From Freetown, Sierra Leone.
Volume 2: Chapter 1: Executive Summary
CHAPTER ONE
Executive Summary
This Executive Summary provides a
cursory overview of the Report and its principal areas of analysis.
Substantive detail is contained in the chapters that comprise the
remainder of the Report. It is particularly important to read the
Executive Summary in conjunction with the Findings and Recommendations
chapters. The Commission hopes those who read the Executive Summary
will take the time also to read the rest of the Report. Only by so
doing can a comprehensive understanding be obtained of one of the
terrible human tragedies that unfolded in the last decade of the
twentieth century.
Introduction
1.
On 23 March 1991, armed conflict broke out in Sierra Leone - a country
on the coast of West Africa made up of just 4.5 million people - when
forces crossed the border from Liberia into the town of Bomaru near the
eastern frontier. An organisation styling itself the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) claimed responsibility for the incursion, with the
declared objective being to overthrow the corrupt and tyrannical
government of Joseph Saidu Momoh and the All People’s Congress (APC),
which had ruled Sierra Leone since 1968.
2. The events in Bomaru
that day heralded the beginning of a decade of violence that devastated
the country. As the conflict exploded into appalling brutality against
civilians, the world recoiled in horror at the tactics used by the RUF,
its allies and opponents. Reports emerged of indiscriminate
amputations, abductions of women and children, recruitment of children
as combatants, rape, sexual slavery, cannibalism, gratuitous killings
and wanton destruction of villages and towns. This was a war measured
not so much in battles and confrontations between combatants as in
attacks upon civilian populations. Its awesome climax was the
destruction of much of Freetown in January 1999.
3. The war
finally shuddered to a negotiated conclusion, reached at Lomé, the
capital of nearby Togo, in July 1999. Although the Lomé Peace Agreement
did not end the fighting entirely, it began a process that brought a
fragile peace to the country. The subsequent presence of a sizeable
United Nations peacekeeping force, the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), did much to ensure that conflict
would not be renewed and that the components of a lasting peace,
notably disarmament and demobilisation, would be effected.
4.
Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement provided for the establishment
of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The mandate of the Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC or Commission) was then
set out in several sections of the enabling legislation, the TRC Act,
adopted in 2000 by the Parliament of Sierra Leone. According to Section
6(1) of the TRC Act:
[T]he
object for which the Commission is established is to create an
impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights
and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in
Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing
of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the
needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to
prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.
5.
In response to its mandate and in order to create an impartial
historical record, the Commission examined the following areas:
- the historical antecedents to the conflict and other events that defined or shaped the evolution of the Sierra Leonean state;
- the causes of conflict, with a particular focus on issues of governance;
- the story of the conflict, including its military and political
dynamics, its nature and characteristics, the role of external actors
and factors that fuelled it, such as the exploitation of mineral
resources;
- the impact of the conflict on specific groups, particularly on women, children and youths;
- the relationship between the TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone; and
- efforts that can be made to help Sierra Leone reconcile with its
past, including the prospect of a reparations programme and the
development of a National Vision for Sierra Leone.
6. In making its findings and preparing its Report, the Commission
took into account information gathered through a variety of means.
Primary sources included: testimonies given by victims, witnesses and
perpetrators at the Commission’s hearings and during its
statement-taking phase; the outcomes of investigation and research
conducted by the Commission’s staff; and the statistical or
quantitative analysis derived from the Commission’s database of human
rights violations.
Historical Antecedents to the Conflict
7.
How did a peace-loving nation become engulfed, seemingly overnight, in
horror? What events occurred in the history of the country to make this
conflict possible? Explanations put forward have varied from ‘bad
governance’ and ‘the history of the post-colonial period in Sierra
Leone’ to ‘the urge to acquire the country’s diamond wealth’ and the
roles of Libya or the Liberian faction leader Charles Taylor. The
international community initially dismissed the war as just another
example of tribal conflict in Africa; another failed state imploding in
the context of environmental degradation and acute economic crisis.
8.
In order to ‘‘compile a clear picture of the past’’ the Commission
devoted considerable resources towards examining the pre-conflict
history of the country. These efforts were intended to locate causes of
conflict in Sierra Leone’s past, place the conflict within its proper
historical context and offer explanations for what went wrong.
9.
The Commission identified social trends that spawned division and
confrontation between the various groups that make up Sierra Leone. It
picked out fault lines and key events that created the structural
conditions for conflict. It highlighted decisions on the part of the
political elite that were designed to strengthen their grip on power at
the expense of common benefit, progress and ultimately peace.
10.
Central to the Commission’s study of history was the social and
political interaction among Sierra Leone’s constituent groups. The
nature and extent of such interaction - often negative and limited -
influenced people’s perceptions of the state in which they lived and
their own places within it. These perceptions in turn presented the
greatest challenge to the concepts of nationhood and citizenship. They
undermined the positive sense of national identity needed to build a
strong and unified independent nation.
11. The Commission
examined the colonial period and the first few years of independence
together under the section entitled ‘The Historical Evolution of the
Sierra Leonean State’. In this section, four distinct phases proved
crucial to understanding the roots of the conflict and some of the
challenges that the country still faces today:
- The Colony and the Protectorate.
Rather than constructing a unified Sierra Leonean state, the colonial
government effectively created two nations in the same land. The
colonial capital Freetown, known as the Colony, and the much larger
area of provincial territory, known as the Protectorate, were developed
separately and unequally. The colonial government formalised the common
law practised in the Colony yet neglected the development of customary
law in the Protectorate, thus producing two separate legal systems that
persist to the present day. The impact of colonial policies and
practices, including those relating to citizenship, ownership of land,
land tenure rights and conflict of laws, was far-reaching. People in
the Colony enjoyed vastly superior social, political and economic
development and access to vital resources such as education. The divide
between the two entities bred deep ethnic and regional resentment and
destabilised the traditional system of Chieftaincy.
- The Era of Party Politics.
In 1947, a new Constitution was proposed in order to prepare Sierra
Leone for independence. This Constitution amalgamated the Colony and
the Protectorate into a single political entity, but divided their
elite representatives into opposing factions, each dedicated to
protecting the interests of its own people. In due course these
factions formed themselves into narrow, regionally based political
parties with little or no national agenda. Party politics became the
greatest obstacle to national cohesion and identity. Party allegiance
was just as divisive as ethnicity, class or regional prejudice in the
battle over who should succeed the British. On the cusp of independence
in 1961, the ten-year-old Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was joined
in the political arena by the All People’s Congress (APC), which would
become its main rival in contesting elections.
- The Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) in Power.
The SLPP majority party formed the first post-colonial government in
1961. The 1962 elections then revealed the depths of ethnic and
regional polarisation in Sierra Leone and the superficiality of the
ideological differences between the opposing parties. The SLPP retained
power by winning most of its seats in the South and East of the
country, which were predominantly populated by Mende people. The SLPP
government was therefore labelled as a Mende government. This image
polarised public opinion in the country, introduced notions of cronyism
in many state institutions and laid the foundations for military
involvement in politics. The period had terrible, albeit foreseeable
consequences on the unity of the young state and served to deepen
existing cleavages.
- The 1967 Elections and their Aftermath. The
elections of 1967 were scarred by bitter power struggles based on
ethnicity, personality and party affiliation. Although the APC won the
most seats, the leadership of the SLPP stoutly refused to concede
defeat. The resultant standoff signalled a watershed in the political
fortunes of the country and ultimately led to the destruction of the
multi-party system. The head of the Army sabotaged the swearing-in of
the APC Prime Minister and declared martial law. When it became
apparent that this move was engineered to favour the SLPP leadership,
junior-ranking soldiers staged a coup. The consequent period of
military rule served to narrow the political space in Sierra Leone and
compelled others to seek alternative routes to power that did not
depend on free and fair elections. It set the scene for multiple
further coup attempts in the following decades.
12. In the second section of the chapter, the Commission focussed
on the prolonged period in power of the All People’s Congress (APC).
The APC government used concerns about internal security as a pretext
to stifle the nascent democratic culture. All the institutions of the
state were subjected to strict party control and Siaka Stevens, the new
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, adopted an increasingly
authoritarian approach.
13. Under the APC, central government
sustained itself through corruption, nepotism and the plundering of
state assets. These practices were replicated at regional and local
levels, where Chieftaincy became synonymous with power, patronage and
control of resources. When Sierra Leone adopted a one-party
constitution in 1978, any semblance of accountability or effective
opposition had already been eliminated. Historical trends like economic
decay and fragmentation of the national spirit were exacerbated under
the one-party system and became key causes of the conflict.
14.
Neither the SLPP nor the APC made any genuine effort to attend to the
debasement of the post-independence politics and economy of the
country. On the contrary, history speaks of a systemic failure, whereby
all the members of the political elite belonged to the same failing
system. While they claimed to be ideologically different, in reality
the two parties shared a brand of politics that was all about power and
the benefits it conferred. Tragically these characteristics persist
today in Sierra Leone.
15. The final section of this chapter
traces past dynamics at District level in order to help explain the
manner in which the war unfolded across the nation. There were
undercurrents of conflict in many areas, from the border Districts that
served as ‘gateways’ for the fighting forces, to the strategically
located ‘heartland’ Districts that initially supported the insurgency
to overthrow the APC. At local level as at national level, many of the
answers as to why and how this conflict happened are to be found in its
historical antecedents.
Governance
16.
The Commission heard submissions from a variety of authoritative
sources that the war in Sierra Leone was largely the result of failures
in governance and institutional processes in the country. Successive
governments diminished the state’s capacity to meet such critical
challenges as the security and livelihood of its citizens, let alone to
provide for democratic participation in decision-making processes. The
Commission shares the view that unsound governance provided a context
conducive for the interplay of poverty, marginalisation, greed and
grievances that caused and sustained the conflict. The Commission hopes
its treatment of issues of governance - by identifying past
distortions, evaluating the adequacy of current remedies and making
recommendations to fill the gaps - will enhance efforts towards
national recovery, stability and reconciliation.
17. The
instruments of proper governance include laws, institutions, due
processes and humane practices that lead to such desired ends as
security, justice, enhanced livelihoods and democratic participation.
The perceptions adduced by the Commission during its hearings indicate
that Sierra Leoneans yearn for a principled system of governance. They
want a system that upholds the rule of law over the rule of strong
patrons and protects the people from the abuse of rulers through a
system of checks and balances. They wish to see horizontal and vertical
accountability through the effective operation of such institutions as
the judiciary, the auditor general’s office, the electoral commission,
the media and civil society.
18. The Commission looked at the
record of each of the post-independence governments on the following
critical ‘indicators’: separation of powers; decentralisation;
political participation; independence of the judiciary; the rule of
law; and the existence and effective operation of oversight bodies and
institutions of accountability. The Commission analysed approximations
towards or deviations from proper governance on two levels. First, it
reviewed the basic legal documents of the land, such as Constitutions
and the evolving body of laws, to assess whether ‘indicators’ of proper
governance were enshrined and guaranteed. Second, it assessed the
manifestation of these ‘indicators’ in practice.
19. The
Commission concluded that all the administrations of the
post-independence period contributed to the structural and proximate
contexts that led to the conflict in 1991. The duality of the country’s
administrative and judicial structures made them vulnerable to
manipulation, which the regimes of Sir Milton Margai, Sir Albert Margai
and Dr. Siaka Stevens duly utilised to their respective advantages. In
the provincial areas, for example, local courts and Chieftaincy
structures were used to clamp down on opposition activities and to
entrench the authority of whichever traditional ruling houses were
allied to the party in power. Meanwhile the continual assault on the
rule of law weakened the capacities of state institutions to perform.
The judiciary was subordinated to the executive, parliament did little
more than ‘rubber-stamp’, the civil service became a redundant state
machine and the Army and police force became vectors of violence
against the very people they were established to protect. Non-state
bodies that ought to ensure accountability - like media houses or civil
society groups - were thoroughly co-opted. Opposition political parties
were suppressed and eventually banned by President Stevens’ One Party
Constitution of 1978.
20. The successor to Stevens, President J.
S. Momoh, attempted to decelerate the economic and political decline
through the promulgation of an economic state of emergency and a
multi-party constitution. These measures were, however, managed in a
dictatorial and abusive fashion, which rendered them ‘too little, too
late’ to salvage the situation. Against this backdrop, Sierra Leoneans
became increasingly disgruntled and aggrieved with the malaise in
governance and their inability to do anything to alleviate it. Many
citizens, particularly the poor, marginalised youths of the provinces,
became open to radical means of effecting change: they would readily
answer the call to arms when the so-called ‘revolution’ began to enter
the country in 1991.
21. Today, proper governance is still an
imperative, unfulfilled objective in Sierra Leone. Corruption remains
rampant and no culture of tolerance or inclusion in political discourse
has yet emerged. Many ex-combatants testified that the conditions that
caused them to join the conflict persist in the country and, if given
the opportunity, they would fight again. Yet, distressingly, the
Commission did not detect any sense of urgency among public officials
to respond to the myriad challenges facing the country. Indeed, the
perception within civil society and the international community is that
all efforts at designing and implementing meaningful intervention
programmes, such as the National Recovery Strategy, the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or ‘Vision 2025’, are driven by donors
rather than the national government. This is lamentable.
22. The
state is an abstract concept to most Sierra Leoneans and central
government has made itself largely irrelevant to their daily lives. In
order to correct this deficit in engagement, an overhaul in the culture
of governance is required. The executive needs to prove that it is
different from its predecessors in the post-independence period. It
needs to demonstrate ownership, leadership, imagination and
determination in developing and implementing programmes for change.
Strong and independent monitoring institutions must hold the government
accountable in this exercise. Only then will Sierra Leoneans believe
that the necessary lessons have been learnt from the decades of rotten
governance that culminated in the tragedy of conflict.
The Military and Political History of the Conflict
23.
The Commission recounts the story of the eleven-year conflict by
charting its key events and dynamics in the military and political
spheres. A description of the factors that led to the outbreak of
hostilities is followed by a detailed accounting of the conflict
itself, divided into three distinct ‘phases’. Phase I (Conventional
‘Target’ Warfare: 1991-93) covers the early period defined by
inter-factional fighting and the capture of territory. Phase II
(‘Guerrilla’ Warfare: 1994-97) describes the shifts in tactics as
attacks spread through the country. Phase III (Power Struggles and
Peace Efforts: 1997-2000) reviews various military and political
alliances, moves towards peace and the resumption of hostilities,
before the conflict was finally declared over in 2002. Although each
‘phase’ assumed a slightly different character, they all shared one
devastating characteristic: gross violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law by all warring factions.
24. In
the pre-conflict stage, the innumerable failings in governance caused
Sierra Leonean activists to seek alternative outlets for expression of
their dissent and dissatisfaction with the one-party system. In the
late 1980s, a small group of would-be revolutionaries formed a nascent
programme for change, which included the idea of undertaking
‘self-defence’ training in Libya. The original ‘revolutionary’
programme never materialised in the form it was intended to take. It
was supplanted by a deviant, militant agenda spearheaded by Foday
Sankoh, who elicited support from foreign contacts, notably Charles
Taylor, and conceived a plan to organise and lead an armed insurgency
into Sierra Leone. Sankoh assembled and trained in Liberia a force
comprising 385 commandos, who became the ‘vanguards’ of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Taylor authorised nearly 2,000 of his
own men from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to become
‘Special Forces’ and operate jointly with the RUF in Sierra Leone.
Shortly after dawn on 23 March 1991, a band of fighters from Taylor’s
NPFL struck the town of Bomaru, Kailahun District. This attack sparked
a conflict that was unprecedented in its intensity and nature.
25.
Phase I describes the initial ‘war on two fronts’ and the inclusion of
civilian settlements within the scope of NPFL and RUF assaults. It
assesses the role of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the APC
Government’s failure properly to supply it at the outset of the
conflict, which contributed to the April 1992 coup forming the National
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). It explains how an expanded Army
then gained ascendancy over a divided insurgent force in 1993, reducing
the RUF to a confined area of forest territory on the Liberian border.
Nevertheless, there came no decisive thrust from pro-Government forces
to end the conflict.
26. Phase II began when the RUF launched a
‘guerrilla’ strategy, becoming less visible, less predictable, less
consistent and less distinguishable. It expanded the scope and coverage
of combat operations into every District of Sierra Leone. An RUF
trademark was to carry out ‘false flag’ attacks dressed in full SLA
military uniforms. This tactic, combined with increased human rights
violations by soldiers, led to the breakdown in trust between the
civilian population and the SLA. A ‘Palace Coup’ saw a change in the
leadership of the NPRC and eventually secured a transition to
democratic elections in 1996. Although marred by violence, the
elections ushered in a new Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)
Government headed by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. The Abidjan Peace
Talks of 1996 were a false dawn and the SLPP Government endorsement of
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) as an arm of the state security
apparatus further antagonised the SLA. This phase ended in a collapsed
peace process, violence with ethnic undertones by the CDF of the South
and East, known as the Kamajors, and an embittered Army looking to
exploit a volatile security situation.
27. Phase III started
with the bloody military coup of May 1997 and the appointment of Major
Johnny Paul Koroma as Head of State. It heralded a large-scale shift in
allegiance away from the SLA to a ‘new’ fighting force known as the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC forged a military
and political alliance with the RUF, creating the ‘People’s Army’, a
band of brutal and systematic violators of human rights. President
Kabbah established a War Council in Exile in Guinea, while Deputy
Minister of Defence Chief Samuel Hinga Norman mobilised a vast but
untrained force of Kamajors to oppose the AFRC military junta. In
February 1998, a forceful intervention was led by West African
‘peacekeeping’ troops under the banner of ECOMOG, dividing the country
along starkly factional lines. ECOMOG was the surrogate national Army
in all but name, but its defence of strategic areas would prove
disgracefully weak. The State of Public Emergency declared by the
reinstated SLPP government encompassed four years and numerous illegal
acts carried out on the premise of pursuing ‘justice’. 24 SLA soldiers
were executed by the state in 1998, which had a telling impact on the
ongoing conflict. An AFRC-led wave of atrocities against the civilian
population swept through the North of the country and met with no
robust government response. The descent of the AFRC-led attackers onto
Freetown in January 1999 wreaked havoc and horror in the city,
constituting the nadir of the third phase.
28. The Lomé Peace
Agreement of 7 July 1999 was cast as a solution to the conflict with
two components: military resolution, through the disarmament of
combatants; and political settlement, by implementing a power-sharing
arrangement. In reality neither the RUF nor the Government complied in
full with its terms. The RUF combatant displayed particular contempt
for the ethos of the peace process and their hostage taking of several
hundred UNAMSIL peacekeepers was unjustifiable. In May 2000, the state
security apparatus carried out decisive enforcement actions through its
so-called ‘Peace Task Force’, a squad of armed vigilantes from various
factions tasked to raid, arrest and detain anyone associated with the
RUF. As part of its analysis, the Commission notes that many of those
rounded up in May 2000 remain in prison today. In the Commission’s
view, this ongoing detention is tantamount to a continuation of the
conflict itself. It is corrosive to the prospect of national
reconciliation and testifies to the continuing struggle for justice in
Sierra Leone.
Nature of the Conflict
29.
In compiling its chapter on the nature of the conflict, the Commission
used quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques to shed further
light on particular patterns and trends. Areas of analysis included the
types and frequencies of the violations committed, the profiles of the
perpetrators, the identities and demographics of their victims and any
evidence of targeting. The Commission examined sixteen specific
categories of violations, although within each of these the scope of
analysis was broad. For example, acts of rape were considered in
multiple contexts, including abduction, sexual slavery, during attacks
on villages, or when the victim was encountered at a checkpoint or in
the bush.
30. Some violations, such as amputations and forced
displacement, were discussed separately in their own right. Others were
divided into three overarching categories, as follows: 1) violations
perpetrated in the context of abduction and outside abduction; 2)
mistreatment violations; and 3) economic violations. The violations
discussed under these categories include killings; forced recruitment;
cannibalism or forced cannibalism; forced labour, assault, physical
torture and rape; arbitrary detention; looting and extortion; and
destruction of property.
31. From the Commission’s review
emerged the devastating impact of this conflict. It destroyed
individual lives, families and communities, people’s belief systems and
cultural heritages. Traditional and community meeting spaces and
institutions were demolished and desecrated. People were forced to
commit sacrilege against symbols of their religion or faith. Certain
groups like property owners, chiefs, figures of traditional authority
and representatives of government institutions were targeted on the
basis of revenge, economic appropriation and because of their ethnicity.
32.
The link between the conflict and ethnicity lies in the way in which
certain factions turned ethnicity into an instrument of prejudice and
violence against perceived opponents or those who did not ‘belong’.
People of Northern origin were found to have been targeted in the
Southern and Eastern regions during the latter part of the war. The
Kamajors committed disproportionate levels of violations against such
ethnic groups as the Temne, Koranko, Loko, Limba and Yalunka. Other
reported instances of ‘targeting’ included RUF violations against,
variously, the Lebanese, Fullahs, Mandingos, Nigerians and Marakas.
33.
Understanding the violations committed during the war requires an
understanding of those who perpetrated them. Those affiliated to the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) carried out the majority of violations
and abuses over the conflict as a whole. The RUF pioneered the concept
of forced recruitment, including the enlistment of child combatants. It
also bears overwhelming responsibility for the widespread use of drugs
by its members, which precipitated spates of crazed violence and
compounded the prevailing general sense of oppression and hopelessness.
34.
While most of the violations and abuses were attributed to the RUF,
other significant perpetrators included the AFRC and the CDF. The
second highest institutional count was attributed to the AFRC, whose
fighters most notably committed atrocities on a massive scale in the
Northern region and in Kono District. The AFRC demonstrated a
‘specialisation’ in the practice of amputations in the period from 1998
to 1999.
35. Of the various groups that comprised the CDF, the
Kamajors received the most scrutiny, as they were responsible for
almost all the CDF violations reported after 1996. Forced cannibalism
is attributed only to the Kamajors. A defining characteristic of the
CDF became its ceremony of ‘initiation’, described to the Commission by
many witnesses as entailing physical and psychological torture as well
as other gross abuses of human rights.
36. Perhaps most notably,
the Commission identified some characteristics and tendencies that
spanned across all factions in the conflict. There existed an
astonishing factional fluidity among the different militias and armed
groups. Overtly and covertly, gradually and suddenly, fighters switched
sides or established new units on a scale unprecedented in any other
conflict. Another common feature was the almost identical composition
of the ground forces: impressionable, disgruntled young men eager for
an opportunity to assert themselves, either to ensure that no harm was
done to their own people, to fight against perceived injustice, or for
personal and group aggrandisement.
Mineral Resources
37.
The management of state resources is central to the quality of
governance in any country. This is particularly the case in Sierra
Leone, which despite its huge mineral resources (primarily, extensive
alluvial and kimberlitic diamond deposits, bauxite, rutile, iron and
gold) has remained one of the poorest countries in the world. Since
Sierra Leone’s economy depends essentially on revenues from its mineral
resources, the Commission deemed it important to examine how mineral
resources were used by successive governments, how they may have
contributed to the war and the extent to which combat groups exploited
them to sustain and replenish their activities.
38. There is a
widely held belief in the western world that the conflict in Sierra
Leone was initiated and perpetuated because of diamonds, the country’s
most important mineral resource. According to this version, the RUF,
backed by Charles Taylor and the NPFL, initiated an armed rebellion in
Sierra Leone to gain control of its diamond resources. In the years
following the initial attack, it is alleged, the proceeds from an
illicit diamond trade enabled the RUF to finance its war effort through
the purchase of weapons abroad.
39. In the Commission’s view,
this version of the conflict is simplistic. It fails to capture
numerous complexities, the reasons for the decay of the state in Sierra
Leone and the role minerals played prior to and during the conflict. It
also does not reflect what unfolded on the ground in Sierra Leone.
There were multiple causes of the conflict and reasons for the
involvement of Liberian and other foreign actors. Although it is true
that the RUF partly financed its war effort through diamond
trafficking, diamonds did not yield significant revenues for the
movement before 1997.
40. Simply put, diamonds were both an
indirect cause of the war in Sierra Leone and a fuelling factor. As an
indirect cause, the misapplication of the diamond resources in a
country with a practically ‘single-product’ economy (diamonds) created
huge disparities in the socio-economic conditions of people. While the
elite and their business cohorts in the diamond industry enjoyed
grandeur and affluence, poor people living in deprived communities rued
how the collective common wealth had been appropriated by a few in the
name of the many.
41. From the outset of the post-independence
period, those in power plundered the state and its resources, putting
self-enrichment before any form of real development or accountability.
Political power became a means to economic wealth and the predatory
accumulation of the ruling elite led to the acquisition of state
offices and resources for personal gain. This led to the ‘functional
contraction’ of Sierra Leonean leadership, as it could no longer
provide services to the people. The dispossessed and disenfranchised
masses quickly began to ask questions as to the role and mission of
their new political elite.
42. Successive post-colonial
governments mismanaged the diamond industry and placed its effective
control in the hands of outsiders in a way that has not benefited the
Sierra Leone economy. A culture of diamond smuggling and embezzlement
has been entrenched among key members of the political elite.
Meanwhile, labour conditions in the mines are appalling, with many
children still being used as miners.
43. During the conflict,
diamonds were highly coveted because they yielded tremendous revenues,
which enabled armed factions to procure arms and ammunition. Possession
of arms conferred power on the factions, allowing them to control large
areas of the country and thus further exploit resources for economic
purposes. The desire to capture more territory for exploitation
subsequently became a major motivating factor for the armed groups and
their commanders, triggering intense fighting in resource-rich parts of
the country and fuelling the conflict in areas already engulfed by it.
44.
The international diamond industry was largely indifferent to the
origin of ‘conflict diamonds’, even when reports of atrocities relating
to the conflict in Sierra Leone were widely disseminated in the global
media. This indifference enabled the illicit trade in Sierra Leonean
diamonds to flourish and thereby encouraged the prolongation of the
conflict.
45. Although the government of Sierra Leone has
recently made progress in tackling diamond smuggling, largely due to
the international introduction of the new Kimberley Certification
Process (KCP), the problem is nowhere near to being eradicated. The KPC
has two major weaknesses: there is no global mechanism to monitor each
member’s national certification system and countries with no diamond
resources have been accepted as members.
External Actors
46.
Although the armed conflict in Sierra Leone was not a war imposed from
outside, the Commission did identify substantial involvement from
external actors. There were essentially two main parties to the
conflict in Sierra Leone: the government and the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF). Each of the external actors that took part in the conflict
was affiliated in some way to one of these two entities.
47.
External support either to the government or to the RUF came from
nation states, regional organisations, international organisations and
non-state actors such as private security firms.
48. Countries
that provided unilateral support included Libya, Liberia, Guinea,
Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and the United Kingdom. Regional
intervention came from the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), while a large multilateral intervention was rendered latterly
by the United Nations. ‘Mercenary’ groups involved in the conflict
included the Ghurkhas Security Group, Sandline International and
Executive Outcomes. The United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO),
which began when a group of Liberians living in refugee camps and other
parts of Sierra Leone were organised into a fighting force to assist
the government, also evolved into a significant player. A variety of
international humanitarian organisations delivered medical assistance
and food aid throughout the war, including the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médicins san Frontières (MSF).
49.
The involvement of the United Nations can be traced back to December
1994, when it sent its first exploratory mission to Sierra Leone.
However, the subsequent presence of a UN Special Envoy to Sierra Leone
did not abate the fighting and the commission of atrocities against
civilians. In July 1998, the UN Security Council established the UN
Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor the security
situation and to advise on the disarmament and demobilisation of former
combatants. This Mission never achieved full strength and is remembered
more for its lack of impact. On 22 October 1999, the UN Security
Council authorised the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which contributed significantly to the
achievement of stability and rebuilding of the nation following the
signing og the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999.
Women
50.
Women and girls became the targets in the brutal conflict in Sierra
Leone. They suffered abduction and brutality at the hands of their
perpetrators. Their vulnerability was deliberately exploited in order
to dehumanise them. Women and girls were raped, forced into sexual
slavery and endured other acts of sexual violence, including
mutilations, torture and a host of other cruel and inhumane treatment.
They were taken from their homes and villages by force. Refusal to
comply with their captors often met with death. For those fortunate
enough to escape, displacement invariably followed, either in exile or
in camps inside or outside the country. They were not safe even in
these camps, as humanitarian workers meant to protect them also
violated their rights. Women and girls were compelled to barter their
bodies in order to access aid to which they were rightfully entitled.
Girls as young as 12 were forced to pay for aid with sex in order to
gain assistance for their families.
51. The Commission was
enjoined by statute to give special attention to the needs of women and
girls, particularly with regard to sexual violence. Why was so much
violence perpetrated against women? Did the origins lie in the cultural
and traditional history of Sierra Leone? Did the fact that women
endured such a lowly status in the socio-political life make them easy
targets? Is it because men perceived females to be mere chattels
symbolising male honour that made women the deliberate target of an
enemy determined to destroy the honour of the other?
52. In
seeking answers, the Commission reviewed the multiple roles of women in
the armed conflict, recognising that women often took on the role of
perpetrator and / or collaborator usually out of conviction and / or
the need to survive. The Commission assessed the impact of the conflict
on women, notions of honour and the breakdown of the traditional
extended African family structures and social fabric. It looked at the
extent to which women’s issues were addressed by disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration efforts; their level of access to
education and the impact of the practice of early and forced marriages
on the education of girls; and areas in which women suffer
discrimination (both under common and customary laws), including
marriage, divorce, inheritance, property rights, domestic violence and
political participation. Overall, this chapter captures the
gender-specific experiences of women and girls at a political, legal,
health and social welfare level. The Commission noted the significant
role women played in making peace, along with the fact that they are
starting to feature more prominently in the public life of Sierra Leone.
53.
The main armed groups accused of perpetrating sexual violence against
women and girls during the conflict were the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Civil Defence
Forces (CDF), the Westside Boys and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).
54.
While peace has returned to Sierra Leone, many of the wounds of war
still remain open. Women and girls bear the scars of their horrible
experiences. Many have borne children as a result of rape and sexual
slavery. These mothers are shunned and punished by society for giving
birth to ‘rebel’ children.
55. The Commission believes that it
is only when the legal and socio-political system treats women as
equals to men, giving them full access to economic opportunities and
enabling them to participate freely in both public and private life,
that they will realise their full potential. Developing accountability
mechanisms for those who perpetrate gender crimes is a necessary part
of this evolution in order to ensure that women are not dehumanised. An
opportunity exists in the post-conflict period to address the plight of
women and girls in Sierra Leone and improve their quality of life. The
Government should give effect to the provisions of the Convention on
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
and of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR) on the Rights of Women in Africa.
Children
56.
Like women, children were violated and abused by all of the armed
factions involved in the Sierra Leonean conflict. They suffered
abductions, forced recruitment, sexual slavery and rape, amputations,
mutilations, displacement, drugging and torture. Children were also
forced to become perpetrators and were compelled to violate the rights
of others. Thousands of children were killed during the conflict in
Sierra Leone. In addition, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and
Children Affairs (MSWGCA) estimates that more than 15,000 children
suffered separation from their families and communities during the
eleven-year war. This resulted in their becoming refugees in countries
like Liberia, Guinea, Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria. In addition,
many became internally displaced persons. Children were used as
fighters and forced labour by the armed groups. Although the RUF was
the first to abduct and forcibly enlist children as soldiers and
porters, all the armed factions recruited children and deployed them to
such ends.
57. The Lomé Peace Agreement provides that the
government of Sierra Leone shall accord particular attention to the
issue of child soldiers and that the special needs of children should
be addressed in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
process. In addition, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act
directed the Commission to give special attention to the experiences of
children in the armed conflict.
58. The Commission examined the
experiences of children prior to the conflict in the economic, social
and political spheres. It dealt with issues of education, health, law,
tradition and customs and how they impact on the rights of children. It
also examined the impact of the armed conflict on children and their
experiences at the hands of different armed groups. The status of
children following the conflict was considered together with measures
taken by state and non-state actors in responding to their needs.
59.
While the full impact of the conflict has yet to be measured, children
have been affected at all levels of their development, in particular
their education and health. During the conflict, children in Sierra
Leone were denied their childhood. A major area of concern is the
child-headed household, a direct result of children having lost parents
or guardians in the war. The breakdown in family and community
structures and the loss of social values have affected children
materially and psycho-socially. These effects are enduring and
far-reaching. A number of ex-combatant children are still bearing the
brunt of their forced participation in the war. Their families and
communities have in many cases rejected them because of their former
affiliations. Girls especially have experienced both derision and
rejection because they were forced to become ‘bush wives’ or sexual
slaves.
60. The Commission has found that the abduction of
children and their forcible recruitment as child soldiers constitutes a
grave violation of international law for which the leadership of all
factions must be held accountable. In addition, the Commission is of
the view that the Child Rights Bill needs to be passed into law as a
matter of urgency.
Youth
61.
Forty-five percent of Sierra Leone’s estimated population of 4.5
million are youths, falling within the age bracket of 18 to 35 years.
Members of this age group were major perpetrators and victims of
violations and abuses during the conflict. The Commission examined the
nature, causes and extent of the acts perpetrated and suffered by
youths; the impact of these acts on them; and the current interventions
geared towards addressing the youth question in Sierra Leone.
62.
During the years of APC one-party rule, youths constituted the only
viable opposition to the government. The 1970s and 1980s saw an
emergence of radical groups and study clubs on university campuses,
galvanising students to stage demonstrations against the APC. Acts of
dissent and disobedience by students at Fourah Bay College in 1985 led
to the expulsion of their perceived leaders, some of whom sought to
complete their studies in Ghana. Gradually, contacts and ties from both
Sierra Leone and Ghana were developed with the Revolutionary Council of
Libya and a nascent movement geared towards revolutionary change in
Sierra Leone took root.
63. When the Sierra Leonean delegation
to Libya became divided by internal ideological and strategic
differences, Foday Sankoh exploited the vacuum in leadership and
devised a plan for his own, more militant revolutionary project. While
in Libya, Sankoh met Charles Taylor and the two men formed an alliance.
Sankoh would help Taylor ‘liberate’ Liberia, after which he would be
provided with support to launch an insurgency in Sierra Leone.
64.
Sierra Leonean youths were recruited (either by force or by persuasion)
from Liberia, Ivory Coast and parts of Sierra Leone for the rebellion
in 1991. Upon entry into Sierra Leone, the RUF was essentially
dominated by youths who were less educated and less ideologically
conscious than their predecessors in the Sierra Leonean ‘revolutionary’
groups of the 1980s. Sunk in the abyss of unemployment and despair, the
prospect of joining the RUF offered a viable alternative to many
youths; for others, it was not a choice as they were forcibly abducted
into the ranks of an armed group. In both cases, the conflict had a
marginalising effect, as youths were alienated from their communities
when forced to commit atrocities against their own people. The conflict
further compounded their prior plight and has had negative consequences
on their overall development, in particular vis-à-vis educational
opportunities. A whole generation lost its childhood and youth. Many
young people have lost all stabilising ties and emotional support due
to the death of, or rejection by, their families.
65. In an
effort to address the problems facing youth in Sierra Leone, the
Ministry of Youth and Sports was established in 2002. One of the
efforts undertaken by the ministry was the publishing of the National
Youth Policy, approved and launched by the government in July 2003. The
policy ought to be translated into projects, which can be undertaken by
NGOs and youth agencies. This well-intentioned initiative is
constrained, however, by a dearth of financial resources and of
well-trained people experienced in working with youth.
66.
Another programme to assist the youths of Sierra Leone was the National
Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR)
Programme. NCDDR was established in July 1998 to disarm and demobilise
combatants and to support their reintegration into society through the
learning of trade skills. Unfortunately, the poor state of the
country’s economy is hindering the translation of these skills into
means of sustaining a livelihood. In addition, many ex-combatants have
left their programmes inadequately trained.
The TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
67.
The Commission worked alongside an international criminal tribunal, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Special Court was tasked with
prosecuting those persons who bore the greatest responsibility for
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.
The Special Court impacted upon the work of the Commission. The
simultaneous operation of the two bodies brought into sharp focus their
different roles. It also highlighted the need for harmonisation and an
operational model designed to mitigate inherent tensions and avoid
potential pitfalls in future instances where a TRC and criminal court
work are supposed to work in tandem.
68. Most truth commissions
have operated as an alternative to criminal prosecution. Given the
pardon and amnesty provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Sierra
Leone TRC was proposed as a substitute for criminal justice in order to
establish accountability for the atrocities that had been committed
during the conflict. The creation of the Special Court stemmed from
President Kabbah’s request to the UN Security Council to establish a
special tribunal to bring prosecutions against members of the RUF and
its allies, following the hostage taking of hundreds of UN peacekeepers
and the resumption of violence in 2000.
69. The Special Court
was created, however, by abandoning certain amnesty provisions reached
at Lomé, on the basis that certain elements within the RUF had breached
the Lomé Peace Agreement. In the Commission’s view, the international
community has signalled to combatants in future wars that peace
agreements containing amnesty clauses ought not to be trusted and, in
so doing, has undermined the legitimacy of such national and regional
peace initiatives.
70. Although the relationship between the
Commission and the Special Court was mostly cordial, tensions arose
following the refusal of the Special Court to permit the Commission to
hold public hearings with the detainees held in its custody. The
President of the Appeals Chamber denied the hearings because of their
public character and because they would appear to mete out justice by
reaching findings of fact, which was, according to Judge Robertson, the
‘special duty’ of the Special Court. The decision rejected the right of
the detainees to testify in an open and transparent manner before the
TRC and denied the right of the Sierra Leonean people to see the
process of truth and reconciliation done in relation to the detainees.
The Commission disagrees with Judge Robertson’s conclusion and
considers that it does not sufficiently take into account the special
role and contribution of truth commissions in building accountability
and in the search for peace and reconciliation.
71. Operational
difficulties between the mechanisms arose out of their different
approaches to addressing impunity and because they also share many
objectives. Both institutions seek truth about a conflict, although in
different forms; both attempt to assign responsibilities for
atrocities; both work with similar bodies of law; both are aimed at
establishing peace and preventing future conflict. Where there is no
harmonisation of their objectives, a criminal justice body will have
largely punitive and retributive aims, whereas a truth and
reconciliation body will have largely restorative and healing
objectives. Where the two bodies operate simultaneously in an ad hoc
fashion, conflict between such objectives is likely and public
confusion is inevitable.
72. Harmonisation of objectives means
that each of the transitional institutions should not operate in a
manner that is incompatible with the aims and objectives of the other.
It requires the development of a framework, which allows the pursuit by
each body of its objectives in a manner that is respectful of the
other’s mandate and which ultimately leads to the same goals of
achieving justice and peace.
73. The Commission holds that the
right to the truth is inalienable. This right should be upheld in terms
of national and international law. It is the reaching of the wider
truth through broad-based participation that permits a nation to
examine itself honestly and to take effective measures to prevent a
repetition of the past.
Reconciliation
74.
The Commission recognises that the term reconciliation evolves from a
notion of restorative justice. A system based on restorative justice
focuses on restoring relations, as far as possible, between victims and
perpetrators and between perpetrators and the communities to which they
belong. Helping to restore relations between these various actors is a
long-term process that entails a number of measures. These measures
include accountability, acknowledgment, truth telling and reparations.
To be effective, reconciliation must occur at the national, community
and individual levels.
75. National reconciliation begins by
creating the conditions for an immediate cessation of the armed
conflict and the return of the country to peace. The state and other
stakeholders must then work towards the prevention of new conflict,
which is dependent on a number of factors: the improvement of the
socio-economic living conditions of the people; good governance; strong
and functional oversight institutions; and the implementation of a
reparations programme. The Commission believes the leadership of Sierra
Leone must make more of an effort to promote reconciliation at the
national level, particularly as national reconciliation is a long-term
project. The government must commit itself to the process of
reconciliation and it can do this by ensuring that the recommendations
made by the Commission are carried out.
76. Community
reconciliation entails restoring relations between the community and
the perpetrator. It is fostered by understanding and sharing
experiences and by creating the conditions for community acceptance of
the particular wrong or wrongs done. Like national reconciliation,
community reconciliation is a long-term project. The Commission noted
that some chiefs have been discredited for perpetrating violations and
many did not appear before the Commission. In order for community
reconciliation to foster, it is essential that chiefs commit themselves
to the process.
77. Individual reconciliation requires that the
victim and perpetrator meet. It is not imperative either for the victim
to forgive the perpetrator or for the perpetrator to express remorse.
78.
In attempting to restore relations between victims and perpetrators, as
well as between perpetrators and their communities, the Commission has
been guided by the mandate of the TRC. The mandate called upon the
Commission to base its reconciliation activities on the country’s own
culture, tradition, and values. For this reason, religious and other
traditional leaders were to be used as much as possible in the process.
The TRC was also mandated to use existing structures as much as
possible so as not to ‘reinvent the wheel’. Recognising the short
life-span of the Commission, provisions were made for the continuation
of reconciliation activities after the closure of the Secretariat. In
2003, District Reconciliation Committees were established in
partnership with the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone in order
to continue the Commission’s long-term activities on reconciliation.
79.
The Commission’s activities on reconciliation have been varied. They
have often begun with sensitisation activities, targeted at specific
groups of victims and perpetrators to encourage them to partake in
reconciliation activities. They have included reconciliation ceremonies
(bringing together victims and perpetrators or perpetrators with their
communities) and memorial ceremonies (naming victims who died during
the conflict and establishing monuments or memorials). Towards the end
of its operations, the Commission also organised a large-scale National
Reconciliation March (with participants from the various political
parties, the police, Army and war-affected groups) and a series of
workshops and consultations with civil society, involving discussion of
factors that help and impede reconciliation.
Reparations
80.
Section 15(2) of the TRC Act mandates the Commission to make
recommendations to help: 1) prevent repetition of the violations or
abuses suffered; 2) respond to the needs of the victims; and 3) promote
healing and reconciliation. To achieve these objectives, the Commission
recommended the implementation of a reparations programme for Sierra
Leone. The specific purpose of a reparations programme is to provide
redress to the victims of human rights violations. The needs of the
victims can be used to determine what benefits they should be accorded
in such a programme.
81. Reparations are the primary
responsibility of the government. The government must ensure the
implementation of a reparations programme. It is an accepted principle
of international law that states may be held liable for human rights
violations committed either by them or their agents. A violation of
international human rights law or international humanitarian law
imposes a duty on a state to afford adequate reparations. The state may
also be responsible in certain circumstances for providing reparations
for violations by non-state actors. In addition, the 1991 Constitution
of Sierra Leone mandates the provision of redress for the violation of
fundamental human rights.
82. In devising its recommendations on
reparations, the Commission took into account the resources available
to the state to ensure that its recommendations would be feasible. This
determination proved problematic given the inability of the Commission
to determine the potential universe of victims eligible for specific
benefits under its programme.
83. For a victim of the conflict
to be eligible for reparations, the Commission determined that the
event or injury in question had to have occurred between 23 March 1991
and 1 March 2002.
84. In determining the categories of
beneficiaries for the reparations programme, the Commission first
considered those victims who have become vulnerable as a result of
having suffered human rights violations. Subject to practical
limitations relating to state resources, the Commission recommends that
the following list of victims be considered beneficiaries of the
reparations programme: amputees and other war wounded, victims of
sexual violence, children and war widows. Each category should be
carefully defined to fit specific parameters and conditions. For
example, child beneficiaries should include those who, as a result of
the conflict, suffered physical injuries or psychological harm, were
abducted or forcibly conscripted, lost parents as a consequence of a
violation as described in the Report or were born out of sexual
violence and whose mother is single. In certain cases, the benefits of
particular reparations measures may also confer upon various categories
of ‘indirect beneficiaries’, such as wives and children of the eligible
victims.
85. In determining what reparations should be accorded
to victims, the Commission relied on the needs expressed by victims, as
well as on extensive research and consultations with a large number of
international organisations and NGOs with relevant experience. The
Commission’s recommended measures deal with the needs of victims in the
following areas: health; pensions; education; skills training and
micro-credit; community reparations; and symbolic reparations.
86.
The Government of Sierra Leone should carry out symbolic measures of
reparations that encompass the entire universe of victims of the
conflict.
87. The Commission proposes that the reparations
programme be co-ordinated by the National Commission for Social Action
(NaCSA), which would also serve as the implementing body for the
programme and be entrusted with administering the Special Fund for War
Victims. NaCSA should work closely with different ministries in
ensuring the decentralisation of reparations programmes. A dedicated
Advisory Committee should assist NaCSA in its task.
88. The
ability of reparations to foster reconciliation need not be
underscored. A reparations programme has the potential to assist those
victims whose lives have been most devastated to move beyond the
position they are currently in as a consequence of the conflict.
Providing victims with the assistance they urgently need also serves to
restore their dignity which, in turn, helps foster the conditions
necessary for reconciliation.
National Vision for Sierra Leone
89.
The Commission looked not only to the past but also to the future, in
order to describe the society that its recommendations were designed to
achieve. This strategy required the Commission to get a sense of the
expectations, hopes and aspirations of the people of Sierra Leone.
Instituted by the Commission as a complementary project to
reconciliation, the National Vision for Sierra Leone (National Vision)
invited the public to supply individual ‘visions’ for a future
‘roadmap’ for Sierra Leone.
90. The collection of ‘visions’
began in September 2003 with a call for contributions. During the
following two months hundreds of contributions poured in. Among the
contributors were men, women and children of all ages, reflecting a
wide variety of social and educational backgrounds. They included
ex-combatants, artists and artisans, teachers, students and prisoners.
The contributions included written and recorded essays, slogans, plays,
poems and songs; paintings, etchings and drawings; sculptures,
installations and a boat. Common themes included references to the
country’s violent past, justice, peace, unity and love.
91. The
contributions were displayed in the National Vision Exhibit, launched
in December 2003, and remained on display at the National Museum in
Freetown until May 2004. Over 400 people attended the launch and
several thousand have visited the Exhibit in various locations since.
92.
The National Vision has been praised by the Government of Sierra Leone,
receiving a personal endorsement from President Kabbah, who also
attended a televised tour of the Exhibit. It has also been endorsed and
praised by a variety of international figures, including Archbishop
Desmond Tutu of South Africa.
93. Through the National Vision,
Sierra Leoneans of all ages and backgrounds have claimed their own
civic space in the new Sierra Leone and made their contributions to the
country’s cultural and national heritage. The National Vision for
Sierra Leone uniquely and effectively complements Vision 2025. Vision
2025 is a government policy document that outlines implementing
strategies for the development of Sierra Leone over the next 21 years.
As the National Vision for Sierra Leone serves as a non-partisan,
intergenerational forum for dialogue, it raises awareness around the
existence of such dialogue and encourages individual Sierra Leoneans,
especially the youth, to participate in this dialogue. The National
Vision has great potential to serve as a vehicle for continuing popular
input into Vision 2025.
94. The Commission decided that the
momentum generated by the National Vision should be nurtured even after
the closure of the Commission. The Commission accordingly recommended
that the National Vision should become a permanent open, interactive
civic space for all stakeholders in Sierra Leone to engage in dialogue
through artistic and scholarly expression on political, moral and
social issues relating to the past, present and future.
95. The
National Vision for Sierra Leone must remain true to the founding
principles underlying the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. As such,
all future National Vision activities must serve the preservation of
peace, strive for unity and promote healing and reconciliation. In
order to achieve these objectives the National Vision must remain
independent and non-partisan.
96. The National Vision has
emphasised the significance of each individual contributor to Sierra
Leone. The work of building a new and better Sierra Leone belongs to
every stakeholder in Sierra Leone. The individuals who have lent their
hopes and dreams for Sierra Leone are vehicles for change.
Conclusion
97.
Building a lasting peace in Sierra Leone can only begin with a
comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the country’s past. The
past holds many lessons that will aid in forging a politically and
economically healthy Sierra Leone. Knowledge and understanding are the
most powerful deterrents to the recurrence of conflict as Sierra Leone
strives to give meaning to the sentiments of ‘never again’. In closing,
therefore, the Commission reiterates its call to readers to take the
time to study and widely discuss with others as many of the other
volumes and chapters of the Report as possible.
© 2002 - 2007, Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission
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