingly impervious to the wishes and needs of the majority. Instead of implementing positive and progressive policies, each regime perpetuated the ills and self-serving machinations left behind by its predecessor. 43. A number of internal factors accumulated, which made armed rebellion an increasingly attractive option for many disaffected Sierra Leoneans. These factors included unrestrained greed, corruption and bad governance. 44. Institutional collapse reduced the vast majority of people to a state of deprivation. Government accountability was non-existent. Political expression and dissent had been crushed. Democracy and the rule of law were dead. 45. By 1991, Sierra Leone was a deeply divided society, full of the potential for violence. It required only the slightest spark for this violence to be ignited. Main findings
The Colonial Period
46. The Commission finds that the Colonial power in Sierra Leone deliberately created two nations in the same land, one in the colony and the other in the protectorate. The impact of the separate development policies had far-reaching consequences, particularly in the fields of education, access to resources and in the social and political development of the two regions. The policies of the Colonial government led to the preferential development of the Colony at the expense of the Protectorate. 47. The Commission finds that the Colonial government manipulated the Chieftaincy system and, in so doing, undermined its legitimacy. The Chiefs became mere surrogates of the colonial government. They owed their loyalty to their colonial masters rather than to the people they were meant to serve. 48. The Commission finds that the policies of the Colonial government created a dual legal system that affected the colony and the protectorate differently. This impacted negatively on those in the protectorate who had to contend with the arbitrary and capricious application of customary law by the Chiefs. This created much resentment amongst the residents of the protectorate.
The Post-Independence Period
49. The Commission finds that, by the early 1990s, greed, corruption and bad governance had led to institutional collapse, through the weakening of the Army, the police, the judiciary and the civil service. The entire economy was undermined by grave mismanagement. 50. Selfish leadership bred resentment, poverty and a deplorable lack of access to key services. Notwithstanding the riches endowed to Sierra Leone in the form of diamonds and other mineral resources, the bulk of the population remained impoverished. Indeed, many of the poor were becoming poorer. 51. These social ills began with a collective failure to subscribe to notions of the common good. In many instances, the rich perceived the poor to be worthless, while the poor perceived the rich to be unworthy. 52. A culture of grabbing and intolerance for the rights of others became entrenched in Sierra Leone. People were systematically deprived of their dignity. 53. The political elite in successive regimes excluded society-at-large from meaningful participation in decision-making. Key stakeholders in society, including students, youths, and the populace of the Provinces, were marginalised by the political elite. Ultimately, these marginalised groups played a central role in initiating and fuelling the armed conflict. 54. The Commission finds in particular that the term of government under the All People’s Congress (APC), particularly during the reign of President Siaka Stevens (1969 – 1985), was one that suppressed any semblance of opposition. The creation of a one-party state effectively neutralised all checks and balances on the exercise of executive power. The one-party state systematically closed down avenues for open debate and democratic activity. 55. By the time of the conflict, successive regimes had rendered the country devoid of governmental accountability. Institutions such as the judiciary and civil society had become mere pawns in the hands of the executive. Parliament proved itself to be a servile agent of the executive, lacking courage and determination to resist tyranny. 56. The Commission finds that all institutions of oversight must accept responsibility for the effective entrenchment of dictatorship and bad governance that laid the grounds for war. 57. There were no significant acts of resistance to the excesses of the system. Civil society was largely co-opted into the very same system. Organs or agents of the APC Government quickly crushed the few who did stand up to totalitarianism. In short, there were no real restraints on the executive. The rule of law was well and truly dead. Those in power became a law unto themselves. 58. The signs of the impending human catastrophe were plain to see. The Provinces had been almost totally sidelined through the centralisation of political and economic power in Freetown. Local government was in demise across the country. Chiefs and traditional structures did little more than the bidding of the power base in Freetown. Regions and ethnic groups were polarised by the contrasting treatments they were afforded. 59. It had become commonplace for elections to be rigged. Elections were associated with campaigns of intimidation and violence often carried out by thugs who were employed by party bosses and given drugs to fuel their waywardness. 60. Historically, the conduct of the political elite, while in power was largely the same, regardless of which political party was in power. Corruption in the judiciary and public sector was rife. The people had lost all faith in the ruling class to act with integrity and to deliver basic services to the nation. 61. Successive political regimes abused their authority over the security forces and unleashed them against their political opponents in the name of national security. Soldiers and police officers were reduced to playing roles as agents of destabilisation. The Commission finds that the military overthrow of the APC government in 1967 sowed the seeds for future military coups of successive governments. 62. By the time of the outbreak of war, the army had become dangerously under resourced after years of neglect, when government devoted its resources to internal security for purposes of extinguishing political opposition. 63. The Commission finds that divisions along ethnic and regional lines characterised the post-colonial period. Successive regimes favoured certain ethnic groups over others with regard to appointments in cabinet, the civil service and army. 64. Sierra Leoneans owed loyalty to their respective ethnic group rather than to the nation. They became captive to different systems of patronage. The basis for political, social and economic mobility was dependent on allegiance to a “pa” (benefactor) rather than effort based on merit. 65. By the end of the 1980s, Sierra Leone had become a deeply fragmented country, marked by an almost total lack of national identity. Notions of citizenship and patriotism had become meaningless concepts. 66. The Commission finds that the innumerable failings in governance caused Sierra Leonean activists to seek alternative outlets for expression of their dissent and dissatisfaction. The exclusionist actions of the APC led to a complete loss of faith in the political system and ultimately gave rise to a general belief that only a revolutionary movement could bring about change. 67. The Commission finds that those in leadership in government, public life and civil society failed the people of Sierra Leone. The period between independence and the start of the conflict represents a colossal failure of leadership at all levels of public life. No enlightened and visionary leaders emerged to steer the country away from the slide into chaos and bloody civil war. 68. The Commission holds the political elite of successive regimes in the post-independence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict in Sierra Leone. The governments headed by Sir Milton Margai, Sir Albert Margai, Colonel A. T. Juxon Smith, Siaka Probyn Stevens and General Joseph Saidu Momoh all bear a share of this responsibility. These leaders together with the entire political elite collectively placed their personal and political interests above those of the nation.
The immediate antecedents to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone
69. Outbreak of armed conflict was made inevitable by events unfolding in Liberia. A series of events took place on Liberian territory in 1990 and 1991 that culminated in the formulation of a joint agenda on the part of Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh. The Commission finds that they planned to instigate a war in Sierra Leone. 70. The launch of a renewed insurgency by Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) against the Government of Liberia in December 1989 was an integral antecedent to the conflict in Sierra Leone. 71. The Commission finds that Charles Taylor played an influential role in bringing war to Sierra Leone. Taylor provided the organisational oversight of both the NPFL and the RUF factions during the period preceding the conflict. 72. Foday Sankoh assembled and trained a force comprising 385 commandos at Camp Namma in Liberia. The Commission finds that Sankoh’s training programme was geared to no other purpose but the launching of an armed insurgency in Sierra Leone with this force. 73. The High Command of the Sierra Leone Army failed to put in place sufficiently robust measures to deter, prevent or contain attacks in the border area with Liberia. 74. The Commission finds that there were concrete plans for joint military operations by the RUF and NPFL in existence before 23 March 1991. These plans sparked a conflict that was unprecedented in its intensity, its nature and its characteristics. FINDINGS ON THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICT Primary Findings 75. The war was waged largely by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans. 76. All factions specifically targeted civilians. 77. While the majority of victims were adult males, perpetrators singled out women and children for some of the most brutal violations of human rights recorded in any conflict. In a few cases, the children victimised were below ten years of age. 78. Forced displacements, abductions, arbitrary detentions, and killings were the most common violations. 79. Sierra Leone was systematically plundered and looted by all factions in the conflict. The war has left Sierra Leone in a state of infrastructural disrepair. Main Findings
Self-destructive character of the conflict
80. Notwithstanding the participation of thousands of fighters from other countries in the war, the overwhelming majority of atrocities were committed by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans. The conflict was essentially self destructive in character.
Age and gender profile of the victims
81. Most of the violations reported to the Commission were committed against adult males (59.6%, or 6816 violations out of 11,429). Of the victims reported to the Commission for whom age and sex are known, 66.5% (7,603 out of 11,429 victims) are male while 33.5% (3,826 out of 11,429 victims) are female. Female victims reported to the Commission comprised 31.9% of adult victims (3,186 out of 10,002 victims) but made up 44.9% (640 out of 1,427) of the child victims. 82. Most of the violations in the Commission’s database were committed against adults, but an alarming high proportion was committed against children. Sixty-six percent of the victims in the Commission’s database are male. Female victims in the Commission’s database comprised 30.9% of adult victims but made up nearly half of all child victims.
Targeting of Civilians
83. Civilians accounted for a large number of deaths at the hands of each of the fighting factions. 84. The Commission finds that civilians, as individuals and in groups, were often the direct targets of participant militias and armed groups rather than merely the unfortunate victims of “collateral damage”. Combatant groups executed brutal campaigns of terror against civilians in order to enforce their military and political agendas. Civilians became the “objects” of political or factional allegiance. They were victimised indiscriminately to send a message to “the enemy”. 85. The Commission finds that all participant militias and armed groups not only disrespected the international laws and conventions of war, but also intentionally flouted the laws and customs that traditionally have lent structure to Sierra Leonean communities, culture and society.
Nature of Violations
86. Forced displacement accounted for 19.8% (7,983 out of 40,242) of the violations reported to the Commission. More forced displacements were reported than any other violation. The Commission found that a typical, recurring pattern of experience was for victims to flee from their homes in fear of their lives, leaving attackers in their wake. These attackers would often systematically loot and destroy whatever property had been left behind. 87. Abductions were the second most common violation reported to the Commission followed by arbitrary detention. The total reported violations and percentages are shown in the table below.
88. Within the context of the violations reported in statements to the Commission, rape and sexual slavery were committed exclusively against females, while 89.1% (293 out of 331) of forced recruitments were committed against males.
Targeting of Children
89. The Commission finds that children were specifically targeted during the conflict. In particular, the Commission finds statistical patterns that are consistent with the hypothesis that children between the ages of 10 and 14 were specifically targeted for forced recruitment, rape, and sexual slavery. Twenty-five percent of the victims reported to the Commission across these three violations were young children: 11 years of age or younger in respect of forced recruitment; 13 years or below in respect of those raped; 12 years or younger in respect of those forced into sexual slavery. 90. The Commission finds the RUF, the AFRC and the SLA (when it operated with the AFRC) to be the primary organisations that committed violations against children. Of the violations known to the Commission with a victim with known age and alleged to have been committed by the RUF, 15.4% (3,090 out of 20,125 violations) were against children. The corresponding statistic for the AFRC (including the SLA when it operated with the AFRC) was 10.7% (603 out of 5,610 violations). The leaderships of these factions are held responsible for permitting the commission of gross human rights violations against children. There are no mitigating factors to justify such inhuman and cruel conduct.
Looting of the Nation
91. Sierra Leone was systematically plundered during the conflict period. Looting violations were rife and constant throughout the period of fighting. Property owners and those with assets, such as motor cars and large numbers of livestock, were deliberately targeted by each of the fighting factions, as they sought to accumulate wealth for themselves. 92. The Commission finds that the targeting by the RUF of the affluent and the attacking of commercial operations crippled the economy. 93. Combatants from each of the factions enriched themselves through tactics universally known as “pay yourself”. They would force captives to act as “human caravans” to carry away their loot. 94. Combatants from all the factions in the Sierra Leone civil war are held responsible for looting and pillaging the country. The Commission holds the leadership elements of all factions responsible for either authorising or failing to stop the dispossession of the people.
Characterisation of the Fighting Forces
95. The majority of the fighting forces were composed of the young, the disgruntled, the unemployed and the poor. 96. The Commission has identified an astonishing “factional fluidity” among the different militias and armed groups that prosecuted the war. Both overtly and covertly, gradually and suddenly, fighters switched sides or established new “units”. These “chameleonic tendencies” spanned across all factions without exception. 97. The factional fluidity that defined this conflict was drawn into its sharpest focus in the latter stages of the conflict. Many of the early members of the RUF on its Southern Front in the Pujehun District reappeared as Kamajors under the banner of the CDF after 1997. Theirs was not so much a switching of sides as the identification of a new vehicle on which to purvey their notions of empowerment as civil militiamen.
Other Characteristics of the Conflict
98. Chiefs, Speakers, elders and other social, cultural and religious figureheads were singled out for humiliation and brutal maltreatment by combatants of the NPFL and the RUF. 99. The conflict was often used as a vehicle for carrying out pre-existing grudges, grievances and vendettas. 100. Acts of summary justice were often directed or encouraged by other civilians. These were mostly isolated incidents motivated by unresolved personal feuds and other localised dynamics in the particular deployment areas where they took place. Residents pointed fingers at other members of their communities with whom they had a history of civil strife. ECOMOG or SLA soldiers, RUF fighters or CDF militiamen then executed the alleged wrongdoer without substantiating the accusation. 101. Persons in positions of leadership or responsibility at times made malicious statements regarding other ethnic groups in order to promote their strategic objectives. This heightened ethnic tensions.
The Nature of Particular Violations
102. There was widespread voluntary and recreational use of drugs by members of the militias and armed groups. However, there were also many violations of forced ingestion of drugs and alcohol, particularly by members of the RUF against those they had abducted or forcibly enlisted. 103. The Commission finds that amputations were not a constant or underpinning feature to the prosecution of the war, but rather came in the form of campaigns. Amputations were carried out by members of the RUF, the CDF, the AFRC and the SLA in its earlier incarnations. 104. The Commission recorded violations committed by all combatant factions in which captives or villagers were forced to eat the flesh and body parts of human corpses. This violation also manifested itself in the forced drinking of (one’s own or another’s) blood, and the forced eating of one’s own body parts. It served to dehumanise the victim and to create grave psychological damage. 105. The Kamajors, who constituted the CDF of the Southern and Eastern Regions, demonstrated a tendency towards the subjection of their victims to forced cannibalism. FINDINGS ON PERPETRATOR RESPONSIBILITY Primary Findings 106. The RUF was the primary violator of human rights in the conflict. The AFRC was responsible for the second largest number of violations. The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was the third biggest violator, followed by the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). Main Findings 107. The Commission finds that the RUF was responsible for more violations than any other faction during the period 1991 to 2000: 60.5% (24,353 out of 40,242) of all violations were attributed to the RUF. Furthermore, the RUF committed more violations than any other group during every individual year between 1991 and 2000. 108. The AFRC was responsible for the second largest number of violations during the period 1991 to 2000. Some 9.8% (3,950 out of 40,242 violations) of all allegations made in statements to the Commission were attributed to the AFRC. 109. The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was responsible for the third largest number of violations during the same period. Some 6.8% (2,724 out of 40,242) of the allegations made in the statements were levelled at the SLA. 110. 6% (2,419 out of 40,242) of violations alleged by the statement-makers are attributed to the CDF, and 1.5% of violations alleged by the statement-makers are attributed jointly to the SLA and AFRC during the second quarter of 1997. 111. Other groups such as ECOMOG, the Special Security Division (SSD) of the Sierra Leone Police and the Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) account for less than 1% each of the recorded violations. 5.0% of the recorded violations are considered to have unknown perpetrators. 112. The total number of reported violations by year and alleged perpetrator identity are set out in the table overleaf. Number of violations reported to the TRC according to year and alleged perpetrator identity
FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 113. The next section covers the findings made in respect of the military and political history of the conflict. These findings are organised per faction. Findings of responsibility are made in relation to the role played by each faction and, in certain circumstances, with respect to individual leaders, commanders, combatants and other role-players. 114. The factions included in this study are the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Government of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP Government) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF) Primary Findings 115. The RUF and its supporters were responsible for the greatest number of human rights violations during the conflict period. 116. Although the RUF may have reflected prevailing discontent and revolutionary fervour existing in Sierra Leone at the start of the conflict, it soon lost its claim to be a peoples’ movement. From the beginning, the RUF’s war was a war of terror. While its political objectives evolved over time, the RUF never ceased or lessened its attack on the lives and properties of the people of Sierra Leone. 117. The RUF’s terror tactics included the widespread abduction of children and their forced enlistment into the RUF movement under threat of death; massacres of entire communities and the targeting of traditional figureheads and influential persons; campaigns of amputations; public and brutal executions; and the destruction and looting of property. 118. The RUF carried out widespread rapes and acts of sexual violence against women and girls. Main Findings
Characteristics of the RUF faction as it evolved over the course of the conflict
119. The Commission finds that the RUF comprised a highly unconventional fighting force. Their members were recruited in troubled circumstances, many of them under false pretences, duress, or threats to their lives. 120. The Commission finds that large parts of the RUF fighting force that evolved in Pujehun District in the early years bore the character of a civil militia movement. This anomaly was attributable to the enlistment into the RUF ranks of a pre-existing civil militia called the “Joso” Group, who were the remnants of the force that had led the 1982 Ndorgboryosoi rebellion against the APC. 121. The strained relationship between the RUF and the NPFL, from the outset, speaks of an insurgent force that was deeply divided. The Commission finds that many members of the RUF held completely distinct and partly conflicting agendas from their counterparts in the NPFL. In both Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, RUF members engaged in hostile actions against the NPFL. Divergence and confrontation between the two insurgent factions resulted in several targeted killings of each other’s leadership cadre. 122. The Commission finds that the majority of killings of key RUF commanders between 1991 and 1993 were attributable not to battlefield casualties, but to lethal manifestations of acrimony, rivalry and personal vendettas. 123. The RUF became a totally amorphous movement after the arrest of its leader Foday Sankoh in Nigeria in March 1997. Its command structure was decapitated and it opened the way for opportunists to assert their claims to leadership in his place. The result was calamitous for the prospects of engaging the RUF movement in further peace initiatives. 124. When the movement became the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), it split into two, the political and combatant wings. The tension and stresses between both groups made it impossible for the RUFP to genuinely engage in consolidating the peace.
RUF Strategies and Tactics of War
125. The RUF was responsible for the launch of an armed insurgency in Sierra Leone. The mode of insurgency was the culmination of detailed advance planning undertaken jointly by Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor. The RUF mounted a full-scale incursion from Liberia into both the Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, almost simultaneously. 126. The Commission finds that, for the duration of Phase I of the conflict, from 1991 to 1993, the combatant factions used strategies of conventional “target” warfare. Until the end of 1993, the conflict retained the character of a war on two fronts. 127. The Commission finds that the RUF deliberately included civilian settlements within the scope of offensive operations and holds the orchestrators, planners and commanders of these operations responsible for grave and systematic breaches of international humanitarian law. In particular, Charles Taylor, the leader of the NPFL, and Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, are found to have ordered such operations as part of their joint strategy of conventional “target” warfare. 128. The Commission holds the leadership of the NPFL and the RUF responsible for precipitating systematic forced displacement through their attacks on “targets”. The category of forced displacement accounted for more violations than any other act carried out by the warring factions in Phase I of the conflict. 129. The RUF and its NPFL partner vigorously pursued opportunities for self enrichment in the towns they entered. The insurgents thereby intensified the rate of violations they committed against the populations of the Kailahun and Pujehun Districts. 130. The RUF was responsible for the first sustained assault on Koidu Town, Kono District, from October 1992 until February 1993. This assault resulted in a spate of violations against local residents including the killing of Chiefs, government officials, businesspersons and members of the Lebanese community. 131. The Commission finds that the RUF’s attack on Koidu Town in 1992 represented the first of many occasions on which RUF missions targeted at areas rich in strategic resources resulted in the substantial loss of human life and destruction of property.
132. The Commission finds that the RUF overhauled its tactical approach to the war at the end of 1993 and launched a fresh strategy based on “guerrilla” warfare. The RUF was solely responsible for a far higher rate of violations and abuses in Phase II than in either the earlier or the later years of the conflict. 133. In particular, the Commission finds that the RUF perpetrated a systematic campaign of abductions on an unprecedented level in Phase II. The prime targets of RUF abduction were boys and young men who were forcibly recruited into the combatant cadre, as well as young girls who were raped and sexually enslaved by existing fighters. Almost every abductee was also forced into carrying loads for the RUF, often over long distances. The RUF carried out widespread rapes and acts of sexual violence in every community it entered. 134. The two tactical pillars on which the RUF guerrilla campaign was built were ambushes and “hit and run attacks”. In advance of ambushes, RUF commanders would whip up tension and aggression in their combatants. This manifested itself in intense brutality when they were released into action. Hence RUF ambush teams committed horrendous acts of civilian killings, sexual violence, mutilation and destruction of property. 135. Violations and abuses followed two principal sub-patterns within “hit and run attacks”. “Hits” became gradually less discriminate in their targeting and transpired to inflict gross human rights violations on numerous civilian communities. Violations typically included killings on sight, detentions of civilians (often en masse in cramped conditions), beatings of captives and incidents of rape and gang rape. 136. In the “run”, or flight from a target, the RUF systematically accrued “resources” for its sustenance as a guerrilla fighting force. Hence the RUF habitually captured civilians and took them unwillingly from their communities, often torturing them and forcing them into carrying pillaged properties. These captures were the bedrocks upon which the violations of forced recruitment and sexual slavery increased substantially. 137. The RUF was able to expand the scope and coverage of its operations so broadly that it had carved out a presence in every one of Sierra Leone’s twelve provincial Districts by 1995. The Commission finds that the RUF was responsible for the majority of violations and abuses carried out in every single one of these Districts. Among the atrocities attributable to the RUF during this period are several massacres of entire resident populations of townships in each of the Provinces of the country. 138. The Commission finds that the RUF carried out a host of attacks in the Central and Southern territories of Sierra Leone dressed in full SLA military uniforms. In many cases the RUF successfully deceived the local population that the Army was responsible for its attacks. Whilst widely and diversely practised, the Commission finds that such a mode of “false flag” attacks became a particular trademark of the troops commanded by the RUF’s erstwhile Battlefield Commander Mohamed Tarawallie (alias “Zino” or “CO Mohamed”). 139. The Commission holds the RUF responsible for the majority of the violence against civilians that accompanied the General and Presidential Elections of 1996. In particular, the RUF launched “Operation Stop Elections” against the civilian population as a deliberate ploy to undermine the expression of democratic will by the people of Sierra Leone who participated.
RUF Tactics of Enlistment: Abductions and Forced Recruitment
140. The Commission finds that the RUF pioneered the policy of forced recruitment in the conflict. The RUF bore a marked proclivity towards abduction, abuse and training of civilians for the purpose of creating commandos. It was the first armed group to practise forced recruitment and was responsible for the vast majority of the forced recruitment violations recorded by the Commission. 141. In addition, the Commission finds that many young men joined the RUF voluntarily because they were disaffected. This trend demonstrates the centrality of bad governance, corruption, all forms of discrimination and the marginalisation of certain sectors of society among the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. Historical ills and injustices had prepared the ground for someone of Foday Sankoh’s manipulative ability to canvass among the people and find scores of would-be RUF commandos who could be brought on board with relatively little persuasion. 142. The Commission finds that, by including young boys among his vanguard trainees at Camp Namma in the early 1990s, Sankoh set a trend of wanton violation of the rights of children that would recur and perpetuate throughout the following eleven years of conflict in Sierra Leone. 143. The Commission finds that insurgent factions forced thousands of civilians to join them. Sometimes, people’s normal lives and levels of tolerance were systematically worn away until they had no choice but to join the RUF. More commonly, though, youths and children were recruited by explicit force that included coercing them at gunpoint, sending them to training bases and turning them into combatants, known as “junior commandos”. 144. The Commission holds the RUF responsible for the majority of violations involving forced recruitment of children. The forcible recruitment of children less than 18 years old is a gross violation of international law.
Particular Responsibilities among RUF Ground Commanders
145. The Commission finds that the RUF Battlefield Commander from 1994 to 1996, Mohamed Tarawallie (alias “Zino” or “CO Mohamed”), bears a larger share of responsibility than any other individual combatant for the spread of RUF attacks into the Northern Province of Sierra Leone from 1994 onwards. Tarawallie carved a niche for himself as the commander in charge of “expanding” the RUF’s areas of operations and leading attacks on Government installations of perceived strategic importance. 146. The Commission furthermore regards Tarawallie as responsible for the policy of “false flag” operations. This policy sowed considerable mayhem and bitter distrust of the SLA. Tarawallie was the main and most frequent perpetrator of attacks in which the whole troop under his command wore full SLA uniforms. 147. Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”) rose to prominence as both a Battlefield Commander of lethal prowess and a deviant of unknown quantity in Phase II of the war. He frequently disobeyed orders and committed human rights abuses with total abandon. 148. Dennis Mingo (alias “Superman”) is also held responsible for a multiplicity of violations and abuses in Phase II. He was one of the foremost perpetrators of abduction-related crimes against children, including forced recruitment and forced drugging. 149. Among those commanders who recruited child combatants for the RUF were “vanguard” commanders including Komba Gbondema, Monica Pearson and Rashid Sandi, who undertook training on the RUF base known as ”Camp Charlie”. These commanders were never disciplined for their wanton mistreatment of children.
Amputations
150. The Commission finds that the RUF was responsible for more amputations than any other faction during the conflict in Sierra Leone. During 1996, the RUF’s “Operation Stop Elections” entailed the chopping off of hands and arms as a symbol of preventing people from voting. 151. In the RUF, a significant proportion of those who wielded the “implement of amputation” and actually performed the cutting of the limb in question were children. Many of the testimonies collected by the Commission indicate that the perpetrators themselves were acting under strictly enforced orders or other forms of compulsion. Children were instructed that they would be killed if they did not follow orders from their commanders.
Other Characteristics
152. Indiscipline was rife among the fighting forces of the RUF and it was a cause of some of the worst violations and abuses committed by cadres of the RUF movement. 153. The Commission finds that the RUF bears a considerable degree of responsibility for the destruction of the symbols and institutions of authority in Sierra Leone. The RUF replaced traditional role players, including Chiefs and elders, with totally inappropriate authority figures, such as “Town Commanders”. 154. The Commission finds that the RUF carried out a purposive ploy to attract the attention of the international community by abducting civilian foreign nationals and holding them hostage in violation of international humanitarian law.
Internal Acrimony and Power Struggles within the RUF
155. The Commission holds Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”) responsible for the torture and summary executions of up to 40 RUF members in the Kailahun District in 1993. This set of executions eliminated some of Sankoh’s most envied personal rivals within the movement, including the erstwhile second-in-command Rashid Mansaray. 156. The Commission holds Gibril Massaquoi responsible for the torture and summary executions of up to 25 RUF members in the Pujehun District in 1993. This set of executions eliminated some of the most popular and credible commanders in the RUF’s First Battalion, including the erstwhile Battalion Commander Patrick Lamin. It was the aim of Massaquoi and a core of his Mende henchmen to localise and reshape the leadership of the movement on the Southern Front. It was targeted particularly against vanguards, many of whom were of Northern descent. 157. Following the arrest and detention of Foday Sankoh in Nigeria, the leadership of the RUF movement was seized by Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”). The Commission finds that the notion of authority in the RUF thereafter was connected inexorably with brutality. A process of competition for control and management of the movement and its resources ensued. The levels of violations against civilians increased in almost direct proportion.
Breach of the Abidjan Ceasefire
158. The ceasefire declared to provide a stable backdrop to the Peace Talks in Abidjan was flouted by both the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone.
RUF Involvement in the Political and Military Implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement
159. The Commission finds that, by the time of the negotiations at Lomé and beyond, Foday Sankoh no longer enjoyed sole and unfettered authority over all arms of the RUF movement. To a great extent, the RUF had become divided into two distinct entities with two distinct agendas. The “political wing” was largely loyal to Sankoh, but its members did not command constituencies of sufficient size or significance to dictate the direction of the whole faction. The RUF “combatant cadre” was far more volatile and threatening. 160. The Commission finds that the RUF combatant cadre perceived that the dividends of the Peace Agreement were concentrated in the hands of their “political” leadership, while the concessions associated with disarmament and demobilisation were all “military” sacrifices that had to be made by the combatant cadre. A major shortcoming on the part of the RUF faction leaders was that they failed to engender confidence and faith among the RUF combatant cadre that Lomé was a fair and impartial process. 161. The RUF’s participation in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement drove a wedge between members of its political wing and the RUF combatant cadre. RUF monitors in the Joint Monitoring Commission and the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee were often subjected to harassment and physical abuse by members of their own faction. 162. The Commission finds that the RUF combatant cadre did not comply with the terms of the disarmament programme. Its commanders encouraged and engaged in persistent breaches of the peace. They displayed a particular disregard for the status of the peacekeepers. Commanders such as Komba Gbondema, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay and Augustine Bao displayed utter contempt for the ethos of the peace process in their areas of control. Foday Sankoh was outwardly fiercely protective of “his boys” in the field and shares the responsibility with them for numerous attacks between October 1999 and April 2000.
RUF Violation of the Lomé Peace Agreement in Taking Peacekeepers Hostage
163. The hostage-taking of about 500 UNAMSIL military personnel in the early days of May 2000 was the gravest violation carried out by the RUF combatant cadre during the disarmament phase. These widespread and unprovoked abductions constituted a grave breach of the conditions of the Lomé ceasefire. There can be no justification for the use of armed force against observers and support staff whose neutrality and safety were imperative to the successful implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement. 164. The Commission finds that the hostilities against UNAMSIL peacekeepers, which culminated in their abductions, were initiated and commanded at the instance of Morris Kallon and Augustine Bao of the RUF. 165. Foday Sankoh never ordered the responsible parties to release the peacekeepers. Nor did he issue a decisive public statement condemning the hostage-taking. Sankoh deceived his fellow signatories to the Lomé Peace Agreement by purporting to resolve the hostage-taking crisis. In the process, he further endangered the lives of the peacekeepers. He squandered any semblance of trustworthiness he previously had as a partner in peace due to his lack of rectitude. Cumulatively, Foday Sankoh served to aggravate the deteriorating security situation in Sierra Leone. He effectively invited enforcement action against the RUF. 166. Sankoh’s “Special Assistant”, Gibril Massaquoi, personally fuelled the tensions surrounding the UNAMSIL hostage-taking crisis. He was a central part of the chain of command of the RUF. He was duplicitous in his presentation of the RUF position to the outside world. Massaquoi bears an individual share of the responsibility for the deterioration in the security situation in Sierra Leone. 167. The RUF as an organisation inflicted irreparable discredit upon itself during the hostage-taking episode. The public, the Parliament, the President and the RUF’s other partners in the peace process held a common viewpoint that the RUF had exhausted all its chances.
Violent Action of RUF Commandos Acting as Security on 8 May 2000
168. The Commission finds that 24 (twenty-four) members of Foday Sankoh’s personal security detail were arrested and detained arbitrarily at the behest of Johnny Paul Koroma, former Head of State during the AFRC regime, on 7 May 2000. These arrests severely depleted Sankoh’s protective unit. 169. The Commission finds that on 8 May 2000, during the demonstration at Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge compound, RUF combatants returned fire in response to shots fired by the West Side Boys and CDF elements within the crowd. In so doing, they fired several rounds of automatic weapons fire and at least one RPG in the direction of the crowd of demonstrators. The RUF killed at least ten civilians among the crowd and injured several others. Names of RUF Leadership 170. Ranks and areas of deployment were malleable and ever changing in the RUF movement. The insurgent group calling itself the RUF that entered the country in 1991 was largely comprised of NPFL commandos (as described in the chapter on Military and Political History in Volume Three A) and would change in character on numerous occasions. Moreover, many of the RUF’s original office-holders were killed in the early years of the conflict. It is therefore unrealistic to speak of a permanent hierarchy in the RUF. 171. While certain individuals held effective command responsibility at certain times over certain combatants, the Commission found it difficult to discern any consistent and centralised vertical structure of leadership. The leadership of the movement was further complicated after the RUF formed its alliance with the AFRC, when the latter seized power in a coup on 25 May 1997. 172. The names listed below as RUF office-holders are divided, as far as possible, into coherent categories. The order in which office-holders are listed reflects seniority at the time when they held the positions in question. Promotions, demotions and realignments within the RUF were found to be too numerous to list in their entirety. It has also proved too onerous in some cases to enumerate every nominal position held by a particular individual, or, to reflect properly the role or roles played by that individual. The naming of an individual hereunder should nevertheless signify that individual’s high-level involvement in the operations of the RUF. The RUF High Command The RUF High Command was predominantly comprised of battlefield combatants and other frontline operatives. Leader and Commander-in-Chief Foday Saybana Sankoh Original RUF Battle Group Commanders John Kargbo / Rashid Mansaray Original RUF First Battalion Commander Patrick Lamin Battlefront Commander and Battle Group Commander (after 1992) Mohamed Tarawallie (alias “Zino”) Member of the RUF elite “Special Forces” and Influential Ground Commander Abu Kanu Member of the RUF elite “Special Forces” and Influential Ground Commander Mike Lamin Battlefield Commander (1992 to 1997) / Battle Group Commander and RUF / “People’s Army” Chief of Defence Staff (post-May 1997) Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”) Influential Ground Commander and “Special Assistant” to the RUF Leader and Commander-in-Chief Gibril Massaquoi Battlefield Commander (1997 to 2001) and Interim Leader of the RUF (after Foday Sankoh’s arrest in May 2000) Issa Hassan Sesay Senior RUF Battalion Commanders and Influential Ground Commanders Dennis Mingo (alias “Superman”) Peter Borbor Vandy Morris Kallon (alias “Birlai Karim”) Komba Gbondema (alias “Monamie”) Boston Flomoh (alias “Rambo”) Momoh Rogers Isaac Mongor Abubakarr Jalloh (alias “Bai Bureh”) Monica Pearson Sheriff Parker (alias “Base Marine”) Commander of RUF Internal Defence Unit (IDU) Augustine Ato Bao The RUF Administrative Cadre Classification and commandership under “G-numbers” was used in the RUF to denote different responsibilities within the main administrative cadre of the movement; the original Sierra Leonean incumbents of these administrative positions were found by the Commission to have remained influential figures of leadership in the RUF throughout the conflict. G-1 / GSO-1 / Training and “Recruitment” Moigboi Moigande Kosia G-2 / Internal Defence Unit Patrick Beinda G-3 / Adjutant General Jonathan Kposowa G-4 / Arms and Ammunition Joseph Brown G-5 / Civilian Liaison Prince Taylor Chairman of the RUF War Council Solomon Y. B. Rogers RUF Spokespersons and Miscellaneous Figures of Seniority and / or Influence (at various points in the evolution of the RUF movement) Eldred Collins Omrie Golley Philip Palmer Ibrahim H. Deen-Jalloh Alimamy Sankoh THE SIERRA LEONE ARMY (SLA) Primary Findings 173. The Commission finds that, during the period of conflict, the SLA failed the people of Sierra Leone. The SLA was unable to defend Sierra Leone and its people from the armed insurrection and the program of terror launched by the RUF and other factions. 174. The Commission finds that the SLA was unprofessional and ill-disciplined. The leadership of the SLA undermined the war effort through many corrupt practices, which caused dissatisfaction and rebellion to swell among the junior ranks. 175. On many occasions, the SLA acted against the Sierra Leonean people – the very people it was meant to defend. Soldiers perpetrated extensive human rights violations against the civilian population. A large number of soldiers collaborated with the RUF and later the AFRC. At times, troops masqueraded as rebel fighters while attacking convoys and villages in order to loot and steal. 176. Army officers and soldiers twice seized power from the people and, in so doing, unleashed violence and chaos on the nation. Main findings
The APC Legacy of Deficiencies in the SLA
177. The Commission finds that the APC demonstrated a grave abandonment of the basic needs of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), to the extent that the country was devoid of an operational Army when it needed one most in 1991. There was such an extreme paucity of numbers in the Army that its existence was nothing more than perfunctory. 178. The Commission finds that the APC had a preoccupation with internal security and chose to strengthen the paramilitary wing of the police, the Special Security Division (SSD), in almost inverse proportion to the Army. The preference for the SSD had a naturally debilitating effect on the RSLMF and, in particular, on its readiness for an attack from outside the country.
Failing to Defend against the Threat and the Outbreak of War
179. In view of the fact that neighbouring Liberia was engulfed in conflict, the Government and the SLA were astoundingly remiss in failing seriously to address the incapacitated state of the sparse deployments in the East and South of the country. This omission ultimately left the porous border with Liberia susceptible to an armed incursion. 180. The Commission finds that the APC Government and SLA failed to act upon intelligence information in their possession pertaining to the training of a potential incursion force by Foday Sankoh in Liberia. The Commission finds that neither the Government nor the Sierra Leone Army took the initial incursions into Sierra Leonean territory seriously enough. This neglect contributed in large measure to the escalation of a conflict that would ultimately devastate the entire country. 181. The Commission finds that the APC administration proved itself to be inept in the prosecution of the war in its first year. The failure properly to supply the front line with rations and reinforcements was a tremendous source of disgruntlement among SLA troops as they endeavoured to repel the insurgency.
Corruption by Senior Officers
182. The Commission finds that senior officers of the SLA diverted much logistical support intended for the war effort for their own personal gain. In so doing, they not only severely undermined the defence of the country but their corruption precipitated a great deal of dissatisfaction on the part of junior soldiers and those at the war front. This dissatisfaction would ultimately germinate into rebellion on the part of the junior ranks who gave vent to their frustrations by seizing power on two occasions. 183. Rice allocations, which have historical significance for the families of military personnel, were subverted and abused by senior officers. This contributed to the distrust among the junior officers for their seniors and strengthened their resolve to seize power.
Retaliatory Actions against Civilians
184. Soldiers of the SLA undertook retaliatory actions, including summary killings, against members of the civilian population, whom they suspected of having assisted or supported the insurgents. On occasions they did so with undue abandon or inappropriate feelings of vengeance against persons they perceived to be “rebels” or “collaborators”. Many soldiers were driven to such acts by an urge to avenge the deaths of fallen comrades at the hands of the insurgents.
Violations in Response to RUF Guerrilla Tactics
185. The Commission finds that the SLA committed numerous violations of human rights in its withering efforts to repel the RUF’s campaign of guerrilla warfare. 186. The Commission finds that many soldiers failed to respond in a measured fashion to the exigencies they faced at the warfront. Many of the acts carried out by the SLA fit into a particular pattern of abuse, whereby soldiers detained, tortured or killed people they suspected to be “rebels” or “collaborators”. Their acts of summary justice were also partly representative of a wider trend, whereby armed combatants of all factions acted hastily and violently to eliminate an “enemy” whom they did not know for certain was an enemy.
Distrust between the SLA and the Civilian Population
187. The Commission finds that trust between the SLA and the civilian population completely broke down in the years between 1994 and 1996. 188. A small but significant number of Army officers and private soldiers engaged in connivance with the RUF to plunder resources out of ambushes and raids on civilian convoys and settlements during the phase of guerrilla warfare. They did so for entirely unscrupulous reasons. They pursued their own self enrichment and betrayed the state they were enlisted to serve. 189. Captain Tom Nyuma, who held various positions of political and military status during his service in the SLA, was foremost among the officers who put his personal interests ahead of his constitutional duties. 190. Two factors combined to undermine the reputation of the Army in the eyes of civilians: the opportunistic and vindictive acts of a minority of soldiers who flouted their constitutional duties; and the devastating effectiveness of the RUF’s tactic of carrying out attacks on civilians in the guise of SLA soldiers. As a result, the Army as an institution was distrusted and, in many instances, maligned. The unforeseen outcome of this tarring with a broad brush was to turn many of the soldiers who had served their country assiduously into potential threats to national security.
The Election Process in 1996
191. In addition to their collective failure to provide security against RUF attacks, some SLA soldiers engaged in acts of violence during the election process in 1996. These soldiers brought tremendous discredit to the Army as an institution and further entrenched the suspicion and animosity towards the SLA that existed in many sections of the civilian population.
Characteristics of the SLA as it Evolved over the Course of the Conflict
192. On two occasions, in 1992 and 1997, elements within the SLA acted unconstitutionally by seizing power from civilian governments, thereby fuelling the conflict and committing widespread human rights violations. 193. Through its recruitment drive that began in 1992, the NPRC burdened itself with an unmanageably large and unorthodox Army. Entry standards were in practice abandoned and the new soldiers were of a far lower calibre. 194. Poor regulation opened the way for persons of malicious intent, including members of the RUF, to enter the Armed Forces. 195. The NPRC recruitment intake and its accompanying disregard for the quality of human resources served to exacerbate the overall lack of common understanding and common purpose in the SLA. 196. While acting in concert at times with the RUF, many members of the SLA engaged in some of the worst atrocities against the people of Sierra Leone. At other times, soldiers masqueraded as rebel fighters, while attacking convoys and villages in order to loot and steal. 197. The Commission finds that Sierra Leonean soldiers’ loyalties were transient and they were malleable to the political agenda of those in power. 198. The coup leaders of 25 May 1997 carried a sizeable proportion of the SLA with them, leading to a large-scale shift in allegiance away from the state and towards a “new’” fighting force known as the AFRC. This factional identity was obscured by the alliance with the RUF, but nevertheless remained distinct for most of its members. 199. Erstwhile soldiers of the SLA carried out the most egregious acts of atrocity during the third phase under the factional guise of the AFRC. They acted largely in their individual capacities in doing so and were motivated by an alarming degree of power-hungriness. 200. When the AFRC junta was ousted forcibly from political office by the intervention of ECOMOG, the institution was wiped out but the factional identity persisted for its soldiers. Sierra Leonean soldiers were also stripped of their constitutional status as a national Army on account of their actions. The Commission finds that the disbandment of the Army precipitated resentment and frustration on the part of AFRC soldiers, which in turn led to the further commission of grave violations against civilians. 201. In the wake of the devastating events in Freetown in January 1999, soldiers coalesced afresh around commanders with whom they had become allied or associated during the fighting. The most notable new sub-faction to emerge out of this trend was the splinter group known as the West Side Boys. 202. The Commission finds the West Side Boys to have been one of the more ruthless offshoots of the SLA. They committed some of the most serious violations of human rights and displayed no respect for human life. They had no principled political allegiance. They acted both against and for the Government. The West Side Boys played a leading role in the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999, which visited mayhem and devastation on the city and its occupants. They were also deployed by Johnny Paul Koroma to murder and apprehend RUF members on and around 8 May 2000. Names of SLA Leadership 203. The Sierra Leone Army, or SLA, underwent a series of reincarnations during the eleven-year period of conflict. As the findings above indicate, the composition, character and conduct of the SLA were liable to unpredictable and dramatic shifts. Such was the extent of this continuous institutional upheaval that not only the personnel, but also the numbers of senior office-holders and the titles of their positions were changed multiple times. 204. It would thus be unrealistic to trace responsibility to a particular military office or rank in the expectation that such a position would be filled by a succession of individuals who could be held accountable for the acts of the SLA under successive governing regimes. Instead, it should be broadly understood that two people holding very different titles years apart might actually have fulfilled the same de facto roles. 205. The Commission does not attempt here to capture the ever-changing relationship between senior military office-holders and their political masters. The level to which the former group exercised genuine control over the affairs of the SLA was naturally dependent on the administration holding political power at the time. In this regard, however, the numerous fluctuations in hierarchy, loyalty and efficacy in the relationship are properly explained in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict. 206. For the sake of simplicity, the list of SLA leadership has been divided into five chronological segments, corresponding with the changes in government during the conflict. Three of these segments are shown below, denoted by the name of the relevant ruling administration and the dates for which that administration was in power. The two remaining segments of leadership are addressed separately beneath the findings on the NPRC (April 1992 to March 1996) and the AFRC (May 1997 to March 1998) respectively. SLA Leadership under the All People’s Congress (APC) March 1991 to April 1992 Head of State, Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief General J. S. Momoh SLA Force Commander Brigadier M. L. Tarawallie SLA Deputy Force Commander Colonel Thoronka SLA Leadership under the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) March 1996 to May 1997 President of the Republic / Minister of Defence / Commander-in-Chief Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah Deputy Minister of Defence Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP Chief of Defence Staff Brigadier Hassan K. Conteh Chief of Army Staff Colonel James Max-Kanga ‘SLA’ Leadership under the restored SLPP Government March 1998 to May 2002 (transition / re-training after ECOMOG intervention) President of the Republic / Minister of Defence / Commander-in-Chief Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah Deputy Minister of Defence Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP Chief of Defence Staff (original, 1998 to 2000) General Maxwell M. Khobe Deputy CDS (original, instituted to replace Chief of Army Staff, 1998 to 2000) Chief of Defence Staff (replacement, 2000 to 2002 and beyond) Colonel (later Major-General) Tom S. Carew THE NATIONAL PROVISIONAL RULING COUNCIL (NPRC) Primary Findings 207. The NPRC junta was responsible for the extra-judicial executions of many innocent civilians throughout the country on the grounds that they were suspected of being rebels. In December 1992, the NPRC junta executed 26 persons without due process of law and in flagrant violation of international standards. The NPRC was also responsible for carrying out acts of torture on many detainees. 208. The unilateral declaration of a ceasefire by the NPRC in December 1993 was a terrible blunder and permitted the RUF to regain ascendancy. The decision probably had the effect of prolonging the war. Main Findings 209. The Commission finds that the APC Government’s mishandling of the war and, in particular, its mismanagement of the Army, demonstrated by its failure to pay salaries and issue food rations, was a direct cause of the 1992 coup d’état. 210. The overthrow of the APC Government on 29 April 1992 was a pre conceived coup, in which the modalities were planned but the implementation was improvised. The Commission finds that the coup-makers lent sufficient forethought to the operation for it to be described as a deliberate attempt to unseat the incumbent President. The NPRC came to power through a relatively bloodless coup. 211. The Commission finds that the military coup that created the NPRC and elevated Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser to Head of State was nevertheless an unconstitutional seizure of power by several junior-ranking officers of the SLA. It ultimately contributed to a pattern of lawlessness and impunity in Sierra Leone in the period following 29 April 1992.
Management of the War Effort
212. The Commission holds the leadership of the NPRC responsible for the rash and reactionary overall management of the war effort between April 1992 and early 1996. 213. The NPRC had mixed success in its efforts at structural engineering in the SLA. Its procurement of logistics and heavy expenditure spoke of irresponsible largesse. While its enlistment of a foreign private security firm, namely Executive Outcomes, was helpful to the war effort in the short term, in the long run it had a negative impact on the economy of the country. Indeed the Government of Sierra Leone is still paying off its debts to the sponsors of the mercenary outfit. 214. The NPRC’s recruitment drive that began in 1992 attracted predominantly young men from the margins of society. On the whole, the recruits joined the Army for the wrong reasons: mostly because of idleness, disaffection with their previous surroundings and misplaced bravado. None of these characteristics boded well for the future direction of the conflict. 215. The NPRC never managed to unify its Army under a single, coherent command structure. The recruits of 1992 formed another distinct faction in an already divided force. 216. The NPRC High command demonstrated a reactionary attitude towards complaints made against its commanders in the field. If a commander was found to be engaging in some kind of unlawful or unscrupulous activity, he would merely be switched and replaced. This was a weak measure that shirked the NPRC’s responsibilities to curb human rights violations. 217. There was very little continuity in command under the NPRC. Civilians had no particular conception of who was in charge in their area at any given time. The NPRC’s strategies disrupted the effectiveness of the command structure and led to a far higher degree of indiscipline.
Extra-judicial Killings, Torture and Intimidation
218. The Commission finds that forces deployed by the NPRC junta were responsible for the extra-judicial executions of many innocent civilians on the grounds that they were suspected of being rebels or rebel collaborators. 219. In particular, the Commission finds that the SLA, supported by civil militia men and women from the Koinadugu District known as Tamaboros, committed numerous excesses as it attempted to dislodge the RUF from Kono District in late 1992 and early 1993. Among the officers who carried out torture practices on captured rebel suspects was Colonel K. I. S. Kamara. 220. The Commission finds that the NPRC regime was responsible in December 1992 for the execution of 26 persons, including a former Inspector-General of Police and a former Brigade Commander for the Eastern Province, without due process of law and in flagrant violation of international standards. The NPRC’s attempt to justify these executions retrospectively by decree, on the basis that the 26 were alleged coup plotters, was an unlawful abuse of executive power. 221. In particular, the Commission finds that the Deputy Chairman of the NPRC, Captain Solomon A. J. Musa, was personally responsible for acts of torture on detainees and those who were subsequently put to death. 222. The Commission finds further that the NPRC Government authorised a campaign of intimidation and human rights violations against certain individuals in public office who were related to or associated with those who were executed. One of them was Major Lucy Kanu, who was unlawfully dismissed from the Army in 1993. She was targeted because her husband was one of the alleged coup plotters of December 1992.
Eventual Demise of the NPRC amidst Internal Power Struggles
223. Towards the end of its period in Government, the NPRC administration became mired in internal power struggles. The Commission finds that the “Palace Coup” that replaced Valentine Strasser with Julius Maada Bio was a calculated effort on Bio’s part to wrest power from a Head of State he thought did not have the best interests of the country at heart. Bio became the greatest individual influence in securing the transition from NPRC military rule into democratic elections. Names of NPRC Leadership. 224. The NPRC was formed in the wake of the coup that overthrew the APC Government on 29 April 1992. Although the coup-makers were relatively junior officers of the Sierra Leone Army, they formed a regime that was moderate and mixed by the standards of a military junta. 225. The NPRC is best characterised as a hybrid administration, since it depended on the symbiosis between civilian and military office-holders from its outset. The NPRC underwent several shifts and reshuffles in the composition of its collective leadership between 1992 and 1996, as well as a “Palace Coup” in January 1996, which saw the Chairman of the NPRC removed and replaced by rivals from within the faction. 226. Each of the shifts and reshuffles changed the balance of leadership of the NPRC between military and civilian office-holders, sometimes subtly, sometimes dramatically. In terms of command over the troops of the SLA on the ground, there is little doubt that de facto leadership lay in the hands of the military officers who had seized power in the first place. 227. Nevertheless, by the end of the NPRC’s four-year tenure, the civilian component of its leadership had strengthened itself politically to a degree sufficient to ease the soldiers out of office. The civilian politicians within the ranks of the NPRC saw themselves as the natural successors to the NPRC’s military rulers and were instrumental in paving the way for multi-party elections, in which many of them subsequently participated. 228. The list below reflects the balance between military and civilian office-holders in the leadership of the NPRC. It names those individuals who were found to have played prominent leadership roles at various points during the NPRC’s period in power, both militarily and politically. The NPRC High Command / Supreme Council of State The NPRC High Command was largely comprised of the coup makers of 29 April 1992 and those civilians who joined them to form successive administrations. The designations listed below indicate the office(s) occupied by the particular individual in the NPRC Supreme Council of State whilst the NPRC was in power. Ranks assigned to the soldiers in question are the official SLA ranks they had attained up to the point of the coup. Chairman of the NPRC Supreme Council of State / Head of State / Commander-in-Chief / Secretary for Defence (1992 to 1996) Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser Chairman of the NPRC Supreme Council of State / Head of State / Commander-in-Chief / Secretary for Defence (January to March 1996) (previously Vice Chairman and erstwhile Chief of Army Staff) Lieutenant Julius Maada Bio Vice Chairman of the NPRC Supreme Council Deputy Head of State (until 1995) Lieutenant Solomon A. J. Musa Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State / Secretary of State for the Eastern Province / later General Staff Officer (GSO) of the Sierra Leone Army Lieutenant Tom Nyuma Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State later Chief of Military Intelligence Branch (MIB) Lieutenant Charlie Mbayoh Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State later Director of Defence Information Lieutenant Karefa Kargbo Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State / Under-Secretary of State for Defence Lieutenant Komba Mondeh Chief Security Officer to the NPRC Chairman Captain Amara Kwegor Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State / Secretary of State for the Southern Province / later Chief of Internal Security in the Sierra Leone Army Lieutenant Idriss H. Kamara Chief of Army Staff Brigadier Kellie H. Conteh Secretary-General of the NPRC / previously NPRC Chief Secretary of State John Benjamin Secretary of State for Finance John A. Karimu Secretary of State for Information, Broadcasting and Culture / previously Attorney-General under the NPRC Arnold Bishop Gooding Secretary of State for Development and Economic Planning Victor O. Brandon Secretary of State for Transport and Communications Hindolo Trye The NPRC National Advisory Council The NPRC National Advisory Council comprised political functionaries and civilian administrators from various sectors of society. Their names are only included here insofar as the persons in question played a key leadership role in directing the path of the transition from the NPRC’s military junta back to civilian rule, and beyond. Chairman of the NPRC National Advisory Council Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah Secretary of the NPRC National Advisory Council Solomon Berewa Representative to the NPRC National Advisory Council from the Sierra Leone Bar Association George Banda Thomas THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (AFRC) Primary Findings 229. The SLA officers and soldiers who made up the AFRC betrayed the trust of the people. Instead of serving and protecting them, the soldiers of the AFRC unconstitutionally seized power and unleashed a reign of lawlessness and violence on the people. 230. When these rogue troops were forced out of Freetown in 1998, they viciously attacked defenceless civilians and destroyed everything in their path. They were responsible for a similar rampage through the Northern Provinces. 231. The Commission finds the AFRC to be primarily responsible for the large-scale loss of life, amputations and destruction of property that swept through Freetown in January 1999. 232. The Commission finds that the leadership and membership of the AFRC displayed a particularly ruthless disregard for human life and limb. Main Findings
Military Coup
233. The military coup that elevated Major Johnny Paul Koroma to Head of State was an unconstitutional seizure of power by several junior-ranking soldiers of the SLA. It precipitated a reign of lawlessness and violent suppression of opposition in Sierra Leone in the period from 25 May 1997 until 12 February 1998. 234. The central difference between the actions of the AFRC coup-makers of 25 May 1997 and those of their predecessors in the NPRC was that the AFRC group was more concerned with the pursuit of personal gain, while the actions of the NPRC group were largely viewed as an advancement of the national interest. The recklessness of the AFRC group was rightly condemned by the people of Sierra Leone.
Faltering Alliance between the AFRC and the RUF
235. The AFRC’s alliance with the RUF proved to be unworkable. The alliance strengthened people’s perceptions that the Sierra Leone Army had long been in collusion with the RUF. 236. The Commission finds that as the AFRC and RUF factions split and began independently to engage the Government of Sierra Leone in armed conflict, they unleashed unprecedented levels of abuse on the people of Sierra Leone.
“People’s Army”
237. The flaws in the High Command of the “People’s Army” meant that there was no effective regulatory structure to restrain or discipline the ground commanders of the AFRC and the RUF. 238. The Commission finds that the officers who held state functions under the military rule of the AFRC acted with utter impunity. They looted civilians’ properties throughout Freetown and in towns in the Provinces. They beat up and summarily killed both soldiers and civilians.
Abuses of Individual and Collective Power by Members of the AFRC
239. In certain instances during the conflict period, the soldiers of the AFRC were deployed as agents of someone else’s agenda, precisely because they were known to be malleable and unscrupulous by those who directed them. The Commission finds that Johnny Paul Koroma was the man most responsible for the violations and abuses carried out by the AFRC soldiers: first as the Head of State in the AFRC junta government; and later in his personal capacity as the Chairman of the ill-fated Commission for the Consolidation of Peace. 240. The AFRC was a brutal and systematic violator of human rights whilst in office. The AFRC used the arms of the state to suppress freedom of expression and association, notably during its clampdown on the student demonstrations of 18 August 1997. Members of the AFRC engaged in the mass rape of student nurses at the College of Nursing in Freetown. 241. The AFRC plundered the resources of the state. Its management of Sierra Leone’s mineral resources was irresponsible and motivated by personal profit.
Callous Disregard for Human Life and Limb after the AFRC was ousted from Power
242. The Commission finds that the AFRC soldiers viewed civilians with contempt because they regarded civilian life as the hallmark of what their enemies stood for. By deliberately disrupting and destroying civilian life, the AFRC soldiers saw themselves as striking at the foundations of civilian Government. These perceptions were the cause of unprecedented levels of all categories of violations in the year immediately after the AFRC was unseated from power. They harboured a vengeful and callous disregard for human life and limb. 243. The AFRC and RUF factions, both separately and in tandem with one another, visited a sustained and unprecedented level of human rights abuse on the populace of the North and North-East of Sierra Leone in 1998. The two organisations were not in fact acting in concert at the level of their respective High Commands. Rather, AFRC soldiers launched and led the assault through the North of the country and were joined only later by certain combatants from the RUF on a separate flank. 244. The Commission finds that Solomon A. J. Musa, popularly known as SAJ Musa, was the undisputed leader of and directional influence on the faction of approximately 2,000 combatants who perpetrated a sustained campaign of abuses against civilians throughout the Northern Province of Sierra Leone. The combatants under Musa’s command were largely drawn from the former AFRC but included a contingent of RUF among their ranks. 245. In particular, the Commission finds that the SAJ Musa group conducted targeted attacks on townships or villages from which they had originally been dislodged or chased out by ECOMOG, to avenge their earlier defeats. The group engaged in widespread looting and destruction of houses. 246. The Commission finds that the AFRC embarked on a programme of amputations from 1998 to 1999. The Commission finds that 44.7% (85 out of 190) of the amputations recorded during this period were the responsibility of the AFRC. Abductions also reached levels of unparalleled intensity in the months that immediately preceded the invasion of Freetown. 247. AFRC thugs practiced a deliberate policy of using abductees to muster numerical bulk when conducting attacks. Abductees were subjected to a wretched existence of degrading physical and psychological abuse coupled with incessant compulsion to march onwards to the targets of their captors. The AFRC’s abduction policy created an impression in the minds of its battlefield adversaries that the AFRC led forces were larger in number than was actually the case.
Invasion of Freetown
248. The ultimate objective of SAJ Musa’s group of combatants – itself a reflection of Musa’s apparent personal ambition until his death on 23 December 1998 – was to invade the capital city of Freetown, to overthrow the constitutional Government of Sierra Leone and to reinstate a form of military junta to power. 249. Additional motivations for the men who led the attacks of late 1998 and early 1999 were recognition and revenge. The AFRC soldiers wrought extreme violence because of their barely containable fury that they had been stripped of their military status and their access to the trappings of power. They were on a mission to avenge the perceived unjust executions of 24 of their colleagues and to rescue from prison the many soldiers who remained in detention. 250. The Commission finds that the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999 was the culmination of a destructive rampage through much of the Northern Province by a combatant group led by and comprised predominantly of former AFRC soldiers. 251. The main troop that attacked Freetown on 6 January 1999 was inordinately well equipped by the standards of the Sierra Leone conflict. It possessed artillery pieces and other heavy weaponry that had been imported illegally and stealthily for the purposes of launching a new attack on the seat of Government. 252. A pernicious and cowardly tactic used by the invaders of Freetown was to dissolve themselves into an indistinguishable mass comprised mostly of abducted civilians. It constituted a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law, known as the use of “human shields”. The combatants were “protected” from counter-attack as they entered Freetown by the cover of the non-combatants around them. 253. Upon arrival in Freetown in January 1999, the AFRC group bore the primary responsibility for the unprecedented scale and intensity of violations and abuses committed against civilians during the assault on the city. The Commission finds further that the AFRC group destroyed significant numbers of properties in the city and stormed the Pademba Road Prison, releasing several thousand inmates, including persons who themselves went on to participate in further urban warfare in the city.
Marginalisation of the AFRC in the Lomé Peace Process
254. The AFRC faction was deliberately left out from participating in the Lomé Peace Talks at the insistence of the RUF. Accordingly, its terms and conditions for peace were not addressed in the resultant Lomé Agreement. The AFRC High Command had advocated strongly for Johnny Paul Koroma’s participation in the Lomé Peace Talks, but these efforts were in vain. The AFRC therefore did not have a stake in the implementation of the peace agreement. The marginalisation of the AFRC at Lomé endangered the prospects of successfully implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement. 255. As the implementation of Lomé unfolded, the majority of AFRC commanders declared their loyalty to Johnny Paul Koroma and set out to oppose the RUF. They acted obstructively against parties who sought to advance the implementation of the Peace Agreement, including taking hostages from the RUFP sensitisation team. The AFRC demonstrated no commitment to peace. Names of AFRC Leadership 256. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed in the wake of the coup that overthrew the SLPP Government on 25 May 1997. The formation of the AFRC gave rise to a new and distinct factional identity for the coup makers and their supporters. This identity encompassed many serving soldiers of the SLA, as well as their key civilian accomplices. 257. The de facto leadership of the AFRC was drawn largely from the coup-making group, which originally comprised seventeen men – fourteen junior non commissioned Army officers, a former officer of the SSD paramilitary police unit and two civilians. This leadership was chaired by a slightly more senior military officer who was freed from prison on the day of the coup, and bolstered in vital areas by the presence of established Army figureheads, some of whom had also been office-holders during the reign of the NPRC. 258. The Commission has recognised that the AFRC factional identity persisted considerably beyond the month of February 1998, when the AFRC Ruling Council was ousted from power. After February 1998, the AFRC leadership underwent a shift in style from political office-holding to military commandership. 259. The commanders of the AFRC went on to form the core of the group that rampaged through the North of Sierra Leone in late 1998 and attacked Freetown in January 1999. 260. |
